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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores the potential and role of the Internet-based media in the
Kyrgyz Republic’s political processes after the 2005 March Revolution. It uses a model of
interaction between the government and citizens through various types of realities: the
reality constructed and imposed by the state-controlled media, the reality created by
alternative, independent sources of information online, and the realities experienced by
citizens in their daily lives. The model pulled together various theories from political
science, sociology, psychology, and mass communication and focused on the exit-voiceloyalty options available for the citizens in response to governance practices.
The research project uses a mix of qualitative and quantitative research methods.
The results of content analysis have shown that in coverage of the 2007 Constitutional
Referendum, independent Internet-based media indeed constructed a reality alternative
to the official propaganda imposed by state media and were more critical of the
government in terms of good governance practices than the state media. Further, the
results of surveys and focus groups provide the evidence that Internet-based media play
a significant role in shaping perceptions of good governance among politically
interested Internet-based media users toward more negative evaluations of and higher
levels of frustration with the government performance. Finally, the Internet media use
is associated with the higher levels of intent to leave the country (i.e., exercise the exit
option) among the research participants with low political interest.
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation project was designed to explore the role of new media in forming
citizens’ perceptions of good governance in a post-Soviet republic of Kyrgyzstan, where
a “color” revolution took place in 2005, following the 2003 Orange Revolution in the
Ukraine and 2004 Rose Revolution in Georgia. Grounded in the theories of democratic
transition and consolidation, as well as in the ongoing debate on the Internet’s role in
democratization, the research focuses on how the traditional and online media construct
realities for citizens and attempt to shape their perceptions on the one hand and how the
citizens process the media-constructed realities and create their own understanding of
good governance on the other.
The question of how these perceptions drive citizens’ views of their government’s
performance and their own role and future in the country is the central focus of the
study. In addition, the project explores whether those who are more knowledgeable
about politics thanks to their access to Internet-based media and participation in on-line
discussions share the information with those who have no Internet access, i.e. whether
they perform the role of opinion leaders.
Using a mix of qualitative and quantitative research methods, such as content
analysis, face-to-face and online surveys, observation of Internet users, and focus groups
with both the users and non-users of Internet, the research attempts to answer a set of
questions probing the perceptions of governance and how they relate to the
participants’ political knowledge, beliefs and media use patterns.
This research project is designed to produce results that will provide evidence for
one of the opposing views of the Internet as a medium facilitating or impeding
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formation of the public sphere and democratization following the collapse of a semiauthoritarian regime.
According to the first view, the Internet has an advantage over traditional media as
a more democratic and open medium with unrestricted, uncensored information.
Therefore, those on-line media users who are interested in politics will be more aware of
good governance characteristics and will be more critical in assessing their
governments’ performance than the traditional media users. If such users choose to
voice their concerns and share their views with others who have no Internet access, they
can become influential opinion leaders in both the online and off-line world.
Supporters of the opposing view believe that the Internet is an elite medium
widening the digital divide and impeding the democratic processes through
fragmentation of audiences and users’ exclusion from the political debate in favor of
non-political activities. This view is widely spread and actively discussed in
established, mature democracies where the information in the traditional media is free
from the government’s direct control and multiplicity of sources provide wider choices
for the media users.
In contrast, the governments in transitional countries such as Kyrgyzstan still
control most of the traditional media, and in particular widely accessible television
channels. Under such restrictions, the Internet users interested in politics and public
affairs will be more knowledgeable in politics than the traditional media users almost by
definition, simply by the virtue of having access to alternative information sources not
controlled by the government.
This logical assumption serves as a key hypothesis for this project prompting other
relationships between the perceptions of government practices and performance,
various realities and options available for key players – the government and the citizens.
2

The theoretical model developed specifically for this project and presented in Figure 2.2
(see Chapter 2) synthesizes various theories and perspectives from political science,
psychology, sociology, and mass communication.
In essence, the model illustrates that in a fragile and weak democracy, the
government projects and constructs the reality through the state media with the goal of
maintaining a certain level of citizens’ loyalty and support for the government, at least
so that the citizens do not protest against the government and demand its resignation.
On the other hand, citizens live daily in their own experienced reality, which is much
worse than what the government tries to convince them it is.
If the gap between the two realities is wide, the citizens develop a certain level of
frustration with the government that would translate into one of two options. The first
one is that including an attempt to change the situation by expressing their frustration
through the means available to them, such as voting, active involvement in political
organizations, especially opposing the government, and participation in protests and
demonstrations against the government (the voice option). The second option involves
searching for a better life elsewhere, i.e. to leave the country either temporarily or
permanently (the exit option).
This project looks at both how the reality is constructed through various types of
media and how the citizens’ experienced reality connects or disconnects with the
options available for them. The project consists of two distinct parts of analysis. The
first part, presented in Chapter 1, is aimed at understanding how various types of
media, in particular state and independent and print and online, construct the reality for
the citizens, i.e. this is the analysis focused on the sender’s end. The main theoretical
foundation of the content analysis is the framing theory. It allows for establishing that
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through selection of various frames different types of media indeed construct realities so
vastly different that they seem like perfect mirrors of each other.
The second part of the analysis is focused on the receiving end – citizens – and
attempts to tap into their experienced reality, evaluations of government performance
and options available for them to change the reality. This part is presented in Chapter 2.
It is based on the theoretical model presented in Figure 2.2, briefly described above and
elaborated upon in Section 2.2.5. As for the methods, this part of analysis uses
observations, surveys of traditional media users and Internet users, and focus groups
with both traditional media users and Internet-based media users. The results of this
part of analysis show that the frustration with the government is indeed so high that the
citizens are considering the options of exit more and more, less of the voice, and almost
never loyalty, which is expressed in low evaluations of government performance.
Finally, the Conclusions chapter brings everything together in the light of the
theoretical model of the Government-Citizen interaction and options and presents some
policy implications and recommendations.
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CHAPTER 1. FRAMING A GOOD GOVERNANCE ISSUE:
COVERAGE OF 2007 CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM BY
KYRGYZSTAN’S PRINT AND INTERNET-BASED MEDIA
1.1 Background
On Sept. 19, 2007 the Kyrgyz Republic’s President Kurmanbek Bakiev announced a
decree scheduling a national referendum for Oct. 21, 2007. The Referendum was to reject
or approve two major pieces of legislation – a new Constitution draft and the Election
Code. The decision did not come completely unexpected because several days earlier,
on September 14, the Constitutional Court had ruled void the previous Constitution
versions adopted by the Parliament in October and November 2006 since they had not
been subject to the Constitutional Court evaluation. Still, many a president’s critic
accused him of rushing the events and “declaring the Referendum on his own people
like a war.”1
The opponents formulated five main reasons against the Referendum as a means to
approve the proposed legislation. The first reason was that since the Referendum format
allowed no article-by-article voting on each proposed draft, it could only be used to
approve the major changes in principle but not to introduce such complicated and
sophisticated legislation as the Constitution and Election Code in their entirety. Second,
the critics argued, the documents had not been discussed broadly earlier and one month
was not enough for the citizens to study and evaluate them meaningfully. Third, for the
citizens to make an informed and intelligent decision, the drafts should be broadly and
publicly discussed in comparison with not only the current legislation but also
alternative and more progressive drafts, which would be impossible to do in the media

1

Avdeeva, E. (Sept. 21, 2007). ‘Hello to the Bakievs, or give me the Constitution I will vote for!’ Bely Parohod.
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environment largely controlled by the state and pro-presidential circles. Fourth, the
referendum as a means for approving major legislative changes had been discredited by
the previous president, Askar Akaev, and allowed too much room for manipulation and
vote rigging. Finally, the fifth and most important reason was that the Constitution
draft submitted to the Referendum effectively expanded the president’s authority even
beyond the 2003 “Akaev” Constitution, which had been often cited as one of the reasons
for the 2005 “Tulip Revolution” (for the timeline of main events, see Appendix A).
The president’s proponents, however, dismissed these arguments by formulating
counter arguments aggressively promoted in the state media. First, they maintained,
the Referendum was the best way for the people to express their will directly and thus
legitimize the drafts by giving them the vote of confidence; in addition, the Referendum
was only to approve the drafts in principle and later they would be evaluated and
amended as needed. Second, the presidents’ supporters responded to the argument that
there was not enough time for the citizens to make a decision, the constitutional reform
had been discussed so much and so many drafts had been debated that any citizen now
was an expert in constitutional matters, therefore one month would be more than
enough to make up one’s mind. Third, the legislative drafts will be published in all
media and the media will be expected to provide space and opportunities for discussing
them. Fourth, no administrative resource will be used to force people to vote or to rig
the referendum results, and both domestic and international observers will make sure
that the referendum is conducted honestly and transparently.
As for the main claim that the new Constitution draft expanded the presidential
powers and could lead the country to enforcement of authoritarianism, the president’s
political consultants counter argued that the amendments were not about consolidating
the power but about taking ultimate and sole responsibility for the reforms, as well as
6

about better control over the various levels of the executive branch of power, especially
the local government.
These two interpretations of the presidential initiative so crucial for the country’s
life illustrate two opposing approaches to good governance – one based on the true
democratic participation and conscious expression of will by the people and the other
based on the leader’s duty to take responsibility, single-mindedly make the decision for
the entire nation and hone support for it by various means, including skilful and subtle
manipulation of the public conscious.
In the country where most of the traditional print and electronic media are
controlled by the state either directly or through partial ownership, the first view is
underrepresented in the public domain. It should find a better venue for expression and
discussion in the Internet-based media, which are largely open and independent of the
state. The goal of this project is to test this theoretical assumption. Using both
quantitative and qualitative content analysis of stories published on the Referendum
and relating events, this part of the research project tests whether there are significant
differences between Kyrgyz print and Internet media in covering such a crucial good
governance issue as a referendum.

1.2 Literature Review
Since the goal of this chapter is to see how the print and Internet-based media
framed the coverage of the referendum and surrounding events, a brief overview of the
framing theory is necessary to set up the theoretical context.
Perhaps the first scientific framing analysis in the history of mass communication
was the 1920 Lippmann and Merz’s pioneering analysis of how The New York Times
covered the 1917 Russian Revolution and subsequent events up to the spring of 1920.
“The chief censor and the chief propagandist,” Lippmann and Merz argued, “were hope
7

and fear in the minds of reporters and editors” (p.3) that framed the coverage. This
hope and fear drove the newspaper staff to omit undesirable information and to rely on
the opinions of government officials, self-proclaimed experts, and even anonymous
sources clearly biased against the revolution and for the Bolsheviks’ defeat. In addition,
dependence on untrustworthy journalists whose “sympathies are too deeply engaged,”
inadequate preparation of correspondents and the breach of “the time honored tradition
of protecting news against editorials” (pp.41-42) misleadingly presented opinions as
facts and violated the core professional standards. Thus, Lippmann and Merz conclude,
the New York Time’s coverage of the Russian Revolution uncovered serious problems
in journalism as it was practiced at the time:
…the professional standards of journalism are not high enough, and the
discipline by which standards are maintained not strong enough, to carry the
press triumphantly through a test so severe as that provided by the Russian
Revolution. (p.42)
In relation to Kyrgyzstan, a former Soviet republic with a lingering influence of
Soviet journalism, it is useful to keep Lippmann and Merz’s study as a reference point
because even though journalists today have better skills and means for fact-checking,
they still have trouble setting aside their individual preferences, hopes and fears,
especially in the media environment like Kyrgyzstan’s, where the standards of balanced
and unbiased journalism are taking root slowly and opinion journalism still prevails.
Lippmann and Merz’s study made a lasting contribution to the inquiry about
international political communication (Hardt, 2002), but it will have been half a century
before communication scholars returned to the issue of news framing. Goffman (1974),
who is often cited as a framing research originator, was first to conceptualize a frame as
the device helping humans to construct and comprehend reality, to “locate, perceive,
identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its
8

limits” (p.21). Many of the later definitions and research on news frames are based on
this sociological approach to news as knowledge and focus on the frames as instruments
for the newsmakers to present the knowledge to the publics.
Tuchman (1978) talks of the news as “a window on the world” whose delineating
frame may distort reality through selection of the view, its angle, distance from the
window, the surrounding background, and other factors associated with the viewer
such as ability to pay attention to fine detail, recognize connections between the
elements, perceive the picture as a whole, etc. (p.1). Clearly, the one who looks out the
window (newsmaker) may distort the reality for those whom he/she describes the view
to. Gitlin (1980), whose definition of frames is considered to be one of the best and is
widely cited in the framing literature, is more specific about how the newsmakers utilize
frames to organize the reality:
Media frames are persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and
presentation, of selection, emphasis and inclusion, by which symbol handlers
routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual. (p.7)
Reese (2002) echoes Gitlin’s definition looking at the frames as “organizing principles
that are socially shared and persistent over time that work symbolically to meaningfully
structure the social world” (p.11, emphasis original). In a similar way, Entman (2004)
defines framing as “selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and
making connections among them so as to promote a particular evaluation,
interpretation, and/or solution” (p.5). He also adds a functional dimension to frames
stating that frames perform “at least two of the following basic functions in covering
political events, issues and actors: (1) defining effects or conditions as problematic; (2)
identifying causes; (3) conveying a moral judgment; and (4) endorsing remedies of
improvements” (p.5). Finally, one of the most recent attempts to synthesize the framing
9

research and approaches produced a definition that is useful for this study as it relates
to the issues of good governance: “Media frames are pervasive, durable sociocultural
and professionally shaped constructs that convey ethnocentric, nationalistic elite views
and largely reinforce the status quo” (Ross & Bantimaroudis, 2006, p.87).
The last conceptualization of framing is particularly useful for this study as it will
explore how the print media controlled by the state, i.e. by definition media reinforcing
the status quo and the official viewpoint, tried to make sense of an important political
event crucial for the country’s future. These media’s influence on the general public is
significant as the independent print papers have limited readerships and the online
independent media are accessible only to 10-13 per cent of people with Internet access.
For the purposes of this chapter, the newspapers and news agencies in Kyrgyzstan
are categorized into print and online by the mode of production and availability for the
readers, as well as into state-controlled, conformist, independent and foreign in terms of
the amount of control the government is able to exert upon them. In relation to how the
different types of media sources evaluate the referendum and government in general,
the following model is at work:

Evaluation of Referendum:
negative-positive

Evaluation of Government:
negative-positive

Source type: online-print,
state-independent
Figure 1.2.1. Source Type and Evaluations of Referendum and Government

As the model shows, the source type predetermines whether the Referendum will
be evaluated as a negative or positive event. Logically, a state-controlled newspaper
10

will not evaluate the referendum, which is a state initiative, as a negative event, while
independent media have more freedom to give their critical evaluations. The onlineprint mode of production plays a role here inasmuch as it roughly falls on the stateindependent division: most of the truly independent media in Kyrgyzstan are forced
into the online world because the state controls the real world media market. If
independent papers are published, they try to stay away from politics and government
(like newspaper Delo # that covers crime) or have very small circulation (like newspaper
Bely Parohod with 3,000 printed copies), so they do not have a lot of impact in the real
world, and the state-controlled and conformist newspapers will skew the reality for the
majority of citizens who have no Internet access.
Further, the evaluation of the Referendum determines the overall evaluation of
government, which is always based on the material of the story relating to referendum.
Basically, when the newspapers evaluate the government, i.e. try to put the Referendum
into a bigger picture of democracy and a better governance system, it is inevitable that
this evaluation is driven by the Referendum evaluation. Thus, the source type will
affect the overall evaluation of the government as well, both directly and indirectly.
It may be argued that the overall evaluation of the government should in its turn
drive the evaluation of the Referendum. However, the source ownership a priori
defines the government evaluation: it is difficult to imagine that a state-controlled
newspaper would go against a government initiative without severe consequences for
the editor and journalists (this relationship is represented by a dotted line in Figure
1.2.1). Given this caveat, the relationship will not be tested in the analysis. The focus
will be placed on how the media evaluate the Referendum and the government in a
broader context, but still shaped by the Referendum and surrounding events.

11

Based on the view of the Internet media as contributors to democratic processes
and development of the public sphere under the conditions where the traditional media
are controlled by the state, the following three hypotheses were formulated to test the
differences between the state print and independent online media coverage of the
referendum:
Hypothesis 1: Compared to state print media, independent Internet-based media
will be more critical and negative in their evaluation of (a) Constitutional
Court/ Referendum decision and (b) the overall evaluation of the government
actions in terms of good governance.
Hypothesis 2: When reporting the referendum results, the independent and
Internet-based media will (a) report lower turnout rates, (b) mention the
violations, and (c) refer to the use of administrative resource more frequently
than the print and state-controlled media.
Hypothesis 3: In predicting future events, the independent online media will be
more pessimistic about possible developments than the state print media.
In addition, two research questions were formulated to explore the professional
standards of original material in reporting, as well as qualitative frames that the media
used to give detail and analysis of the political and public events surrounding the
referendum:
Research Question 1: Will there be any differences between the print and Internetbased media in terms of originality of the material they tend to use to cover such
a complicated and politically sensitive issue?
Research Question 2: What frames are used to make sense of the events in terms of
their meaning for the key political players – (a) the president, (b) the parliament,
and (c) the people as carriers of democracy?
12

1.3 Method and Procedures
This part of the research project uses both qualitative and quantitative content
analysis of all stories obtained from the print and Internet-based sources in Kyrgyzstan
covering the Referendum and relating events. The sample period starts on September
14, when the Constitutional Court made its decision invalidating the December 2006
Constitution, and ends on October 31, after the Parliament was dissolved, the
Government resigned and the coverage of the Referendum-related events diminished.
1.3.1 Sampling Procedure
In the first week after the Presidential decree on the Referendum was published, all
printed newspapers available in the newspaper stands, both current and back issues,
were perused for any stories relating to the Constitutional Court decision and the
Referendum. Since most print papers have online versions, starting from the second
week the stories were downloaded immediately after their publication on the websites.
This comprehensive search produced 286 stories. After a closer examination,
stories shorter than 200 words were excluded because they did not contain any
evaluations beyond brief factual reporting of events. Such stories came mostly from the
news agencies – independent 24.kg and state agency Kabar, only analytical stories from
which were included into the sample. Further, reprints of numerous political addresses
and statements in support of the Referendum made by various pro-presidential political
parties and organizations that did not include any commentary or analysis by the source
staff were excluded as well. This data collection method produced a total of 212 stories
for analysis (see Table 1.3.1).
As the table shows, the largest number of stories from a single source is from the
state paper Slovo Kyrgyzstana, followed by a conformist print newspaper MSN. BPC has
the largest number of stories among independent online sources (24), followed by 24.kg
13

with 21 stories. Analytical websites Fergana.ru and Centrasia.ru also provided a
considerable number of stories, while other sources published 1-12 stories each.
Table 1.3.1. Summary of Sources and Published Stories
#

Source Title

Source Description

Source URL

# of
stories

1.

24.kg

Online independent news agency

www.24.kg

21

2.

AKI-Press

Agency for Commercial Information, online
business-oriented news agency

www.akipress.com

11

3.

Bely Parohod2

Independent online newspaper with a printed
version

www.parohod.kg

12

4.

Bishkek Press
Club

Independent online news portal for and by
journalists comparable to a news agency

www.bpc.kg

24

5.

Centrasia.ru

Non-governmental analytical Russian Internet
portal covering events in former Soviet Union
countries

www.centrasia.ru

15

6.

Delo #

Independent print newspaper focusing on crime
and public safety issues

delo.ktnet.kg/inde
x.shtml

12

7.

Fergana.ru

Moscow-based analytical portal covering Fergana
valley (areas of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan around Fergana city)

www.ferghana.ru

17

8.

IWPR

London-based news and analysis portal of Institute
for War and Peace Reporting

www.iwpr.net

4

9.

Kabar

State online news agency

www.kabar.kg

5

10.

Kommersant

Russian top-quality financial daily newspaper of
record

http://www.kom
mersant.ru

5

11.

Megapolis

Print Bishkek city business newspaper

12.

Moskovsky
Komsomolets v
Kyrgyzstane

Russian print tabloid with a special section for
Kyrgyzstan produced by local staff independent of
the Moscow office

www.mk.kg

2

13.

MSN

“Moya Stolitsa Novosti” - Bishkek City capital area
print newspaper

www.msn.kg

27

14.

Pr.kg

Independent online newspaper with frequently
updated news service similar to a news agency

www.pr.kg

9

15.

Obschestveny
Raiting

Independent print newspaper affiliated with pr.kg

16.

Slovo
Kyrgyzstana

Official government print newspaper with national
coverage

www.sk.kg

34

17.

Tazar.kg

Independent analytical website

www.tazar.kg

6

1

7

Total:

2

As of March 11, 2008 the paper comes out under the new name Bely Parus (www.parus.kg).
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1.3.2 Coding and Analysis Procedures
A group of 22 AUCA mass communication students assisted in coding the stories
using the coding sheets presented in Appendix B. They coded a total of 42 (20 per cent)
of the sample stories, which I also coded for inter-coder reliability test. The inter-coder
reliability coefficient for the quantified items was .82, while the agreement on qualitative
frames was roughly estimated to be at 75 per cent, i.e. for most stories, two coders
similarly identified at least three out of the four frames (items 3-6 in Coding Sheet 1).
After the coding, the quantified items were run through descriptive statistics
(frequencies and cross-tabulations). To test Hypotheses 1, 3 and Research Question 1,
ordered logistic regressions were used. Linear regressions were run to test Hypothesis 2
for the subsample of 72 stories covering the referendum results.
For the qualitative frames analysis (Research Question 2), all identified frames
were grouped into larger thematic clusters, characterized as either “negative” (mostly
used by independent sources) or “positive” (mostly used by pro-government sources),
and compared for frequency of appearance and dominance.
1.3.3 Sample Characteristics
Figure 1.3.1 below presents the distribution of stories by dates and source type –
online or print. As it shows, the three highest spikes in the figure are around three
dates: 1) September 19, when the Referendum was announced, 2) September 25, when
several parties formed the movement “For Constitution, Reform, and Development”
that became later the foundation for the pro-presidential party ‘Ak-Jol’, and 3) October
20-24, when the Referendum results became known.
During the entire period on the sample, online sources published 112 stories (53%),
while print sources – 100 (47%), so the sample is split roughly equally between the
online and print stories.
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Figure 1.3.1. Distribution of Stories by Date and Source Type
Further, the online sources were divided into groups based on the potential for
their material to “spill over” into the off-line world. In this sense, Internet newspaper
such as Bely Parohod has the largest potential equal to any other print paper because it
has its own print version (albeit with a small circulation of 3,000), the news agencies are
in the middle because their materials are picked up by both online and print sources,
and analytical websites have the lowest potential because they are usually read only by
experts and “political junkies” with regular Internet access.
All the sources were also categorized into four groups based on independence
from the government: 1) state sources, such as official government newspaper Slovo
Kyrgyzstana and news agency Kabar directly controlled by the government; 2) conformist
sources controlled by the state through either partial ownership or an unofficial
agreement, such as MSN newspaper; 3) independent sources that publish materials
critical of the government, such as news agency 24.kg, newspapers Obschestvenny
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Raiting, Delo #, and Bely Parohod, and analytical websites BPC and Tazar.kg; and 4)
foreign independent sources, such as Russian newspaper Kommersant and analytical
website Centrasia.ru. Newspaper MK-KG and analytical websites Fergana.ru and IWPR,
although affiliated with foreign organizations, were categorized as independent local
sources because they have desks in Bishkek run by the local staff and are quite
independent in their editorial decisions. The distribution of stories in the sample by
source independence and off-line impact potential is presented in Table 1.3.2, which also
shows the variables’ coding schemes in brackets.
As the table shows, stories from print newspapers represent all types of source
independence, as well as stories from independent sources represent all types of off-line
impact potential. There are no stories from analytical websites and online papers in the
state and conformist categories of source independence. This may be at least partly
explained by the fact that the government does not create online media because it is not
particularly concerned about the impact on the Internet readership comprising only
about 10-15% of the total population. It also indirectly confirms that the Internet is a
more open and independent space.
Table 1.3.2. Off-line Impact Potential by Source Independence
Source Independence
Off-line Impact Potential
(1) Print newspaper

State
(1)

Conformist
(2)

Independent
(3)

Foreign
(4)

Total

34

27

22

5

88

(2) Print version of online
newspaper

0

0

12

0

12

(3) News agency

5

11

21

0

37

(4) Online paper

0

0

9

0

9

(5) Analytical website

0

0

51

15

66

39

38

115

20

212

Total

17

The largest number of stories come from independent analytical websites (51, or 24
percent of the sample) and print state newspaper (34, or 16 percent). The sample is also
roughly equally split between the stories from print (100, or 47 percent) and online (112,
or 53 percent) sources, while on the independence dimension the stories from
independent local sources represent about 54 percent (115 stories) compared to 36
percent (77 stories) from non-independent local sources.
In summary, the three variables serving as “demographics” of the sample – story
categorization by print/online mode of production, off-line impact potential, and source
independence from the government control – show that the sample reflects the existing
diversity in Kyrgyzstan’s newspaper market quite well and represents the range of
media reporting, opinions and analyses available for the country’s readers. The next
section presents the key results and findings on how these media sources covered the
events in terms of good governance.

1.4 Results and Discussion
1.4.1 Quantitative Content Analysis
Hypothesis 1 was formulated to test whether the print and online media differ in
how critically they evaluate the Constitutional Court decision, the referendum initiative,
and relating government actions in terms of good governance. Table 1.4.1 presents the
results of the ordered logistic regression for evaluation of the Constitutional Court/
Referendum decision (coded as 1=negative, 2=neutral, 3=positive) by source online/
print type (coded 0=print, 1=online) and independence from the state. For all variables
and their coding schemes, see Appendix D.
As the table shows, the source being print rather than online has only a marginally
significant positive association with the government action evaluation. However, the
source independence is a better predictor: in comparison to the foreign sources that are
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serving as a base category here3, as the source moves to state-controlled, the expected
ordered log odds increases by 2.533 as the evaluation decision moves from negative to
neutral to positive. Thus, in comparison to foreign sources, the state-controlled and
conformist sources are more likely to evaluate the government decisions positively.
Table 1.4.1. Evaluation of Constitutional Court/Referendum Decision
Independent (location) variables

Estimate

St. Error

Wald

State-controlled sources

2.533***

.612

17.133

“Conformist” sources

1.508**

.558

7.293

Independent sources

-.188

.461

.684

Print source

.556

.308

.071

(Threshold 1)

-.556

.437

1.619

(Threshold 2)

1.790*

.461

Model summary
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

3.261
2

N = 212, Cox & Snell Pseudo R = .292, Χ2 = 73.273***

Likewise, the “conformist” sources have a significant positive effect on the decision
evaluation. The independent sources have the hypothesized negative association, but
their influence is not statistically significant. Thus, the sample provides partial support
to Hypothesis 1(a), suggesting that source independence is a better predictor of how
negatively or positively the government decision is evaluated than the source being
online or print.
Hypothesis 1(b) is tested using the same two demographic characteristics of the
sample – source independence and print/online nature. However, since a large part of
the overall evaluation of the government actions (coded from 1 – strongly negative to 5 –
strongly positive) includes evaluation of the Constitutional Court/Referendum decision,
it is also included into the model as an independent variable.
3

I have also run ordered logistic regression models where the state-controlled sources were taken as a reference
category, but they did not perform as well as the models with the foreign sources as the base.
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Table 1.4.2. Evaluation of Government Actions in Terms of Good Governance
Independent (location) variables

Estimate

St. Error

Wald

State-controlled sources

3.108***

.659

22.228

“Conformist” sources

2.140***

.604

12.561

Independent sources

.909*

.490

4.537

Print source

-.507*

.318

3.232

CC/Referendum negative evaluation

-5.585***

.563

98.284

CC/Referendum neutral evaluation

-3.208***

.456

49.421

(Threshold 1)

-3.848***

.660

33.977

(Threshold 2)

-2.270***

.653

12.069

(Threshold 3)

-.831

.638

1.692

(Threshold 4)

1.025*

.595

2.969

Model summary

N = 212, Cox & Snell Pseudo R2 = .652,
Χ2 = 223.711***

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

As the results presented in Table 1.4.2 for one-tailed test show, the source being
print or online effects the overall evaluation of the government action in the expected
direction: as the source moves to the online type, the expected ordered log odds
increases by -.507 for every category of evaluation, i.e. becomes more negative. The
source independence also has a significant positive effect for all types of sources,
suggesting that their overall evaluation of government actions is likely to be more
positive than that of the foreign sources that serve as a base category in the model.
The strongest predictor is the evaluation of the Constitutional Court/Referendum
decision, and this relationship is in the expected direction: negative and neutral
evaluations of these decisions greatly increase the likelihood of the overall negative
evaluation of the government actions discussed in the story.
Thus, both ordered logistic regression analyses presented in Tables 1.4.1 and 1.4.2
provide sufficient support for Hypothesis 1, suggesting that independence from
government control is a strong predictor of how critically the source will cover the
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government actions. Characterization of sources in terms of whether they are online or
print has a significant effect on the overall evaluation of the government actions.
Hypothesis 2 was tested with OLS regressions on the subsample of stories
published on and after October 21, when the referendum results became available,
which includes 72 stories. In Hypothesis 2(a), the dependent variable is the reported
turnout rate, coded as 1=the officially reported rate, 0=lower rate (see Table 1.4.3). Of
the 72 subsample stories, about a half (35 stories) mentioned the turnout rate, and of
those, 26 stories stated or suggested that the turnout rate was much lower than what the
Central Elections Committee announced officially, i.e. 82 per cent of the population
showing up at the polling stations.
Table 1.4.3. Reporting of Turnout Rates
Independent variables

B

St. Error

t

Off-line impact potential

.029

.033

.870

Source type: online-print

-.044

.105

-.422

Source independence from state control

-.107**

.038

-2.852

Overall evaluation of government actions

.147***

.015

9.935

.142

.392

(Constant)
Model summary
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

.056
2

N = 35, R = .908, F = 73.604***

Table 1.4.3 shows that the reporting turnout rate is strongly predicted by the
overall evaluation of the government actions and independence of the source from state
control. Both variables’ impact is in the expected direction, as turnout rate is coded
reversely: as the source becomes more independent, the turnout rate moves away from
the officially reported data by .107 units. At the same time, as the overall evaluation of
the government actions moves from negative to positive by 1 unit, the turnout rate
increases toward the officially reported data by .147 units. Neither the story source type
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on the online/print dimension nor the off-line impact potential play a significant role in
determining how the turnout rate is reported.
Proceeding to Hypothesis 2(b), 42 of the 72 stories in the subsample discussed the
violations and irregularities during the Referendum. Among them, 18 reported the
official data that the violations were insignificant and did not influence the referendum
outcome, and 24 reported the violations observed during the referendum either by their
own staff (2 stories) or documented by NGOs and independent observers (22 stories).
Table 1.4.4 reports the results of OLS regression analysis for this dependent variable,
coded as 0=no violations reported, 1=violations and irregularities reported.
Table 1.4.4. Reporting of Violations During the Referendum
Independent variables

B

St. Error

t

Off-line impact potential

-.034

.099

-.349

Source type: online-print

.085

.321

.264

Source independence from state control

.154

.129

1.190

Overall evaluation of government actions

-.096*

.041

-2.366

.416

1.408

(Constant)
Model summary

.585
2

N = 42, R = .351, F = 5.009**

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

In this model, only one of the independent variables – overall evaluation of the
government actions – is a significant predictor of whether the violations were reported
or not. The relationship is also in the expected direction: as the overall evaluation of
government actions moves from negative to positive by one unit, the reporting of
violations decreases by .096 units.
As for the types of violations reported, 18 stories mentioned multiple voting by the
same people, usually transported from one polling station to another by the local
government bodies, mass stuffing of ballots by one person, usually a local government
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representative in the precinct election commission; 10 stories mentioned abuse of the
migrant voters (citizens of Kyrgyzstan who work in Russia and Kazakhstan) as well as
pressure on those who work or study in government offices and institutions; and 12
stories mentioned threats to and obstructions for the work of independent observers.
As for the reporting of the use of administrative resource (Hypothesis 2(c)), a total
of 30 stories reported that it was used in one degree or another. Various types of
reported administrative resource violation varied from the poor voter lists with
numerous “dead souls” whose vote was easily manipulated, to interference by the
precinct election commission chairs, transportation of voters to the polling stations, and
irregularities in counting results.
Table 1.4.5 presents the results from an OLS regression model where reporting of
the use of administrative resource is a dependent variable, coded 0=no administrative
resource use reported, 1=reported.
Table 1.4.5. Reporting of Use of Administrative Resource During the Referendum
Independent variables

B

St. Error

t

Off-line impact potential

-.202**

.068

-2.983

Source type: online-print

.723**

.228

3.175

Source independence from state control

.037

.077

.480

Overall evaluation of government actions

-.107***

.077

-4.263

.252

3.431

(Constant)
Model summary

.866***
2

N = 72, R = .377, F = 10.136***

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

As the results show, in this regression model only one independent variable has no
significant impact – independence of the source from the state control. All the other
variables are significant and in the expected direction: as the source becomes online and
its off-line impact potential decreases, the reporting of the use of administrative resource
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increases by .723 and .202 units respectively. In addition, as the story’s overall
evaluation of the government’s actions moves from negative to positive by one unit, its
reporting of the use of administrative resource decreases by .107 units.
Thus, from all three regression models above it may be concluded that Hypothesis
2 is supported partially: a) source independence from government control is a better
predictor for reporting lower turnout rates than whether the source is print or Internetbased as it was hypothesized; b) overall evaluation of the government action predicts
whether the source reported the violations during the Referendum better than any
“demographic” variable of the subsample; and c) as it was hypothesized, online media
indeed reported use of administrative resource more often than print media, but two
other variables – offline impact potential and overall evaluation of the government
actions are strong predictors of reporting administrative resource as well.
Hypothesis 3 was formulated to see if there are differences in how the state print
sources and independent Internet-based sources predict the future events and evaluate
possible developments. Of the 212 stories in the sample, 124 made some kind of
prediction as to how the events will develop in the future, and of them 59 (47.6 per cent)
stories took the pessimistic tone, 26 – neutral, and 39 (31.5 per cent) – optimistic.
The results for the ordered logistic regression analysis for the evaluation of possible
developments as pessimistic (coded 1), neutral (2) or optimistic (3) by source types are
presented in Table 1.4.6. As the results in Model 1 show, independence of the source
matters in presenting the future scenarios as pessimistic or optimistic. The state and
conformist sources have an expected positive association with the evaluation of possible
developments: as the source becomes state or conformist, the odds log ratio of the
prediction becomes more optimistic compared to foreign sources, which serve as a base
category in this model.
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Even though the print or Internet-based character of the source does not have a
significant effect, it is also in the expected direction. Besides, for the purpose of this
project the first finding, i.e. the state and conformist sources producing more optimistic
predictions, is more important as these sources have more influence due to their
outreach capacity in the real world.
Table 1.4.6. Evaluation of Possible Developments as Optimistic or Pessimistic
Independent (location)
variables

Model 1
Estimate

SE

Model 2
Wald

Estimate

SE

Wald

State-controlled sources

2.509**

.792

10.024

-.079

.947

.007

“Conformist” sources

1.597*

.729

4.806

-1.021

.964

1.122

Independent sources

.057

.500

.013

-.757

.580

1.701

-.166

.384

.186

.082

.487

.029

Strongly negative evaluation of
government actions

-5.022***

.813

38.181

Negative evaluation of
government actions

-3.112***

.745

17.439

Neutral evaluation of
government actions

-2.360**

.762

9.602

Positive evaluation of
government actions

-1.234^

.708

3.041

Print source

(Threshold 1)

.268

.461

.339

-3.551***

.874

16.504

(Threshold 2)

1.299**

.478

7.390

-1.985*

.818

5.890

Model summary

N = 124, Cox & Snell Pseudo
R2 = .167, Χ2 = 22.663***
^p<.10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

N = 124, Cox & Snell Pseudo
R2 = .473, Χ2 = 79.382***

When the overall evaluation of government actions is introduced as an
independent variable in Model 2, source independence and online/print type variables
are statistically not significant. However, since it was earlier established (see Table
1.4.2) that both these variables have a significant effect on the overall evaluation of
government actions, they have indirect effects on the evaluation of possible future
events as well. Compared to the strongly positive evaluation of government actions
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(base category in the model), the remaining degrees of evaluation have a negative effect
on prediction of future events as optimistic or pessimistic, which is expected.
To give an idea of how pessimistic and optimistic scenarios differ, two quotes
below represent an independent and a conformist source’s evaluation, respectively:
Two scenarios are possible. First, the opposition will give up and put up with
the authoritarian stability, continuing economic stagnation and the "Asian mode of
production" in its pure form. Second, the opposition will organize protests and
resume the pseudo-democratic chaos that our NGOs and some political scientists
are so proud of, but the normal people cannot live in. Two choices, one worse than
the other.
Interview with political scientist Alexandr Knyazev, Sept.24, 2007, Delo #
It is doubtful, of course, that an average citizen will immediately feel all the
advantages of leaving under new constitution. However I want to believe that we
will be able to tell our main law 'good-bye' in our everyday life, and to bid
farewell to demonstrations, protests, and Maidans. And in their turn our skydwellers will finally deal with the economy separately from politics.
“Time Will Not Wait," Oct.19, 2007, MSN
As the later qualitative content analysis will show, these quotes are representative
of the general “authoritarianism – sole responsibility” and “uncertainty – better life”
frames in relation to the key players: the president, the parliament, and the people.
Finally, Research Question 1 was formulated to see if the originality of material
depends on the type of source. This question was prompted by the fact that online
sources are often accused of simply reprinting materials that appeared in other media.
In many cases they do indeed reprint material from other sources because they lack staff
and resources, including the sources of information, to come up with their own,
original, material. However, in many cases they add their own commentary and
analysis to the borrowed material.
To answer Research Question 1, the two key “demographic” variables – source
independence of the state control and being print or online – were used as independent
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variables in the multinomial logistic regression model where the originality of material
is a dependent variable, coded as 1=borrowed, reprinted material, 2=borrowed material
with own comment or analysis, and 3=mostly original material. Borrowed, reprinted
material serves as a base category in this multinomial regression.
The results of the regression model presented in Table 1.4.7 show that compared to
the foreign sources, both conformist and independent sources are more likely to publish
original stories. The source being state-controlled has no significant effect, but also has a
positive association with the original material, while negative association – with
borrowed material with commentary. The online sources are likely to publish both
borrowed material with commentary and original material.
Table 1.4.7. Originality of Material by Key Sample Characteristics
Borrowed Material with
Commentary
B

Independent variables

SE

Original Material

Wald

B

SE

Wald

State-controlled sources

-.075

.908

.007

.329

.755

.190

“Conformist” sources

.853

.886

.927

1.451*

.746

3.777

Independent sources

.741

.764

.941

2.261***

.630

12.858

1.695**

.620

7.473

2.071***

.499

17.231

-1.784**

.690

6.690

-1.442*

.593

5.917

Online sources
(Intercept)

Model summary N = 212, Cox & Snell Pseudo R2 = .173, Χ2 = 40.382***
^p<.10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

These models suggest that all types of sources are likely to publish original
material. Thus, originality of material used in stories may depend more on such factors
as professionalism of the staff and access to data sources than independence from the
state control or whether the source is print or Internet-based. Further exploration of this
issue, which is beyond this project, requires classification of sources by their staff
capacity and access to information sources.
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1.4.2 Qualitative Content Analysis
Thematic clusters found in the three categories of qualitative frames under this
study revealed that every frame the independent sources used in an attempt to make
sense of what the government decisions, initiatives and actions meant for the key actors
had its counterpart in the pro-government and conformist sources. This is clearly seen
in the frames explaining what the Constitutional Court decision and the referendum
meant for President Bakiev. Bek Orosaliev, Kommersant’s stringer in Kyrgyzstan,
presents a neutral stance that can serve as a reference point:
…in the fall [after the failed and suppressed opposition protests in April 2007],
Kyrgyzstan's president decided to enforce his success by finishing off the current
parliament that had acted many times against him. With a hint from the
presidential administration, the Constitutional Court voided both Constitutions
earlier adopted by the parliament. The head of the state has taken advantage of the
authority returned to him under the old constitution by having initiated a
referendum on constitutional amendments that would enforce the presidential
authority and fully reform parliamentarianism in the country. Following the
example of Russia and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz parliamentarians will now be elected
exclusively by party lists and very few people doubt that the majority of seats will
be taken by the presidential party.
“Kurmanbek Bakiev showed Kyrgyzstan a 'Bright Way',”4 Oct.16, 2007,
Kommersant
Here, the paper, given its foreign status, takes a detached and non-judgmental
stance toward the events, however, making a clear hint that Bakiev’s actions lead to a
more authoritarian government system. The domestic independent sources are more
open in stating that authoritarianism was looming over the country. They often do it
indirectly, through the interviews and quotes from experts and public figures, which
gives a certain credibility and ‘insurance’ in a political environment where alternative
views can be persecuted by the government:

4

Play on words: in Kyrgyz, “Ak-Jol,” the name of the party Bakiev consolidated shortly before the referendum
for the parliamentary elections, means “Bright/Clear Way.”
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“The haste around the referendum is indicative of the fact that they [the
authorities] simply want to get a super presidential constitution draft and secure
their power. I am afraid that they will deceive only themselves, just like Akaev did
in his time… With every passing day, we are shocked at how our authorities
devolve, and this concerns the president himself. He says one thing, does the
opposite, plans a third thing, and the outcome is always very complicated.“
Interview with an NGO leader Asiya Sasykbaeva, Sept.26, 2007, BPC
The authorities seem to have completely forgotten that the difference between
the De Gaulle's referendum in France and a referendum a la-post-Soviet-Asian
style is like the one between the ground and the sky. We are left with nothing but
to see the proof of the wisdom "referendum is a dictator's tool." And this is why
the outcome of the newly declared Kyrgyz referendum is predetermined.
“Under the Banner of Pack Leadership,” Oct.1, 2007, Delo #
The president's supporters and the opposition that switched camps are building
with their own hands a regime of authoritarian power, destroying the future of
their country and their people, depriving them of the prospect for truly
democratic development.
"In Kyrgyzstan They Want to Use the Sweet Power," Oct.10, 2007, Tazar.kg
This frame’s variations include the suggestions that Bakiev was building a
monarchy, kingdom, dictatorship, or façade democracy (see Table 1.4.8 for the summary
of frames relating to the president). Overall, this frame was most widely used by the
regime opponents and is found in 32 stories.
The counter frame used by the president’s supporters promoted the ideas that the
president was moving toward “enlightened authoritarianism,” sovereign democracy
similar to Russia and Kazakhstan, and strengthening of the state:
Kazakhstan’s and Russia's realities, where the presidents head the strongest
parties, show that this results into very good outcomes, both in economics and
other areas. This is why I believe Kyrgyzstan needs a presidential party.
Interview with parliament member Keldibekov, Sept.21, 2007, BPC
Kurmanbek Bakiev is becoming a president by definition, acquiring the
qualities and features of a leader, the main of which is the ability to take
responsibility for everything happening in the country. Two years of uncertainty,
extremes, doubts and confusion in mind and action have ended. A cold realization
of the basics of history has come – the path from totalitarianism to democracy lies
through strict authoritarianism… Enlightened authoritarianism is better than
feudalism.
“Steps the Whole Country Was Waiting For,” Oct.5, 2007, MSN
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The last quote is also illustrative of a complementary frame relating to the threat of
authoritarianism. Where the president’s opponents were concerned about him
consolidating authority and usurping power, his supporters talked about consolidation
of society and taking full responsibility into his hands for the reforms and everything
that was happening in the country. Below are two quotes from both sides:
Parliamentarian Sariev commented [on the new Constitution draft], "If we
adopt the Constitution offered by the President, we will receive a strong head of
the state with consolidated powers, who may become a dictator as time passes.
Today, the main task is to adopt a conciliatory Constitution that would satisfy the
key political players of the country."
"New Constitution: Road to Dictatorship?" Oct.1, 2007, Oasis story on
Centrasia.ru
The decision to conduct a referendum on the constitutional reform is the only
correct one. Today the head of the state has taken full responsibility upon himself
during this complicated stage for Kyrgyzstan when we found ourselves in the
judicial dead-end… I hope that the people's vote will finally put a stop to the
pulling of the rope, when the parliament, instead of adopting good laws, is
involved in relationship management.
Interview with Issyk-Kul governor Isaev, Sept.21, 2007, Slovo Kyrgyzstana
This longing for sole responsibility is deeply rooted in the authoritarian rule and is
the legacy of the Soviet style of governance. As MSN’s editorial put it in an attempt to
explain why Kyrgyzstan’s citizens will vote for the president’s version of Constitution,
"The people will vote for one-person responsibility for what is happening in the country.
The long historical memory and healthy instinct prompt to the people that the collective
responsibility is just universal irresponsibility" (“Steps the Whole Country Was Waiting
for,” Oct.5, 2007).
However, what the president’s proponents failed to mention is that such a
responsibility is a heavy burden for a head of the state that has slowing economic
growth and stalled reforms, complicated by high levels of corruption. Lawyer Gulnara
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Iskakova, an expert in constitutional law and an active member of the Women in Politics
network, has formulated this clearly:
The president does not understand that his political technologists, who are
staying in the shadow, have put a heaviest historical burden on him. The society
will know: Bakiev has taken responsibility for EVERYTHING upon himself, and
the curtailing of democracy and violation of freedoms and rights from now on will
be the responsibility of one person. Will he be able to carry this burden, including
struggling economy, in an economically poor country? And what is the society left
with, when it is deprived of an opportunity to influence the power through
democratic means? - To either keep silent or ... resist in some other ways.
Interview with lawyer Gulnara Iskakova, Oct.24, 2007, Delo #
Another persistent frame that appeared in many stories relates to the connection
between the politics and economy. The president and his proponents insisted that the
2.5 years of political struggles between the government and opposition after March 2005
had taken attention away from the economic problems. MSN, for example, as well as
Slovo Kyrgyzstana, quoted President Bakiev as he was voting in the referendum:
During the last two years of the political chaos we've accumulated a number of
serious economic problems. Wherever we look, we have problems: we need to
repair roads, to build schools in remote areas, to rehabilitate the factories, and to
increase pensions and salaries. And when do we have time to deal with this all, if
our dear bureaucrats are involved only in political speculations and useless
debates? This is why I believe that the referendum will put a stop, and after the
adoption of the main law, which no one will be able to tailor for themselves any
more, will start working on the economy. There's no other way, we have already
lost a lot of time... This is why pulling the rope should end with the adoption of
the Constitution. Where can the economy be developed successfully? Only in the
countries where there is political stability. We are about to realize a lot of major
projects, but we can implement them only under the conditions of political calm.
“’Yes’ from the People,” Oct. 23, 2007, MSN
Earlier, Slovo Kyrgyzstana published an interview with parliamentarian Tagaev, who
formulated the same idea in more straightforward terms:
It is high time for the executive power to start working for development and,
implementing the President's instructions, develop the economy not on paper, but
in reality. We've had enough of it! Enough political games, it's time to work.
Quoted interview to 24.kg, Sept.21, 2007, Slovo Kyrgyzstana
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To this, the independent newspaper Bely Parohod’s chief editor Elena Avdeeva
answered in a sarcastic and poignant way, addressing her appeal to President Bakiev:
Please do [deal with economy]! Our father, hope and foundation of the state,
please deal with economy! This is the only thing we are praying for you to do. So
why are you deviating again: declared a referendum, decided to dissolve the
parliament and elect a new one. This is pure politics, is it not? Am I mistaken? –
Oh, I am sorry. It was the president who said, "As soon as we conduct the
referendum, the economy will rise." What does this mean? Is our economy a little
trained doggy? It does everything on command, "Economy, sit! Economy, rise!"
And if it does so, why didn't you command it to rise earlier? What have you been
waiting for? – Ah, Referendum. Yes, mister president, you indeed should be
dealing with the economy rather than politics...
“I am always thinking about my people,” Oct.1, 2007, Bely Parohod
Here, a counter frame is expressed: the president’s inability to handle the
opposition, blaming it for everything wrong that is happening in the country, including
the price rise and the shortage of food products, as well as the executive power’s
inability to improve the economy and people’s well-being.
This frame also echoes another frame that is used to show that by the decision to
conduct a referendum, the president has caught the opposition off guard and aims at
weakening and eliminating his political opponents, as political analyst Ibraimov is
quoted in a Centraisa.ru story:
The president’s last step is a well-planned action to strengthen his position
when the opposition is split into fractions and unable to fight him back…
Referenda were always used in Kyrgyzstan as a means to promote the
[government's] interests under the pretext of the people's well-being.
“New Round of Constitutional Stand-off,” Oct.1, 2007
To this, the president’s proponents would answer that eliminating unconstructive
radical opposition will create a better environment for coordination and cooperation
with other branches of power, which ultimately will benefit the people of Kyrgyzstan.
Parliamentarian Tagaev’s quote is illustrative of this point of view:
32

Kyrgyzstan’s president has finished with those who were involved in political
plotting and created tensions between the branches of power… Submitting the
Constitution issue to a referendum is a logical last step in a long-overdue solution
of this important problem [constitutional reform]. Let the people decide how we
will live in the future.
“The Plotting Will Finally End,” Sept.21, 2007, Slovo Kyrgyzstana
Another persistent frame that is used intensively by the president’s opponents
relates to local governance and is constructed in response to the accusations that in the
new Constitution draft the president is expanding his powers to appointing key
national-level and local government officers, thus building a vertical power structure.
Again, an MSN’s editorial addressed this criticism in the following way:
…the constitutional changes offered by Kurmanbek Bakiev give us all a chance
to develop not only a new attitude to local government, but also to make a serious
step toward building a real (and not declared by some political parties) civil
society. If we develop the interest in the actions of local government, the wish to
control and ask of the local government, if every one of us knows that the local
government is accountable to the people, there will be hope for developing
genuine interest in big politics, and in the end – in participation of currently
passive majority of our citizens in all the constructive political processes of the
renewed Kyrgyzstan. And this, you have to agree, is one of the main features of a
true rather than protest-driven democracy.
“Local Self-Government or Small-Place Kings? The Choice Is Near,” Oct.12, 2007
This passage sheds some light on why the whole idea of the referendum could
appeal to the people who lack information about democratic practices and who
developed fatigue from the “protest-driven” democracy. The March 2005 Revolution
was followed by a two-night large-scale looting of the capital city, which scared the
Bishkek residents and ultimately devalued the meaning of the revolution itself. Looting
became engraved in their memories to the extent that on the Internet political sites the
Revolution Day, which was declared a national holiday in March 2008, is often referred
to as “The Looter’s Day.” At the backdrop of this fear, any promise of stability and end
to political battles would “buy” a concerned citizen’s vote.
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Another frame that needs to be mentioned is the president’s confidence with his
own people. The oppositional leaders such as parliamentarian and former Speaker
Omurbek Tekebaev were sure that President Bakiev was rushing the referendum
because he was losing the support base among the citizens:
“The president is losing people's support with every passing day. He wants to
capitalize on his advantage before the New Year's and to secure his political
future. If he receives the majority in the Parliament in one month, he will be able
to avoid direct [presidential] election in 2010”
"New Constitution: Road to Dictatorship?" Oct.1, 2007, Oasis story on Centrasia.ru
The state and conformist sources responded to this by citing President Bakiev
himself referring to the people’s wishes and desires. The interview was taken when
Bakiev was casting his vote in the referendum:
"…[in my trips around the country] I have seen that the people are tired of
politics. They demand, sometimes with reproach, that the constitutional reform
must be completed. But you know the situation that we had during these two
years while we were discussing the draft. At present everyone understands that
there is no reason to delay this process anymore, and I believe that Kyrgyzstanis
will show what they think during the referendum. I am deeply grateful to the
people for their support of the state policy."
“The Weather is Stable at the Referendum,” Oct. 23, 2007, Slovo Kyrgyzstana
The president’s proponents would also say Bakiev came forward with the
referendum initiative because he cared for the people and wanted to fulfill the promise
of the constitutional reform that will result into better democracy:
“When I meet the region citizens, they tell me that the referendum is a
necessity. The participants of such meetings lay great hopes on parliamentary
elections by party lists that will end tribalism and regionalism in the parliament,
will make the electoral process more open and prevent taking the political
conflicts into the streets.”
Interview with Jalal-Abad governor Aidaraliev, Oct.5, 2007 Slovo Kyrgyzstana
Another claim made by the president’s proponents in relation to his level of
confidence with the people is that by putting the trust in the people through the
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referendum President Bakiev in fact is confident that they will support his initiatives,
which also shows his strength as the country’s leader and strategist:
We've been waiting for the president to make these steps for a long time, and,
having read the draft constitution, I cannot hide my satisfaction because the ideals
of our Revolution have not been destroyed. The president has finally steered to the
right path of democratization… After the Constitutional Court decision, we cannot
just sit and wonder which constitution will govern our lives. We have found
ourselves in a judicial vacuum, and this can cause various negative consequences.
So I believe that the speedy referendum was an absolutely correct decision… The
president becomes a growing, understanding person moving forward into the
future. The last 2.5 years taught him a good political lesson and as I understand he
wants to remain in history. He wants to introduce real changes toward
development and democratization of the society.
Interview with Rosa Otunbaeva, Sept.20, 2007, BPC
This statement comes Rosa Otunbaeva, one of the March 2005 Revolution leaders,
who was after the revolution appointed the Minister of Foreign Affairs but then parted
ways with the president and became a co-leader of an opposition party. While some
analysts were surprised by her favorable assessment of the Referendum initiative, others
said that it was not totally unexpected. In December 2007 parliamentary elections
Otunbaeva became a parliament member from the Social Democratic Party of
Kyrgyzstan (SDPK). The party used to be in opposition to the president but ultimately
joined the ranks of parties that supported the idea of the referendum from the time it
was announced.
Otunbaeva received her spot on the SDPK list after one of the party leaders was
disqualified for allegedly having a double citizenship with Kazakhstan. As one of the
newspaper’s editors put it,5 “after all, Kyrgyz politics is more about deals and bargains
rather than promoting true democratic values and principles.”

5

Personal interview, December 17, 2007. The editor agreed to give an interview under the condition of
confidentiality.
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Table 1.4.8. Frames Relating to President Bakiev’s Actions and Motivations
#

Negative frame

Number
of stories
found in

Positive frame

Number
of stories
found in

1.

Aiming at creating a “pocket”
parliament through

6

4

(a) Creating own party that
will get the majority of seats in
the parliament and follow
presidential orders

11

Creating a responsible,
representative and supportive
parliament through

2.

Creating authoritarianism,
super-presidentialism,
monarchy, dictatorship, or
“façade” democracy

32

Moving to “enlightened
authoritarianism,“ “sovereign”
democracy, strengthening the state,
bringing security and stability

14

3.

Consolidating more power,
usurping power

17

Consolidating the society, taking
responsibility into one’s hands

18

4.

Tailoring the constitution for
own needs

5

Completing the long-overdue
constitutional reform

9

5.

Weakening and eliminating
political opposition

8

Creating opportunities for better
coordination and cooperation with
other branches of power, eliminating
unconstructive radical opposition

6

6.

Building vertical power
structure, acquiring more
control over local government

4

Improving local governance through
stronger and more accountable local
executive bodies that will meet the
people’s needs

14

7.

Rushing events out of despair
to stay in power in anticipation
of harder economic times;
losing support among people

4

Speeding up the reform to fulfill the
promise to the people; growing as a
leader and strategist

8

8.

Unable to tolerate and work
with the opposition, to
respond to criticism and to
improve the people’s wellbeing

6

Putting an end to political conflicts
so that attention and effort can be
focused on economics

8

9.

Manipulating the trust of the
people by asking to approve
overly complex legislation

4

Soliciting support for initiatives and
legitimization of the new
Constitution draft from the people
who elected him

6

10.

Game metaphor: preventive
strike, distraction maneuver

2

Getting ahead in the game, making a
quicker move, outwitting the
opposition

3

(a) Creating a party of and for the
people, a party of supporters that
will implement presidential policies
and set up good order in society

36
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Finally, one more frame that deserves a closer look is the opposition’s projections
that President Bakiev was going to create a “pocket,” easy-to-manipulate parliament
through establishing his own presidential party that would take the majority of seats in
the new parliamentary elections. As the leader of the United Front Opposition
Movement Felix Kulov stated at a press conference after the referendum,
The referendum and its preceding events showed that the presidential
administration bet the bank. If they get less than 50 per cent of votes, the
opposition forces in the new parliament will raise the issue of a pre-term
presidential election, since the new Constitution expands the president's authority.
This is why it is necessary [for the presidential party] to get the majority of votes,
to block any decisions by the opposition if it gets to the parliament. Therefore, the
issue of getting more than 50 per cent of votes for the executive power is the issue
of life and death.
"’Ar-Namys’ Party Will Run for Parliament, Possibly with Another Party,"
Oct.23, 2007, AKI-Press
Political journalist Semetei Amanbekov also expressed the widely shared concern
about the upcoming parliamentary elections, but went further to draw a parallel
between President Bakiev’s actions and the pre-revolutionary events in 2005:
The party in power will get the most seats in the new parliament. Those in the
opposition who did not switch camps will not be let into the parliament. This
means that in our time when everything is sold and bought, representatives of
major businesses will get into the legislature (again!). This situation is similar to
the parliamentary elections in 2005. At that time the experiment resulted into
multitude of opposition protests and the March 24, 2005 coup with the complete
failure of the previous regime. Will the situation repeat this time?
"Will Bakiev become his own party's general secretary and Kyrgyzbashi of all
Kyrgyz people?" Sept 21, 2007, Komsomolskaya Pravda in Kyrgyzstan
The state and conformist newspapers dismissed these concerns again by quoting
President Bakiev, this time from his program speech at the founding congress of the AkJol party on October 15, 2007:
The party's name has two main meanings: first of all we created a party of the
people and for the people. I see this as your role and mine. The second meaning is
movement forward, aimed at development and future of Kyrgyzstan. I am sure
that our path will be clear and bright and will lead our country to great prosperity.
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We need a party exactly like this. You know that we have over 100 parties. But
what of them? Among them, there are very few that would be brave enough to
take responsibility for everything that happens.
"Clear Path You Are Taking, Comrades!" Oct.16, 2007, MSN
At best, everyone is simply criticizing the executive power and our mistakes.
And who will and should make things happen? Until today, there was no political
force in the country that would undertake the work, achieve the goals and meet
the challenges the country faces. This is why I myself made a decision to create it
as a new political force, a party of creation, responsibility and action.
“President’s Speech at Ak-Jol Founding Congress,” Oct.15, 2007, Slovo Kyrgyzstana
The message here is clear: a new party, of the people and for the people is needed
to move the country forward. Given how the party was created, from the name
announcement through founding congress to legal registration in one day, and how
quickly it expanded its membership in less then a week before the Referendum, no one
doubted that it would indeed take the majority of seats in the new parliament.
One peculiarity of Kyrgyzstan’s journalism should help put all these various
frames into a perspective. The concept of balanced stories has not taken root in local
newspapers, and this is why the coverage usually presents only one side of the story.
Moreover, as the analysis above shows, the newspapers prefer to quote directly the
experts and public figures they interview or record at press conferences, without much
elaboration or analysis of what is being said.
They do this because they operate in a highly sensitive political environment,
under the constant pressure of libel law and accusations of inaccuracy. If they present
the other side’s viewpoint, they usually do it in a sarcastic and mocking tone. One last
example of a frame relating to President Bakiev is illustrative of this misbalance. In an
editorial, MSN attempted to summarize all the opposition’s claims and concerns about
the Constitution draft:
The most criticism is around the [draft constitution’s] article on parliamentary
elections and power of the executive and legislature, i.e. president and parliament.
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The parliamentarians, already caught in the pre-election fever, maintain that the
draft Constitution submitted to the Referendum will turn Kyrgyzstan toward
dictatorship and away from democracy. To sum up all the claims and statements
of the opposition, the following picture emerges: we are under a threat of a oneparty state headed by an autocrat plus absolutely spineless government and
"pocket" parliament.
Moreover, as they claim, we have such weak parties that they will not be able to
compete meaningfully for the electorate’s votes, and for prevalence in the
parliament. This is why it is too early to form the parliament by party lists only.
When such statements are uttered, and, as a rule, by the opposition that wanted to
get everyone "down with," [from the power structures] it is extremely surprising.
"Uncertainty Does Not Work," Sept.28, 2007, MSN
Using a mocking and sarcastic tone, the editorial simply laundry lists the key
concerns discussed in this framing analysis earlier, without giving them any due
consideration or benefit of analysis, bluntly dismissing them as “surprising” and
laughable. This journalistic “device” is widely used in Kyrgyzstan’s journalism by both
oppositional and pro-governmental sources, and the readers are left with their own
judgment (or lop-sided information, in case when they have no access to alternative
sources of view) to decide whose wit is on top of the situation.
As for the frames relating to the Parliament, here the most prevailing frame was
neutral, simply stating that the Constitutional Court decision renders the parliament
illegitimate. This frame was used by both the state and independent sources, and of 150
stories in the sample that tried to make sense of what the decision meant for the
Parliament, 78 used the neutral frame (see Table 1.4.9).
In their analysis, all sources using the neutral frame were unanimous in the
opinion that if the Referendum approved Bakiev’s Constitution draft, the pre-term
Parliament’s dissolution and new parliamentary elections would be inevitable. To
understand the neutrality of the frame, it is necessary to remember that this parliament
had been elected under the first president, Askar Akaev, and in many ways was the
reason for the March 2005 revolution. It was always referred to as “Akaev parliament”
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and perceived as unconstructive and self-serving, comprised of businessmen6 and mafia
who had bought their seats and manipulated the voting process. This also explains why
six stories in the sample used a strongly negative frame stating that the parliament
poorly represented the people and deserved to be dissolved. As one of the political
activists of a younger generation and member of Social Democratic Party Edil Baisalov
noted after the parliament was dissolved upon the results of the referendum,
The parliament's dissolution was absolutely predictable and did not come
unexpected. To be honest, no one in Kyrgyzstan is crying about this parliament.
Of course, I feel bad for some deputies, among them there were many of my good
comrades, many a good parliamentary star, and I don't think all of them will come
back to parliament. However this Parliament buried itself in December last year,
and the fact that it was dissolved and not self-dissolved is the result of its actions
last year. They should have announced pre-term parliamentary elections then or
fought for the November constitution with everything they had. This disgraceful
end was predicted last December. Already at that time people said that it [the
parliament] was incompetent and morally and politically bankrupt.
Interview with Baislalov, Oct.22, 2007, BPC
What Baisalov means here is that when the Parliament bargained with the
presidential administration under the threat of dissolution in December 2007, it gave in
to the self-preservation instinct rather than the interests of the people it was supposed to
represent. As a result, the parliament lost its trust and credibility with the people.
However, many analysts argued there were still groups in the parliament that
actively opposed the president, and such opposition was valuable simply because it
existed, if nothing else. As an opposition parliament member put it, the parliament’s
dissolution created political uncertainty and the situation where the president had
unlimited power since he would perform the legislative function as well in the absence
of a parliament:

6

This was also the only of four Kyrgyz parliaments since independence that had no women in it.
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“Now our president is the tsar and God, because his decree will be the highest
law in the land, superseding the Constitution. The actions and decision by the
head of the state will fully depend on his whim, on what kind of mood he has in
the morning or evening. Today, the president's options are limited only by his
fantasies. We may see some totally unexpected actions...”
Interview with Parliament member Alymbekov, Oct.27, 2007, BPC
In response to this, the pro-presidential minds kept saying that the political
uncertainty was only temporary and elimination of this uncertainty was the reason to
conduct parliamentary elections as soon as possible. This situation was actually
favorable, they would say, because it cleared the field for new political players, i.e. the
parties that were going to run for parliament. Moreover, because after the Referendum’s
approval of the Election Code the parliamentary elections will be based on party lists,
the country and the people now had a chance at better legislature:
Kyrgyzstanis now have a chance to change everything for the better. The recent
unification of the political forces of the country and the upcoming elections by
party lists will inevitably filter out "the political nutshells" and will bring into the
Parliament (and local bodies) not the populists and dilettantes as it happened
often before, but professionals aimed at a comprehensive reform of the economy.
"We've Made Our Choice, It's Time to Get to Work," Oct.24, 2007, Slovo
Kyrgyzstana
Not everyone, however, shared this optimism. The reason largely was that with
the use of the notorious administrative resource, the presidential Ak-Jol party expanded
its membership aggressively, often by forcing government employees to join. It was
also favored by all executive levels that had control over the parliamentary election
campaign, starting from venues for meetings with the electorate and ending with air
time on radio and TV and printing of party publications in state-run print shops.
Many president’s critics said that the parties from the very beginning had an
unequal start, and projected that Ak-Jol would take the majority of the seats in the
parliament, with the help of the administrative resource:
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Ak-Jol and other two or three pro-presidential parties may receive a majority in
the parliament. At least, the executive power is sure it will achieve this. As you
saw, the referendum showed 80 per cent turnout, but there are not that many
people in Kyrgyzstan now. I thought they'd do 60-65 per cent, but they aimed
higher and produced 80 per cent!
Interview with Ata-Meken party leader Chotonov, Oct.22, 2007, BPC
For the most part, the president’s supporters would ignore these projections and
shift focus to the new opportunities that the Electoral Code provided for the parties.
Table 1.4.9. Frames Explaining What Constitutional Court/Referendum Decisions
Mean for the Parliament
#

Negative frame

Number
of stories
found in

Positive frame

1.

Neutral frame: the Constitutional Court and Referendum decisions make the current
parliament illegitimate; pre-term dissolution and new elections are therefore
inevitable

78

2.

Parliament becomes illegitimate,
political uncertainty

4

Uncertainty is temporary, gives a
chance for a better legislature

18

3.

Unequal conditions at start, one
party will get it all

11

Competition among parties, party
pluralism, stronger individual
parties

8

4.

Elections will be even more
rigged than the Referendum

3

End of tribalism and regionalism in
parliament elections on individual
tickets

5

5.

Parliament will lose its powers,
will play by Bakiev’s rules

12

Parliament will share responsibility,
improve local governance

5

6.

Parliament poorly represented
people in the first place,
deserved to be dissolved

6

Total stories with both negative and
positive frames

Number
of stories
found in

150

Since the elections will be proportionate and based on party lists, the president’s
supporters maintained, it will allow for better competition among parties, party
pluralism, and strengthening and maturation of existing parties. As the Movement for
Constitutional Reform and Development put it in its triumphant and optimistic address
to the nation immediately after the Referendum,
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October 21 Referendum and the constitutional reform have set the country's
course for the future. Now we all together will be able to direct our abilities and
energy for the development of the economy and the country's movement forward.
We want and we need to create party pluralism, support the responsible and
effective executive, achieve consolidation of all political forces and the society.
Oct.23, 2007, Slovo Kyrgyzstana
Again, the president’s opponents did not share this optimism, concerned about the
openness and transparency of the upcoming elections. As parliamentarian Baibolov
warned, the power of administrative resource could create an even more authoritarian
regime, unless all protest electorate united and voted against Ak-Jol:
Much depends on what kind of elections we will have. If the elections were
democratic and open, the opposition would get 80 per cent of the parliament seats.
But in our conditions, when a hammer is the authorities’ main tool, the situation
will develop differently. Most probably, the Kyrgyz tolerant mentality will allow
the authoritarian regime to exist for some time. If the protest electorate does not
unite to act as one front, we’ll have problems.
Interview with parliamentarian Baibolov, Sept.21, 2007, 24.kg
Another frame where both camps agreed is that electing parliamentarians by party
lists would produce a better legislature. Several parties, both supporting and opposing
the presidential policies, came together in the following statement:
Elections by a majority vote in single-ticket districts have resulted into
flourishing of clan interests and strengthening of regionalism, unrestrained
ambitions of certain politicians. Taking this into account, we, representatives of
political parties, despite the diversity of opinions and views, are united in our
support for the timely implementation of the Referendum and urgency of the
issues it is to resolve.
“Several Political Parties Support the Idea of Referendum,” Sept.25, 2007,
Fergana.ru
The party-lists proportionate representation seemed better than the previous
single-mandate system with its wide-spread vote-buying, pressure on the members of
the same clan, and regionalism. However, after the Referendum president’s opponents
doubted that the new electoral system will fix the election problems like a magic wand.
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On the contrary, as an independent journalist Oleg Pankratov noted, with the extent of
the administrative resource the executive power utilized to get the Referendum
approval, it became clear that the opposition already lost the parliamentary elections:
This new 'success' of the president and his team should be a good lesson for the
opposition. The opposition leaders’ naïveté starts to bore already. All opposition
parties let the referendum 'fly by' in the hope to retaliate at the parliamentary
elections. However, the referendum was not only a way to legitimize
authoritarianism. This was a rehearsal for the parliamentary elections. Obvious
shortcomings visible even to unsophisticated ordinary people will be carefully
polished. At the parliamentary elections the script will be more elaborate, the
actors will hone their skills and roles, and the administrative resource at work will
look like 'the triumph of democracy and truly authentic expression of the people's
will.' So, dear opposition representatives, get ready for the next failure!
“Preliminary results of the referendum. Projections or…,” Oct. 22, 07,
Centrasia.ru
This gloomy projection came true when the presidential Ak-Jol party took 71 (78
per cent) of the 90 seats in the new parliament as a result of December 16, 2007 elections.
The remaining frame listed in Table 1.4.9 (Item 5) closely relates to the
“authoritarianism – sole responsibility” frame discussed earlier. The differences are that
it is focused on the parliament rather than on the president and that in both the negative
and positive frame the parliament is given a secondary role, whether it is to merely
validate the president’s policies or to share the responsibility with him.
To summarize, the frames relating to the parliament were not as strong, intense
and polarized as the frames relating to the president. This is partly due to the fact that
from the very beginning the parliament was thought of as the one the country was stuck
with because of the legal complexities after the March 2005 Revolution, but it never
represented the people well. This is why when the parliament was dissolved after the
referendum, very few experts went beyond discussing the individual personalities and
the parliament-president stand-off. One of such experts was a constitutional lawyer
Gulnara Iskakova:
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The parliament's dissolution is a result of a serious political crisis… and in our
case – the power struggle against Bakiev and his political whim… Parliamentary
elections by party lists will not be a step toward democratization and stability, but
more tightening the screws… On the grand scale of things, all our constitutional
struggles were about one dilemma: whether the president shares the access to
power (i.e., to economic resources as well) or he does not share with anybody. He
has chosen the second. But the people would have been better off with the first.
Interview with Gulanara Iskakova, Oct.24, 2007, Delo #
Iskakova correctly pointed out that the dissolution was a structural crisis that
would effect the Kyrgyz democracy overall and a power-sharing agreement between the
president and Ak-Jol party. Indeed, as the recent events show, the parliament simply
performs the function of validating presidential administrations’ decisions. For instance,
on April 10, 2008, the Parliament ratified the border agreement with Kazakhstan,
according to which some of the Kyrgyz lands will be given to the neighboring republic.
This decision was made amidst protests from the non-Ak-Jol party members and was
met with the indignation by many experts and citizens on various Internet forums.
Finally, the frames relating to the people and democracy were fewer to be found.
Of the total 212 sample stories, 93 tried to make sense of what the referendum initiative
meant for the people (see Table 1.4.9). Of the four frames, two (Items 3 and 4) were the
variations of the frames discussed earlier in this analysis relating to authoritarianism
and party pluralism. The most important two frames that were persistent in the stories
and different from the frames discussed earlier were (1) the ability of the people to
navigate in the complex political environment and make an intelligent, educated
decision at the Referendum and (2) people’s function as the ultimate carriers of
democracy (see Items 1 and 2 in Table 1.4.10). These frames deserve closer analysis.
In the first case, the human rights activists were concerned that Kyrgyzstanis had
neither enough time to study the draft legislation nor sufficient expertise to understand
its complexities. A number of NGOs have put together an address to President Bakiev
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with a request to postpone the referendum for a later date because "The people of the
Kyrgyz Republic, as the only carrier of power, must have all opportunities to discuss the
Constitution and the Election Code drafts and make a conscious and intelligent choice of
the system of governance."7 As the Director of Citizens Against Corruption Center
Ismailova stated, the rushed presidential decision threatened the entire democratic
system in Kyrgyzstan, having put a heavy decision-making burden on the people:
How is it possible to have a referendum where the citizens of Kyrgyzstan are
supposed to say literally 'yes' or 'no' on the entire new Constitution draft and
Election Code? There’s nothing like this in any country of the world. Of course the
procedures are violated. A referendum with no democracy is a violation of the
standards for honest, transparent procedures for adoption of the new constitution.
Why is the highest power of the country not meeting its international obligations,
ignores opinion of the public and does not consult with all interested parties, but
simply imposes a referendum? This is a clear threat to the political pluralism,
development of pluralism, democratic parliamentarianism and civil society.
“Deuche Welle: Kyrgyzstan is not ready for Referendum,” Oct.4, 2007, Centrasia.ru
Again, the president’s supporters responded to this with the trusted device – the
use of sarcasm and mockery:
…perpetually disagreeing human rights advocates and some oppositionists
who survived the political battles loudly maintain that it is not proper to make the
people vote on the Constitution and Election Code. Allegedly, the ordinary people
will not be able to understand the legal 'forest' and to find a way out of the
constitutional maze, while even sophisticated scientists and legal experts are still
lost among the three threes. And in general, this is not for the people to decide.
…But… as it turns out Kyrgyzstanis (the voters comprise about 3.5 million not
taking into account the citizens of Kyrgyzstan who work and reside abroad), worn
out by endless street Maidans, will be happy to go in neat lines to the Referendum
and vote for the Constitution favored by the politicians, lest to be swept by the
protest psychosis again.
“Constitution? There is no alternative,” Oct.2, 2007, MSN
They also quoted President Bakiev to point out what was obvious to them but not
to the president’s opponents:

7

"Civil society requests to recall President Bakiev's Decree on Referendum," Sept.21, 2007, 24.kg
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This draft Constitution has been born in suffering, and there is enough time for
the people to study it before the Referendum. We've been discussing this for two
years now, people are already in the know
“Bakiev: I Will Not Stay President a Single Day Beyond My Term,” Sept.24,
2007, Obschestvenny Rating
This widely-shared belief by the president’s supporters that the people have been
following the debate around the constitutional reform was, however, overestimated: as
the exit polls at the Referendum showed, most people did not know what the changes in
the Constitution were about, they simply voted “for” because they wanted peace and
stability. As the OSCE/ODIHR report on the pre-term parliamentary election stated,
The conduct of the referendum was criticized by domestic observers and
representatives of the international community in Bishkek. Observers also said
that the contents of the documents adopted by referendum were largely unknown
to citizens (OSCE/ODIHR, Nov. 2008, p.3).
However, the president’s supporters insisted a broad discussion of the constitution
draft was not necessary because it had been discussed enough. More important, in their
opinion, was that the people were given a chance to end the political battles and
instability, as well as to participate in shaping the system of governance (Frame 2):
For the people, it is important to put a stop to the [political] arguments. They do
not care who will be in power. They prefer one ruler, not the crowd that has so
many varying opinions that it is impossible to reach a compromise. A citizen
desires to get a law providing a mechanism for its realization. The people want to
be sure that the authority they delegated to their government representatives can
be revoked using the law rather than the street power. For example, currently the
Kyrgyz representatives are simply impossible to recall. Only to take out by force.
But to say good-bye to their representatives should be, just as Ostap Bender
advised, similar to parting with money – easy and without moans. Especially
because our life is such that the laws for the common good are written by one
category of people while the others have to live by them.
“Law?-Here's the law! The country before the referendum,” Oct.1, 2007, Kabar
There is a subtle irony that this passage quotes Ostap Bender, a fictional character
from a satirical Soviet novel, who was and is still considered to be an unsurpassed
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master of elegant and refined charlatanism. Not to read too deep into the meaning, the
question a critical reader would ask is to what extent the government is willing and able
to fool, similarly to Ostap Bender, its own people. Another question is why the author is
concerned about no mechanism to recall the parliament members, but fails to mention
that no Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic had a mechanism to impeach the president.
Of course, the president’s proponents also knew how to use the “correct” rhetoric
of citizen participation, without evoking the double reading of what is being said. Here
is an example from a report on the referendum process, where a very optimistic mayor
of Bishkek Daniar Usenov happily reported no violations observed in the city and
proceeded to make this up-beat statement:
This issue [constitutional reform] should have been resolved a long time ago.
The constitutional process has been long overdue, and the main law of the country
has been turned into a subject of political bargaining in the race for political scores.
In the end, the people is the only source of the state power, not a handful of
politicians, and only the people will decide which Constitution will govern and
develop the country.
“’Yes’ from the People,” Oct.23, 2007, MSN
More sober independent journalists, however, correctly predicted that people will
be used again as a toy in the political games and will be deceived by the endless
promises of better life. As Elena Avdeeva, chief editor of Bely Parohod, noted in one of
her editorials after the Referendum and in anticipation of the parliamentary elections,
ultimately nothing will change, if not become worse because of the worsening economic
situation and failed state policies:
Both you, my dear and much-suffering people, and I will have to wait just a
little bit more [till parliamentary elections]. Well, we'll wait. Although you and I
won't be asked about anything any more, they have already decided everything.
The Parliamentary elections will be announced valid with 75 per cent turnout.
And of course, you, my people, will vote in the 'overwhelming majority' for the
presidential party. Who will suppress whom in this – the answer is clear…
Presidential dictatorship will be declared the people's will.
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And you, my people, will not be surprised, or at least you won't be thinking
about that. Because in the winter there will be no gas and power in the country...
“Migrating Eagles, or When Is the Abroad Going to Help Kyrgyzstan?” Oct.24,
2007, Bely Parohod
At the end of the article, Avdeeva concludes that the government of Kyrgyzstan
had mismanaged the country so badly and drove it into such a serious crisis that only an
immediate and urgent interference by the international community could help recover
the situation (hence the title).
Table 1.4.10. Frames Explaining What Constitutional Court/Referendum Decisions
Mean for the People and Democracy
#

Negative frame

Number
of stories
found in

Positive frame

Number
of stories
found in

1.

Not enough time to study the
Constitution draft; no expertise
to evaluate its advantages and
shortcomings

9

People do not need much time, since
the constitutional reform and the
draft has been discussed for 2.5
years; expertise not needed as only
approval in principle is solicited

4

2.

People are easy to manipulate,
which showed in the rigged
referendum; treated as a toy in
political games; the government
betrayed the people’s trust,
threw a direct challenge to them

26

People are given a chance to decide
and participate in governance, to
exercise their ultimate power as
carries of democracy; thus the
government shows the highest level
of trust in the people

16

3.

After the referendum: worse
life, increased poverty,
increased displeasure with
government

11

Improved life, stable political and
economic development, unification
of society

13

4.

Fatigued of uncertainty, political
battles and stand-offs, people
will vote for anything

6

End of political battles will bring
better representation in parliament,
people will make conscious choices
of candidates from the political
parties

8

Total:

93

While Avdeeva was criticized from all sides, including the opposition, that her
appeal was undermining the sovereignty of Kyrgyzstan as an independent country, her
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sharp observation on the power of manipulation (“presidential dictatorship will be
declared the people’s will”) is valuable, especially because hers was the only newspaper
that transmitted it into the open, off-line world of Kyrgyzstan’s politics and public life.
To summarize, this analysis of what a specific government decision (Referendum
initiative) means for the key players – the president, the parliament, and the people –
shows that the media coverage was extremely polarized and almost perfectly mirrored:
for every negative frame from the president’s opponents, his supporters produced a
rough equivalent on the positive side. The differences were in the emphasis and
intensity of each frame, as well as in the message dominance and frequency of use.
To leave off this part of the analysis, I would like to conclude with a quote from a
political analyst Tamerlan Ibraimov, who was among the very few able to maintain a
detached and fair point of view on the Kyrgyz governments’ political short-sidedness:
…the proposed [Constitution] draft reflects the state of things in this very short
period of time. It gives considerable powers to the president, creates obstacles for
opposition and does not allow any of the branches of power to balance the
others… It does not reflect the real composition and disposition of political forces,
if we look into the country's future even half a year ahead. There are significant
power forces disagreeing with the draft and they will fight for their position. Their
opinion was not taken into account, and this is a source of future conflicts.
“Constitutional Reform in Kyrgyzstan Is a Crisis We Cannot Overcome,”
Oct.10, 2007 24.kg
Ibraimov’s predictions seem to be coming true: four months after the
parliamentary elections, the government of Kyrgyzstan has not been able to resolve the
energy crisis and to improve the economy, the parliament is simply ratifying the
president’s decisions on border agreements and privatization of important
infrastructural assets, and the opposition is gaining its momentum in gathering the
largest organized congresses of people’s delegates from various regions of the country
since before the March 2005 Revolution.
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1.5 Conclusions
This chapter presented a content analysis of the media messages covering a
decision of the president of Kyrgyzstan to enlist support of his nation in adopting a
crucial piece of legislation. The new legislation – a new version of the Constitution and
the Election Code – on the one hand effectively restored the parliamentary system
through reinstating elections by party lists, but on the other hand expanded the
president’s authority to appoint key positions in the government and to form his own
party that later became a majority party in the parliament. In a country like Kyrgyzstan,
where democracy has not taken deep root yet, such decisions may result into negative
consequences and a slide to authoritarianism.
The media, with their power to shape perceptions of such events for the people,
play a crucial role in whether the president’s decision will be supported. The
government controls, directly or indirectly, most of the media space in Kyrgyzstan, and
the logical assumption of this research project was that the online media, which remain
largely free of government control, would be more critical in their evaluations of the
president’s initiatives in terms of good governance practices.
The findings from the analysis of 212 media stories covering the referendum and
relating events have shown that the mode of production – print or online – defines how
critically the media in general evaluated the government actions in terms of good
governance, but not the evaluation of the Constitutional Court/Referendum decision.
However, a much stronger predictor of both overall evaluation of government actions
and specific assessment of the Constitutional Court/Referendum decision is the source
independence from the government control. This is not surprising and does not
contradict logic – an independent source, print or online, is expected to take a more
critical stance towards the government by definition.
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Another significant finding from this research project is that the state-controlled
and conformist media were more likely to give positive evaluations of the president’s
initiatives, thus reinforcing the status quo, according to Ross & Bantimaroudis (2006)
function of framing. This is extremely important in the environment where the
independent media are cornered into a very small niche and have a much lower impact
than the state and conformist sources that traditionally have larger readerships. It is,
perhaps, these sources’ visibility and domination in the public domain that at least
partly explain why the citizens of Kyrgyzstan supported the president’s initiative
through the referendum – they were simply not exposed to alternative interpretations
and explanations. And those who were, preferred not to vote at all, having given up
their vote to the skillful use of the notorious administrative resource.
Interestingly enough, it is the reporting of the use of administrative resource, i.e.
the ability of the executive bodies to influence the outcome of elections in various forms,
that supported the initial hypotheses of this paper: the online sources and sources with
lower off-line impact potential were more likely to report the administrative resource
use. Since this is a most serious violation that took place during the referendum, it went
largely unreported for the print media audiences. This means that the online media do
demonstrate higher potential for critical evaluation of the government actions in light of
good governance, especially when its principles are violated.
The key policy implication of this research is that independent media and
independent media online in particular should be supported and developed in countries
like Kyrgyzstan to provide alternative voices critically evaluating the government
actions and initiatives in terms of good governance practices. Even though the online
media impact is currently much lower than the print media, with the number of Internet
users steadily growing this may be an effective way for the opposition to influence the
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public, especially if the Internet users are willing to share the information they receive
online with those who do not have access. Future research, however, should be
conducted on to what extent the Internet users are interested in exerting such influence:
many studies have shown that in general, the Internet users’ motivation to participate in
politics in post-Soviet emerging democracies is quite low.
The qualitative analysis of frames covering the referendum also confirmed that the
state print newspapers that dominate the media market in Kyrgyzstan have constructed
a totally opposite image of the decision to conduct the referendum and what it meant
for good governance than the independent media, which mostly operate online. Thus,
the alternative reality of the threats of authoritarianism constructed by the independent
media was available mostly for those citizens who have the Internet access. This
difference in the “realities” constructed by independent and state media is central to the
thesis of this project (see Figure 2.2.2).
A limitation of this content analysis project is that it did not capture the coverage of
the referendum and relating events and issues by the Kyrgyz-language press.
Newspapers and websites in Kyrgyz are becoming more and more influencial and
visible, and their interpretation of events is not necessarily similar to the Russianlanguage press. A comparative analysis of media messages in Russian and Kyrgyz
would be the next logical step for this study.
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CHAPTER 2. PERCEPTIONS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE AMONG THE
TRADITIONAL AND INTERNET-BASED MEDIA USERS IN
KYRGYZSTAN
2.1 Background and Definitions
After the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact and collapse of the Soviet Union, the
newly independent post-communist countries had to choose a model for future
development. All of them proclaimed that their goal was to build a democracy with the
understanding that it would take several years of transition to liberalize the economy
and set up the necessary political, social and judiciary institutions and practices.8 Almost
20 years later, only a handful of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as
the post-Soviet Baltic republics9 can claim that they have achieved this goal, having
consolidated their democracies. Others, including the countries of interest for this
research project, are still in the period of transition with varying degrees of democratic
reforms and successes.
For the purposes of this study, the classical definitions of democracy and
consolidated democracy will be used, even though the latter has been recently contested
(but not refuted) on two grounds. First, the critics of consolidation maintain, there may
be different varieties of consolidated democracies that do not fit one definition. Second,
the accepted definitions of consolidation have created certain “illusions” about the
process without providing clear theoretical and practical policy mechanisms for an

8

Freedom House, a US-based NGO, evaluates freedom in all countries of the world on several dimensions,
including political rights, civil liberties, development of civil society and independent press, corruption, etc. It
issues an annual report, Nations in Transit, specifically designated to the countries in transition, i.e. 29 countries
that appeared on the world map after the collapse of the Soviet Union and breakdown of Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia. According to the report, which provides a careful analysis of the countries’ legal and
governance systems, all 29 are proclaimed constitutional democracies.
9

These countries’ achievements in democratization were recognized with the European Union membership:
Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
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institutionalized electoral democracy to become a consolidated democracy (O’Donnell,
2001, pp.124-125). This debate, however, is beyond the scope of this project for which
the notion of consolidation is still useful.
2.1.1. Definitions
The definition of democracy that this study is based upon was formulated by one of
the leading modern theorists of democracy Juan Linz, who adopted Robert Dahl’s
classical attributes of polyarchy10 and incorporated complex ideas and realities of
modern democratic regimes. According to this definition, a regime can be regarded
democratic when
… it allows for free formulation of political preferences, through the use of basic
freedoms of association, information and communication, for the purpose of free
competition between leaders to validate at regular intervals by nonviolent means
their claim to rule… without excluding any effective political office from that
competition or prohibiting any members of the political community from
expressing their preference (1975, pp.182-83).
This demanding definition of democracy was developed shortly before the third
wave of global democratization, which started in the last quarter of the 20th century in
Latin America, and before the democratic theory caught up on the fact that even
seemingly established and institutionalized democracies (Chile and Brasil, for example)
can break down and experience enduring crises.
To close the gap, the younger generation of transitologists (i.e., theorists and
scholars of democratic transition) took Linz’s definition further, having added the
consolidation dimension. Consolidation refers to stabilization, routinization,
institutionalization, and legitimization of such political behavior patterns that would

10

The essential six attributes of polyarchy, as refined in Dalh’s most recent work “On Democracy,” include the
following: 1) elected representatives, 2) free, fair and frequent elections, 3) freedom of expression, 4) alternative
information, 5) associational autonomy, and 6) inclusive citizenship. (1998, p.93).
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prevent internal breakdowns of democracies and their reversals to an authoritarian rule.
Specifically, a democratic regime is considered consolidated when
…all politically significant groups regard its key political institutions as the
only legitimate framework for political contestation, and adhere to the democratic
rules of the game (Cunther, Diamondouros, & Puhle, 2001, p.133).
The concept of consolidation became so widely accepted in the modern democratic
theory that it provided a key dimension for the typology of political systems ranging
from consolidated autocracies to consolidated democracies. This typology is used for
international assessments of the status of democracy in the world by organizations like
Freedom House and United Nations (see Figure 2.2.1 below).
The typology implies that the ideal movement of any country in transition from a
totalitarian or authoritarian rule should be toward a consolidated democracy. As it was
already pointed out, most of the countries of the former Soviet Union, except for the
Baltic states, have made little progress in this direction. Moreover, countries like Russia,
Kazakhstan and Belarus have slid into authoritarian modes. Their leaders have been
using the concept of a managed democracy as a justification for their undemocratic
practices. However, the conviction that a managed democracy is a viable temporary
option for a country in transition has produced less impression on the outside observers
than on these governments’ own citizens.11 Belarus, for instance, often referred to as the
last dictatorship in Europe,12 has not managed to convince its European neighbors that it
has established an electoral democracy even with its institution of regular popular

11

Kazakhstan and Belarus have been consistently ranked as “not free” in the Freedom House report Freedom in
the World since 1994 and 1996 respectively and categorized as consolidated autocracies. Russia has been
downgraded from a long-term “partly free” status (it has been characterized as a semi-consolidated autocracy
since 1999) to a “not free” consolidated autocracy in 2005.
12

For an illustration, see country reports on Belarus from the French NGO “Reporters without Borders” at
http://www.rsf.org.
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elections. And in Russia, the Public Chamber called upon the government to establish
Russia’s own monitoring system to evaluate the state of freedom in Western countries
after Freedom House downgraded the country to the “not free” status in 2005.
To understand how and why managed democracy works in the post-Soviet space,
it is necessary to give a brief overview of the concept and its definition.
2.1.2. Managed Democracy for Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regimes?
The origin of the term “managed democracy” is difficult to trace, but it is most
widely associated with Indonesia’s Gen. Suharno, to whom the concept is often
attributed.13 In essence, managed democracy is a regime with all formally attributable
democratic institutions, such as separate legislative, judiciary, and executive powers;
regular contested elections and other forms of participation like referenda; diverse and
private press; developed civil liberties such as freedom to travel, etc. At the same time,
this type of regime is authoritarian at the core as it allows only limited and carefully
controlled autonomy of democratic institutions (Pribylovsky, 2005). The public sphere
in managed democracies is controlled through ownership and guidance of media.
Russia, which still determines and influences many political and economic
processes in the former Soviet republics, revived the concept of managed democracy
with President Putin’s rise to power in 2000. It was subsequently embraced by other
countries’ long-term leaders who had solidified their super-presidential regimes –
President Lukashenka of Belarus, President Kuchma of the Ukraine, President
Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan, President Shevardnadze of Georgia, President Aliev of
Azrbaijan, and President Akaev of Kyrgyzstan.

13

A series of analytical articles on the Russian website “Democracy under Siege” (http://osada.sovacenter.ru/) explain the term’s etymology and provide a good overview of the history and principles of
managed (“guided” in some other references) democracy.
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The popular rationale behind managed democracy is that people in the post-Soviet
countries, who had been suppressed under the totalitarian rule for over 70 years, are
incapable of quickly changing their dependent mentality and becoming mature and
responsible, self-governing citizens. Therefore, someone who legitimately represents
them should have the temporary authority to guide the citizens in the process of
democratic decision-making and to manage effective development of the fragile
democratic institutions.14
It should be noted that consolidation of power under the executive in these
countries started much earlier than Putin’s rise to power. President Akaev, for example,
started to change the Constitution to shift more powers from the legislature to the
executive as early as in 1994. As Nichol (2007) points out, Akaev complained in 1994
that the first post-independence Constitution with extensive human rights protections
and provided countervailing legislative powers “was too ‘idealistic’ since the Kyrgyz
people are not prepared for democracy and said that a ‘transitional period’ was needed.
He decreed referendums in 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2003 that whittled away legislative
power” (p.2). However, it was with Putin’s election as Russian president that the
managed democracy came to use as a term. Lipman and McFaul explained well the
managed democracy Russian style for Western readers:
…Putin seeks to undermine Russia’s fragile and weak democratic institutions.
Putin’s spin doctors call the project ‘managed democracy.’ The system they seek
to create will have all the formal institutions of democracy: elections, parties,
media, civil society, and so on. But the real autonomy of these institutions and,
therefore, their real capacity to influence the actions of the state will be severely
limited. (2001, p.116)

14

Papp (2005) suggests that Chair of Effective Politics Foundation Gleb Pavlovsky, the Kremlin’s key political
strategist, and Director of the Political Research Institute Sergei Markov are the main ideologists of the
managed democracy in Russia. They also often serve as political consultants to other post-Soviet quasidemocratic regimes.
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Shevardnadze’s Georgia before 2003 and Kyrgyzstan of the later Akaev’s tenure in 20012005 represent examples of the managed democracy model. The 2006 Countries at the
Crossroads report describes typical processes in these countries the for the case of
Kyrgyzstan:
During the last five years of his rule [2000-05], Akaev steadily consolidated
power and misused it to neutralize rivals, intimidate independent media, and
manipulate the judiciary. As the international spotlight moved to Central Asia in
the aftermath of September 11, 2001, both the United States and Russia established
airbases in Kyrgyzstan as responses to the war on terrorism. These developments
raised Akaev’s profile on the world stage and emboldened him to clamp down on
his domestic opposition still further. Meanwhile corruption, nepotism and graft
flourished, blurring the boundaries between government and organized crime.
The president’s family and allies took control of many of the country’s prime
economic resources, hiding assets through dozens of shell companies, but their
rapacity was growing blatant and their support was dwindling. Rigged elections,
in which two of Akaev’s children won seats in parliament, hinting the possibility
of a dynastic succession, were the last straw [causing the revolution].
Freedom House, Countries at the Crossroads, 2006

Similar processes took place in the other two revolutionary countries – Georgia and
Ukraine, and their leaders were using the democratic rhetoric and institutions in a
similar way to cover up their pseudo-democratic practices. Indeed, the elections in all
the three countries were regular and contested but manipulated so skillfully that even
outside observers experienced trouble in collecting the evidence of fraud. Political
parties existed and proliferated, but either had little effect in the legislature because the
candidates preferred to run on a single-mandate rather than party-list tickets like in
Kyrgyzstan, or represented a deal-lock, confrontational parliamentary oppositions in
Ukraine and Georgia. The local media in all three countries were allowed certain
degrees of freedom, but the national media were tightly controlled either through direct
ownership or through state subsidies and harassment of independent media. The civil
societies were represented by numerous and diverse NGOs, many of which were quasi-
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NGOs created by pro-government circles to channel the grant money. At the same time,
the citizens were free in their consciousness (religion), thinking, expression, and travel
within and outside the country. In short, what was promoted as a democratic political
system was in essence a weakened, semi-consolidated authoritarian rule.

2.2 Beyond Managed Democracy and Toward Consolidated Democracy
According to the classical democratic theory, the obvious discrepancy between
what is allowed to individual citizens in terms of civil liberties and the abridged political
rights, as well as the gap between the formal political systems with democratic rights
and the actual political practices will inevitably result into internal tensions (Dahl, 1971,
1998). In the three “revolutionary” countries, these tensions and frustration with the
manipulated parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan and Georgia and presidential
election in the Ukraine resulted into popular uprisings.
First was the 2003 “Rose Revolution” in Georgia, followed by the 2004 Ukrainian
“Orange Revolution,” and, finally, the 2005 “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan. Again,
an evaluation of the Ukrainian revolution by Freedom House provides a good
illustration of how these changes were welcomed in the democratic world: “The
extraordinary return of Ukraine to the path of freedom in 2004 may have opened the
door to a new democratic spring in the 12 non-Baltic post-Soviet states” (NIT 2005, p.6).
In Russia, the fear of “the orange plague,” as the leadership refers to the three
revolutions cumulatively, was so strong that the Kremlin ideologists dropped the usage
of the compromised term “managed democracy” and started to use more and more the
term “sovereign democracy,” emphasizing Russia’s right to a unique democratic path
and independence from democratic standards imposed by Western democracies.
It is widely believed now that the color revolutions represented the second way of
democratization in the post-Soviet space, where the impoverished, disillusioned and
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frustrated citizens lead by opposition toppled the semi-authoritarian and authoritarian
rulers in the desire to change the regime toward building a true democracy. Currently,
numerous questions and doubts are raised about the progress of these countries in the
second democratization attempts.
In particular, concerns were raised by the “divorce” of the two revolution leaders
in Ukraine in 2006 – President Yuschenko and Prime-Minister Timoshenko, who
subsequently became a parliament member and one of the most active opponents to
Yuschenko. Even though Timoshenko eventually became the prime-minister again
through a power-sharing agreement, the obvious tensions between her cabinet and
President Yuschenko over the stalling economic reforms and privatization of
infrastructure do not add to strengthening of the Ukrainian democracy.
In Georgia, theorists and practitioners of democracy were concerned about the
transparency of the 2007 presidential election that re-elected President Saakashvili
amidst massive opposition protests. Additional concerns are raised by the fact that most
of the seats in the parliament elected in May 2008 were taken by the ruling propresidential party, effectively shifting the political system from the parliamentary to a
presidential one.
Finally, in Kyrgyzstan, the fight over the constitutional reform resulted into a
violation of the power-sharing agreement between President Bakiev and Prime-minister
Kulov (both had been elected to power on a united ticket in July 2005) as the latter
resigned in 2006. The recent events with the October 2007 Referendum and pre-term
parliamentary elections also raised concerns about the direction the Kyrgyzstan’s
leadership is taking. More and more analysts today agree that Kyrgyzstan under the
President Bakiev is farther from a true democracy than it ever was under the weak
authoritarian leadership of President Akaev.
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Figure 2.2.1 below is designed to demonstrate the chronological movement of the
three countries on the democratic path in three stages: 1) toward democracy through a
transitional order in 1991-1996, as a result of independence and rigorous democratic
developments; 2) back to authoritarianism between 1996-2003, when the leaders in those
countries usurped the power, amended the constitutions and manipulated elections;
and 3) back to the democratic transitional order after the color revolutions starting in
2003 till present. To reflect the concerns formulated above, the projected movement
toward consolidated democracy is shown with a dotted line and a question mark.

1991-1996

2003-present

?

1996-2003

Authoritarian/
totalitarian
regime

Semiauthoritarian
regime

Transitional
(hybrid) regime

Semiconsolidated
democracy

Consolidated
democracy

Ideal Movement

Figure 2.2.1. Actual Movement of Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan on
Democratization Path
Despite considerations and concerns about the recent developments in the political
arena, the rhetoric of revolutionary achievements and democratic reforms in all three
countries is still strong and the governments continue to express their commitment to
building a true democracy. As the content analysis of the Constitutional Referendum in
Kyrgyzstan presented in Chapter 1 shows, such rhetoric can be quite effective in
achieving the government’s goals.
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2.2.1. Government, Citizens and Reality Gaps
One helpful explanation of why managed democracy fails to work is a combination
of the cognitive dissonance theory and Albert Hirschman’s theory of response to
declines in firms, organizations, and states. In a pseudo-democratic, semi-authoritarian
regime the gap between the reality that people experience and the desired reality that
the government projects with its democratic rhetoric is so large that it creates a mental
discomfort, or cognitive dissonance, in citizens’ minds (Festinger, 1947). The people
know what is real as they have to face corruption, disrespect and violations of their
rights and freedoms by the government on a daily basis, so the government-imposed
view of reality does not settle with them well. Thus, the citizens may employ one of the
three available options to remove the source of discomfort, in this case the government’s
lies and promises.
One of the options is to ignore the government-projected reality, which is only a
temporary solution as what the government says defines so many societal processes that
cannot be mentally put away, and sooner or later the people will have to either accept or
reject this reality imposed on them. To accept the projected reality is an option exercised
by many citizens hoping that life will become better if not with the current government,
then with the one that will come to power in the next elections. It can be argued that it
is this dashed hope caused by the governments’ manipulation of elections that took
many citizens to the street protests, thus turning to the third option for removal of
dissonance – rejection of its source, i.e. false reality.
These options roughly correspond to Hirschman’s responses to declining states –
exit, voice and loyalty. Hirschman’s theory is derived from economics, and exit is best
understood as a metaphor for consumers’ stopping to buy the product or service when
its quality declines and there is competition in the market. Voice is exercised when the
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consumers are so accustomed to the product and value it so much that they are ready to
express their dissatisfaction in the hope that it will result into an improvement. If
competition stimulates diversity of the products in the market, it is much easier for the
consumers to exercise exit rather than voice – they simply start buying a better product
and stop using the declining one. As Hirschman (1971) puts it, “the presence of exit
option can sharply reduce the probability that the voice option will be taken up widely
and effectively” (p.76).
Since a country is not a supermarket, the exit from it is more limited than an exit
from a simple buying and selling relationship: “exit is ordinarily unthinkable, though
not wholly impossible, from such primordial human groupings as family, tribe, church,
and state” (Hirschman, 1971, p.76). However, such an exit is easier for ethnic minorities
in a multi-ethnic state that have a “mother” country in which they can resettle. The fact
that between 1992-2005 more than 400,000 Russians left Kyrgyzstan for Russia, about
40,000 Germans left for Germany and 27,000 Jews immigrated to Israel suggests that
people do exercise this option. In Georgia, where the population is much more
homogeneous, the exit option was exercised only by ethnic Russians, who always
comprised less than 10 percent of the entire population and the separatist minorities –
Osetins and Abkhaz, and in smaller numbers.
What decreases the possibility of exit and increases the possibility of voice is
loyalty, or the feeling of attachment and affection, and in case of the states – patriotism.
Loyalty and voice are interdependent, Hirschman argues, as a member loyal to the
organization or the state
will often search for ways to make himself influential, especially when the
organization moves in what he believes is the wrong direction; conversely, a
member who wields (or thinks he wields) considerable power in an organization
and is therefore convinced that he can get it ‘back on the track’ is likely to develop
a strong affection for the organization in which he is powerful. (1971, p.78)
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Hirschman further argues that loyalty is an extremely important element for a state
as it not only holds exit constant and facilitates voice, but also because it can limit the
tendency of the most quality-conscious citizens to be the first to exit. As a result of
loyalty, these potentially most influential citizens
will stay on longer than they would ordinarily, in the hope or, rather, reasoned
expectation that improvement or reform can be achieved “from within.” This
loyalty, far from being irrational, can serve the socially useful purpose of
preventing deterioration from becoming cumulative, as it so often does when
there is no barrier to exit. (1971, p.79)
In the case of Kyrgyzstan, it can be argued, the massive exodus of ethnic minorities
in 1992-2005, the brain drain of the most talented and capable youth and migration of
laborers to the neighboring Kazakhstan and Russia testifies to the fact that loyalty in an
impoverished and corrupt state can keep citizens at bay only temporarily, especially
when the exit is not restricted by the state.
Thus, Hirschman’s explanation for the revolutions that took place in Georgia,
Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan would be that the citizens’ loyalty activated massive voicing of
dissatisfaction as a result of broken hopes for the change of power elites through honest
elections and therefore any improvement of their experienced reality. The popular
dissatisfaction was strong and significant enough to drive the entrenched presidents out
of power, and in the case of Kyrgyzstan – out of the country.
2.2.2. Importance of Good Governance in a Democracy
A brief overview of the contemporary democratic consolidation theory presented
above equips this research project with at least one useful assumption about the
democratic and communicative processes in the post-Soviet countries that recently went
through the second wave of democratization. This assumption is that shaking off the
authoritarian rulers is not enough to become a democracy and the color revolutions
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marked at best a return to the transitional phase rather than a step toward consolidated
democracy.
If the three post-revolution countries – Georgia, the Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan –
want to consolidate democracy, they must meet the three minimal conditions for an
institutionalized electoral democracy, as suggested by Linz and Stepan (2001). First, they
must establish and enforce true “stateness,” expressed in a strong, confident government
resting on the majority’s support and rule of law. Second, they must complete the
democratic transition by establishing fair and contested elections and efficient and
separated executive, judicial, and legislative powers. Finally, they must develop a high
level of culture of democratic governance, wherein the governing elites observe the
constitution and rights of individuals and minorities, respect the legislature, tolerate
criticism and pluralism of opinions, etc. (Linz & Stepan, 2001, p.94-95).
A considerable body of research in political science in general and transitology in
particular focuses on the first two conditions – stateness and completed democratic
transition – by analyzing the electoral and other political processes, development of
democratic institutions and agents and their interrelations with the state, evolution and
enforcement of rights and freedoms for individuals, etc. Volumes have written on the
problems of democratic transition, comparative democratic progress and
democratization in general through the prism of development of the state and civil
society institutions (e.g, Vanhanen, 2003; Doorkenspleet, 2005; Lane & Ersson, 2003;
Pinkney, 2005; O’Kane, 2004).
These studies of processes and political institutions provide useful insights into
why most of the former Soviet republics found themselves “lost in transition.”
However, they pay little attention to the culture of democratic governance, partly
perhaps because this element is less quantifiable, not easily measurable and more
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subjective. Based on the theoretical assumption that democratic consolidation is
impossible without a high culture of democratic governance, or in simpler terms, good
governance practices, the proposed study will focus on this last minimal condition for
democracy as it requires the perceptual, attitudinal and behavioral changes that are the
subject of interest for political communication researchers.
Some scholars and post-Soviet experts argue that the high level of culture of
democratic governance may require a generational change in power elites, i.e.
replacement of old “partokrats” with new democratically minded leaders.15 However, it
is also reasonable to believe that good governance requires a shift in mentality and
behavior on the part of not only the governing elites, who should strive for better
performance and accountability, but also the governed themselves, who need to develop
the sense of what good governance is and what kind of demands it puts on the power
elites. Therefore, probing and monitoring of good governance perceptions among
citizens is essential for new democracies so that the governments know how their
citizens evaluate their performance and take corrective actions as necessary.
Based on the foundational concept of culture of democratic governance developed
by Linz and Stepan and described above, as well as in consultations with the advisors
for this project, the following elements of good governance have been identified as
important in the post-Soviet context and essential for this study:


Understanding, by both the power elites and the citizens, that the government in
a democratic system is to serve rather than to rule the people;



Accountability, transparency and openness of undertaken actions and initiatives;

15

Among the three color revolution countries, the generational change in power elites took place only in
Georgia, where President Mikhael Saakashvili, a lawyer by education with a degree from Columbia University,
brought in a team of young democratically-minded Western-educated and reform-oriented professionals to the
highest government structures of the country.
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Observation of the Constitution and rights of individuals and minorities;



Trust with the governed;



Commitment to fight corruption;



Tolerance to criticism from the media, civic groups and individuals;



Fair and speedy treatment of citizens’ grievances; and



Public scrutiny of performance and campaign promises (usually translated into
approval ratings in established democracies).
Obviously, many of these elements are interconnected and interrelated. For

example, effective accountability is impossible without transparency and openness and
has to deal with the trust by the governed. By the same token, commitment to fight
corruption is useless without tolerance to criticism and public scrutiny of the
government’s performance, etc. None of these elements, however, is fully replaceable
with another element as they all provide a unique dimension to good governance.
Therefore, all of these elements were incorporated into good governance scales and
indexes of the survey instrument to be used in this study (see Appendix C).
2.2.4. Role of Internet-Based Media in Democratization
The debate about the role of the Internet in democracy is ongoing. Some analysts
suggest that by providing the virtually unlimited space for any information, the Internet
encourages users to be researchers of information who have access to diverse and
opposing points of view, thus encouraging the public debate on issues of importance
(Burnett & Marshall, 2003, pp.159-161). Others object that the central features of the
Internet such as anonymity and dispersion over time and space undermine the sort of
the public sphere and political interaction that is required for genuine democratic
participation and deliberation (Shapiro, 1999; Sunstein, 2001). Lasch, for example,
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argues that it is exactly because of the vast and unlimited nature of the Internet that the
content most important for public debates – news – is the least sought for, and since the
Internet provides mostly raw, unprocessed, and often unverified news, it impedes
rather than encourages the public debate (cited in Burnett & Marshall, 2003, p.160).
In this respect, it is useful to draw on Bohman’s distinction between the intrinsic
features and qualities of the Internet (hardware) and the space of publics, or people’s
uses and goals for the Internet (software). The hardware itself may be more conducive
for the public debate compared to other media, but it will be a dead network of wired
computers if the people do not fill it with meaning and actually engage in the debate
(cited in Bucy & Newhagen, 2004, pp.131-132). In this sense, the researchers arguing that
Internet has a potential for mobilizing people’s agency in building strong communities,
fostering civic participation through secure networks and even undermining the
authoritarian regimes, are right (Davis et al., 2002; Kalathil & Boas, 2003). Further, it is
reasonable to argue that where the governments control the traditional media through
direct ownership, third persons or other means such as subsidies, but encourage or at
least do not impede the development of Internet technologies, Internet-based media and
their audiences may become a viable source of alternative information contrasting the
official view transmitted by the government through the controlled media.
In the context of Kyrgyzstan, there is documented evidence that the websites of
political movements, an opposition newspaper Gazeta.kg and advocacy blog Akaevu.net
played a significant role in the March 2005 Revolution (Kulikova & Perlmutter, 2007).
For the country with the Internet penetration rate of about 10-15 per cent,16 this impact

16

Internet World Statistics (http://www.internetworldstats.com), Freedom House, and CIA World Factbook
report the 2005 Internet penetration rates in Georgia at 4%, in Kyrgyzstan – 5%. However, for Kyrgyzstan the
reports by the major national ISPs such as KyrgyzTelecom and Asiainfo estimate the penetration rate of 10-15%.
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may seem overestimated. However, the materials published on these oppositional sites
were circulated in print and re-inserted into the off-line world, which makes the
estimation of the true impact complicated.
With the Internet penetration rates in Kyrgyzstan slowly growing and the
democratic rhetoric still a significant part of the public debate, it is reasonable to expect
that the Internet will be playing an increasingly important role in constructing a reality
alternative to the one projected by the government and closer to the reality actually
experienced by the citizens. This understanding of the Internet media is key for the
design and implementation of this project.
2.2.5. Synthesis: A Model of Governance, Realities and Options for Actors
The theoretical foundations from political science, mass communication and
psychology presented in the literature review allow to synthesize the theories of good
democratic governance, cognitive dissonance, information seeking, and citizens’
behavioral options in a declining state into a single model. The model as applied to
Kyrgyzstan is presented in Figure 2.2.2.
The government, whose goal is to stay in power and govern rather than resign
before the term (the bracketed option), imposes its view of reality on the citizens. It does
so with the help of the traditional media it controls through direct ownership, shield
companies, subsidies, and unofficial agreements with the media managers. This
imposed view of reality is molded by the normative understanding of good governance
in a democratic system and the government’s desire to appear as serving the needs and
tending to expectations of the citizens. Since the government and its media are quite
trained and experienced in democratic rhetoric, this constructed reality may in fact hold
for some time until the citizens start to contrast it with their own experienced reality and
alternative sources of information.
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Figure 2.2.2. Reality, Governance and Options for Actors: Theoretical Model
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In constructing the good governance reality, the government appeals to the
citizens’ loyalty, often blaming the previous regime, and evoking the feelings of
patriotism and hope for a better future: ‘the Akaevs have left the country in a mess. We
are going through tough times, but this is our land and we need to overcome obstacles.
We also need to be patient because any revolutionary change takes time to yield
improvements.’ A thick blue line in the model represents this relationship.
The government-constructed view of reality conflicts with the reality the citizens
experience daily, as they continue facing pervasive corruption, decreasing living
standards, rising consumer prices and unemployment rate, and other deteriorating
conditions caused by bad governance practices. Many Internet forum commentators
point out that the current government has not learned the lessons from the previous
regime and continues doing what the Akaevs were doing, but with more greed and the
heightened fear of being overthrown. However, they still use the rhetoric of the
revolution and democracy as a shield and often appeal to citizens’ feeling of loyalty and
their own legitimacy (“the people have elected us in 2005, so we are a legitimate power
acting in the interests of the people”). The two red wavy lines in the model symbolize
the gap between the two realities, which creates a cognitive dissonance, or mental
discomfort, in the citizens’ minds. According to the cognitive dissonance theory, one of
the three behavioral possibilities can help remove the dissonance.
The first one is to accept the view of reality imposed by the government (thin blue
line in the model). This is the activated loyalty option, often taken up by those coming
from the same clan as the ruling elite or having a relative in the government structure.
This is not to say that this option is only for those who have some sort of personal stake
in the government. Some people may activate the loyalty option because they believe in
the government’s good intentions (albeit accompanied by inexperience and inability to
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govern) and the need to give it some time. Activating loyalty is probably the easiest
way to remove the dissonance, as it only requires a mental effort of bridging the two
realities together through self-persuasion.
The second option, represented by the purple lines in the model, is to reject the
projected reality by exiting the system either physically by leaving the country or
mentally by withdrawing into one’s own life-world or focusing on something else, like
education, family or making money. The real exit is more difficult both psychologically
and physically as people are deeply rooted in the country’s traditions, culture, language,
and are reluctant to leave behind their family and networks. Nonetheless, the ethnic
minorities still exercise this option: after March 2005 revolution, 45,000 ethnic Russians
left for Russia – the second largest wave after 1991-93 exodus of over 200,000 Russians.
In addition, an estimated 500-800,000 ethnic Kyrgyz are migrant workers in Kazakhstan
and Russia. Even though for them it is a temporary exit from the system, it is an exit
nonetheless, perhaps even better testifying to the country’s economic problems.
Individuals with high income, high levels of education and foreign language skills
often exercise the option of mental exit. They usually are relatively unaffected by the
realities and hardships other people face. Such individuals either construct their own,
more cosmopolitan reality with access to the outside world through the Internet and
BBC and CNN in their cable package or withdraw from public affairs because they are
completely disinterested in politics or simply too cynical about it. As citizens, such
individuals have little value because they do not participate in many societal processes.
They are effectively equal to those who exited physically, and many of them eventually
leave the country when opportunity presents itself. The mental exit is equal to the
option of ignoring the projected reality, which is the third behavioral option according
to the cognitive dissonance theory.
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Rejection of the government-constructed reality may result into the third option for
citizens who cannot or will not leave the country and are not able to ignore or put up
with the problems they face in their daily lives. This option is to voice dissatisfaction
with either the experienced reality (green lines in the model) or the projected reality
(yellow lines in the model), or both. The voice option is the most time- and effortconsuming and requires a certain degree of activism and courage to go against the
entrenched and unforgiving government. Therefore, not many individuals pursue this
option. Before such citizens voice their dissatisfaction or frustration with the current
state of affairs, they seek more information to understand where the gap is coming from,
to find facts supporting their view of reality and to establish contacts with other truthseeking individuals. This active form of gap closure, represented by a red line in the
model, is rooted in the uses and gratifications theory that views audiences as active
seekers of information rather than in the cognitive dissonance theory per se, whose
selective exposure, attention and perception suggest that people simply avoid or tailor
the information causing dissonance. For this reason, uses and gratification approach
proposed by Kaye (2007) will be adopted to explore the Internet media users’
motivations in Kyrgyzstan.
This is where the Internet with its uncontrolled and uncensored information is
coming into play. Several political sites in Kyrgyzstan, such as news agency 24.kg
www.24.kg, opposition newspaper Bely Parohod www.parohod.kg, non-profit Institute
for Public Policy www.ipp.kg, Bishkek Press Club www.bpc.kg, and Diesel political
forums on public platform www.diesel.elcat.kg extensively publish analytical
information on political events and the government’s policies and actions. These sites
usually serve as sources of alternative information and often support readers’ forums
with unedited comments from the participants.
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Most of these sites are not reaching wide audiences: their counters usually show
30-50 visitors at a time and up to 3,000 hits a day. However, the government
understands their importance and significance as they reach the most educated and
advanced audiences and tries to impose its view on the virtual world as well (thin
dotted blue line in the model suggests that these efforts are not as successful as in the
offline world). It is widely known in Kyrgyzstan’s web space that the presidential
administration appointed dozens of “monitors” who follow the information on these
sites and write comments as if they were ordinary citizens. In their comments, they
always voice support for the government and often use dirty tricks such as personal
insults and attacks on the journalists and other users who criticize the government.
One recent example is illustrative of the significance the government attaches to the
information published on the Internet sites. On March 15, 2007 one of the commentators
on Bely Parohod online newspaper presented himself as a clerk at a major Kyrgyz bank
that is known to serve all businesspeople and famous individuals, including the first
family. He wrote that in two previous days, he personally had processed two transfers
– one of $10 million and one of $20 million to a Swiss bank and suggested that the
president’s son transferred the money in store of the anti-government demonstrations
scheduled by the opposition for April 2007. “They are afraid of another revolution and
are getting ready to flee the country,” the commentator concluded.
This comment was copied on many other political websites the same day and the
next day and became a subject of heated discussions. In the evening of the next day,
AKI-press website published an extensive and detailed press-release from the National
Bank, titled “National Bank on ‘runaway’ capital.” Its whole purpose was to explain that
in the country where the annual budget is a little over $720 million, huge money
transfers would inevitably plummet the foreign exchange rate and cause major troubles
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in the market. Since no dip like that took place in the recent days, the article concluded,
the major transfers to foreign banks could not have happened. The press-release never
referred to the rumored amounts of the alleged transfers and their origin. However,
those users who followed the discussion immediately understood why the press-release
came out and dismissed it as a cover-up technique.
It should be noted that the eye-opening information available on the Internet can
push people who are frustrated with their experienced reality to use the exit option,
especially when the Internet also provides an opportunity for contact with the outside
world. It is not rare to see comments from people like “I quietly lived my comfortable
life until I walked into your chat room. Now I can’t sleep because I know we are being
ruled and robbed by a clique of kleptomaniacs. It’s time to leave the country.”
Kyrgyzstanis residing abroad often post notes such as “I am now studying in Europe
and a year ago I couldn’t wait to go home and help out the revolutionaries but now I
can see that they are even worse than the Akaev clan. I need to find a way to stay here
as Kyrgyzstan has no future with the ‘elites’ that are at power now.”
However, when people use the voice option, they have two tracks available for
them. The first one is represented by the yellow lines in Figure 2 and may be referred to
as “destructive” as its main goal is to expose the government’s lies and bad governance
practices. This track usually results into the demands for the government to resign. An
example of activity that represents this track through the media-constructed world
would be writing a letter to the editor in response to false or distorted information or
participating in a demonstration demanding the government’s resignation. The
exposure track has more potential for impact on the Internet, as it has no gatekeepers
who decide which letters get published and the readers’ comments usually remain
intact. However, the Internet information exposing the government lies and distortions
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can only be effective when it spills over into the off-line world, i.e. when the Internet
users share what they learned from online media with non-users. Otherwise the
information is relatively ineffective because it can reach at best only 10-15 per cent of the
country’s population who have the Internet access.
The second voice track is represented by the green lines in the model and can be
referred to as “constructive” because its main goal is to improve the experienced reality
or the bad government practices. Civic groups working within the law use this track.
An example of activity representing this track would be participation in a peaceful
demonstration demanding reforms or working with civic groups to help the
disadvantaged. Since this form of voicing the dissatisfaction is less confrontational than
the destructive exposure and is an integral part of any system claiming to be a
democracy, it often happens in the open, real world. However, such enlightened and
advanced civic groups and individuals still use the Internet to share the information,
mobilize their base, and foster connections, especially with the outside world. For
instance, Edil Baisalov, the leader of the NGO Coalition, maintains his personal blog
read by many of his supporters and adversaries both inside and outside Kyrgyzstan.
The main focus of this project is the red and yellow lines as they present the most
interest for the formation of public sphere on the Internet and its realization in the offline world. The green line representing voice in the form of political involvement will
be explored as well. The methodology section below spells out how these relationships
will be operationalized in the study. It is necessary to note at the outset that the quality
of governance will be measured by the variables evaluating government performance
and understanding of democratic norms. Experienced reality will be tapped by the
perceptions of the changes in individual economic situation and political rights and
liberties after March 2005, while media approval variable is a proxy for the attitudes
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toward the constructed reality. On the exit-voice dimension, civic activity index will be
a proxy for voice, and the variable “Your future in Kyrgyzstan” with several leave-stay
options will serve as a measure of readiness to exit. Finally, the variables tapping into
frustration with the government performance and system of governance will serve as a
measure of the gap between the constructed and experienced reality (see Figure 2.2.2).
Based on this theoretical model of government-citizen interaction as well as the
view of the Internet as a facilitator of the public sphere, the following hypotheses and
research questions are formulated:
Hypothesis 1: Compared to traditional media users, Internet-based media users will
have: (a) higher political interest, and (b) higher levels of political knowledge.
Hypothesis 2: Compared to traditional media users, Internet-based media users will
have more negative evaluations of traditional media performance (a proxy for
constructed reality).
Hypothesis 3: Government performance controlled for demographics, especially
such as income and employment, will predict the respondents’ experienced
reality, expressed in satisfaction with a change in (a) current economic situation
and (b) the political rights and freedoms after March 2005.
Hypothesis 4: Internet-based media users will have (a) lower evaluations of
government performance, and (b) higher levels of frustration with the current
government of Kyrgyzstan than the traditional media users.
Hypothesis 5: Given the high levels of frustration with the government, two
options: (a) Internet-based media users will show higher levels of civic activity
(“voice”) than traditional media users, or, alternatively (b) when considering
their own future in Kyrgyzstan, Internet-based media users will be more
oriented to leaving the country (“exit”) than the traditional media users.
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Research Question 1: What are the patterns (if any) of sharing information between
Internet-media users and those who have no Internet access?

2.3 Methods and Instruments
To test the hypotheses and answer the research questions formulated above, both
qualitative and quantitative research methods and techniques were employed.
Specifically, the set of research methods implemented included the following:
1. Observation of Internet-users in their natural environment (Internet cafés and
university computer labs) allowed determining their use patterns, skills, and habits. A
total over 300 hours of observation was completed in June-November 2007. Some of the
observed participants were interviewed in the Internet cafés, but follow-up interviews
were not a necessary element of the research design.
2. Semi-structured focus groups with Internet users and traditional media users. A
total of 10 focus groups, seven with Internet users and three with non-users with 3-8
participants in each, were conducted in October-December 2007. The participants were
recruited among the respondents in the face-to-face survey, as well as through flyers
posted at universities and Internet-cafés.
3. Face-to-face survey of 176 Bishkek residents and group surveys of 124 students of
American University – Central Asia (AUCA), Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University
(KTMU), Kyrgyz-Russian Slavonic University (KRSU), and Kyrgyz Technical University
(KTU) on elements of good governance and assessment of the government performance.
The survey was designed to identify the respondents’ level of political knowledge,
behavioral options for coping with reality and media and Internet use patterns (see
Appendix C, also presenting the variables’ coding scheme). With no donor funding
available, the face-to-face survey was conducted by a group of 12 trained student
volunteers from AUCA and KTMU. They have made a total of 489 approaches, and in
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313 cases were turned down for the reasons of lack of time, unwillingness to participate
in political surveys, or the length of the survey (on average, it took 25-30 minutes to
complete one interview). The following data were collected on non-respondents:
gender, approximate age, and ethnicity. Thus, the response rate of the face-to-face
survey was 36 per cent.
A mail and phone surveys were also attempted, with the response rate of .03 and
.05 per cent respectively (400 phone calls yielded 20 completed interviews and 500-letter
mailing – 14 filled out questionnaires). The mail survey was based on a sampling frame
provided by the National Statistics Committee from the latest available 1999 census, and
58 letters returned as undeliverable, which testifies to the problems with the sample
addresses. In general, mail surveys in Kyrgyzstan are not common practice and it is
inevitable that the addressees were suspicious about the political nature of the survey.
The phone survey had similar problems: the first question the many hostile and
unwilling respondents always asked was an angry “Where did you get my number?” or
“I am not interested in politics,” followed sometimes by insults. In many cases, people
said they didn’t have time to answer questions or directly stated they were not going to
discuss government and politics. Due to the low response rates, the results of these
surveys were not included into the final dataset.
4. Internet survey of web-based media users using the same instrument as in the
face-to-face survey, with some questions replaced to measure Internet use patterns (see
Appendix C). The survey employed a snowball self-selected sample initiated on the
online political forums and sites of the leading on-line media and passed on by the
respondents to their friends and acquaintances. A total of 115 people started the survey,
and 10 responses were excluded because they answered only 3-7 questions of the
questionnaire. Thus, the total N for the online survey is 105. The online survey has
80

produced the largest proportion of missing demographics data: 19 respondents dropped
the survey as they reached the demographics section. These responses were still
included into the final data set since the substantive questions had been answered and
the demographics had been skipped perhaps for the fear of possible identification.
With the three modes of collection combined, the total number of responses in the
final dataset of the survey is 405. While not representative, the survey still reflects
accurately the opinions of younger Bishkek residents, especially students, and allows for
comparisons between the users and non-users of Internet.
2.3.1. Survey Instrument
Some of the items in the questionnaire in Appendix C were designed specifically
for the purpose of this research and therefore are original. Other items, such as
demographics, government performance approval, and media use, were formulated
based on commonly used formats in Pew and other surveys, especially surveys that had
been conducted in the post-Soviet environment. The following subscales were
borrowed from Gibson, Duch, and Tedin (1992):
Support for the Norms of Democracy Subscale
1. No matter what a person’s political beliefs are, he/she is entitled to the
same legal rights and protections as anyone else
2. It is necessary that everyone, regardless of their views, can express
themselves freely
Support for the Value of Dissent Subscale
1. Kyrgyzstan’s government should become much more open to the public
2. If an unjust law is passed, I could do nothing about it
3. People should be able to participate in any organization even if this
activity opposes some current laws
4. We are more likely to have a healthy economy if the government allows
more freedom for individuals to do as they wish
Support for Independent Media Subscale
1. The press should be protected by the law from persecution by the
government
2. Private radios, television, and newspapers should exist alongside stateowned media.
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In addition, the following scale was borrowed from Olsen (1969):
Political Incapability Scale
1. The public officials do not care much about what people like me think of
their performance
2. There is no way other than voting that people like me can influence
actions of the government
3. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that I can’t
really understand what’s going on
4. People like me don’t have much say about what the government does.
These scales were selected because they have been reported to have high validity
and because they have been earlier used in surveys conducted in Russia and other postSoviet republics, which are similar to Kyrgyzstan in terms of political systems and the
characteristics of the population.
The questionnaire was pretested in two focus groups with senior AUCA and
KTMU journalism students, where they filled out the questionnaire and asked questions
about the wording and meaning of the items. Several adjustments to the questionnaire
were made based on their comments, mostly in terms of the wording and better
rendering of concepts in Russian.
As a second step, a pre-test survey of 112 AUCA students was conducted in groups
of 12-22 students at the end of classes. The dataset produced by this pre-test was used
to conduct factor analysis to make sure that the borrowed indexes worked correctly and
to construct new indexes. The preliminary factor analysis alerted to some differences
with the original scaled borrowed for this project, as well as to the existence of the
overall frustration with government index.
After all the data were collected, another factor analysis was run on Items 10-38 of
the final questionnaire presented in Appendix C. The analysis produced 29 components,
with nine components explaining 53 per cent of variance and Eigen values of higher
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than 1.00. On all 29 components, Eigen values range from the highest of 3.912 to the
lowest of .388. Such a disparity can be due to the fact that the variables measured
various issues relating to good governance, tapping into both normative understanding
and subjective perceptions, and at different points of time.
For the purposes of constructing the indexes for this project, only the first three
components were selected. These components produced the following indexes: 1) level
of frustration with the government, 2) support for norms of democracy, including free
expression and independent media, and 3) understanding of own political incapacity
(see Table 2.3.1.1). Although these three components explain cumulatively only 28% of
the variance in the data, they loaded most of the variables from the original indexes
borrowed for this project and the new variables of interest.
As Table 2.3.1.1 shows, not all items from the original indexes loaded on the three
extracted components for this study’s sample as it was expected.
First, the original Value of Dissent Scale did not come out as a separate component.
Two of its items (8 and 9 in the Table) loaded heavily on the Norms of Democracy
component, which is logical because democratic norms include requirement for the
government’s transparency and support for dissent. Item 18, originally the second one
from the Value of Dissent Scale, loaded better on Political Incapacity component, while
Item 23 (third in the original scale) has low coefficients on all three components.
This was the item that raised most questions in the pre-tests, focus groups, and
group interviews, and many respondents pointed out that it went against their beliefs
that law-abiding citizens cannot oppose the current laws, so such activity is illegal by
definition. In future surveys to be conducted in the post-Soviet space, this item should
be reworded more clearly to tap at the concept of dissent or freedom of association. For
the purpose of this paper, the item was left out from all scales.
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Table 2.3.1.1. Principal Component Factor Analysis
#
1.
23.
2.
5.
3.
4.
4.
17.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Questionnaire Item/Original Scale
Q.38. I believe my parliament representative would
follow up on my concern if I express it
Q.18. The current government of Kyrgyzstan is
committed to fight corruption
Q.17. Generally, the government can be trusted to
implement policies that will improve people’s situation
Q.31. Those who are in power today understand that they
were elected to serve rather than to rule the people
Q.33. The courts in Kyrgyzstan make decisions
independently, without government officials’ interference
Q.32. I feel that if I had to seek a court’s protection I
would receive a speedy and fair trial
Q.25. Anyone with appropriate skills and qualifications
can enter a government agency and work for it
Q.22. Kyrgyzstan’s government should become much
more open to the public/Value of Dissent Scale, Item 1
Q.16. We are more likely to have a healthy economy if the
government allows more freedom for individuals to do as
they wish/Value of Dissent Scale, Item 4
Q.11. No matter what a person’s political beliefs are,
he/she is entitled to the same legal rights and protections
as anyone else/Norms of Democracy Scale, Item 1
Q.34. It is necessary that everyone, regardless of their
views, can express themselves freely/ Norms of
Democracy Scale, Item 2
Q.30. Private media should exist alongside state-owned
ones/ Independent Media Scale, Item 2
Q.20. The press should be protected by the law from
persecution by the government/Ind. Media Scale, Item 1
Q.21. Today it is less dangerous for individuals to
criticize the government than before March 2005
Q.29. In Kyrgyzstan, demonstrations and protests are
effective in influencing a government decision
Q.19. Generally, the government is tolerant to criticism
from opposition and media
Q.36. People like me don’t have much say about what the
government does/Political Incapacity Scale, Item 4
Q.23. If an unjust law is passed, I could do nothing about
it/ Value of Dissent Scale, Item 2
Q.35. Sometimes politics and government seem so
complicated that I can’t really understand what’s going on
/Political Incapacity Scale, Item 3
Q.10. There is no way other than voting that people like
me can influence the actions of the government/ Political
Incapacity Scale, Item 2
Q.27. As an individual, I can do something to improve
the current situation in Kyrgyzstan for the better
Q.28. The public officials do not care much about what
people like me think of their performance/ Political
Incapacity scale, Item 1
Q.26. People should be able to participate in any
organization even if this activity opposes some current
laws/ Value of Dissent Scale, Item 3
Eigen Value
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Frustration
with Govt
.576

Norms of
democracy

Political
Incapacity

.572
.552
.482
.518
.515
.415
.487
.425
.400
.593
.480
.318
.267
.241
.221
.575
.049

.523
.409
.348

.369

-.395

-.369

.158

-.029

.061

.126

3.912

2.243

1.858

Second, Item 22 (originally from the Political Incapacity Scale) loaded much better
on Frustration with Government component, where it is a negative equivalent of Item 21
(measure of individual political capacity). It was ultimately left out from the final
Political Incapacity Index, which included four items (Items 17-20 in the Table).
The Norms of Democracy component was subdivided into three 3-item indexes:
Support for Norms of Democracy (Items 8-10), Independent Media and Free Expression
(Items 11-13), and Tolerance of Dissent (Items 14-16).
Finally, the Frustration with Government component was divided into two
subscales: Frustration with Performance (Items 1-4) and Frustration with the System
(Items 5-7). These two subscales were also combined into one Overall Frustration with
Government Index and used in subsequent regression models.
In addition to these scales, three composite indexes were created to capture
political knowledge (five items, Questions 4-8 in Appendix C), media use (five items,
dummy variables in Question 53), and citizen activity, or political involvement (three
items, Questions 63-65 in Appendix C). For the variables, indexes and their coding
schemes see Appendix D.
2.3.2. Sample Characteristics
The samples for the three methods used in this study were slightly different. The
observations, naturally, allowed for no sample selection techniques, and only estimated
guesses could be made about the observed users’ age and ethnic origin. The level of
comfort and observed speed of working on the Internet allowed to estimate how
experienced the users are, however, no visible association was observed between the
skill level and types of Internet activities the users were involved in. It was observed
that there was no dominance of a particular ethnicity among the users: Kyrgyz, Russians
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and other ethnic minorities were represented in the observed sample. There were
slightly more men than women in the observation sample, and males tended to
populate the Internet cafés more than females in the evenings. Younger people were
clearly dominating the Internet cafés compared to older people.
Since the focus groups were aimed at understanding how the Internet users
process and share information, the participants were mostly students and staff (ages 1825) of American University – Central Asia, Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University, KyrgyzRussian Slavonic University, Kyrgyz Technical University, Bishkek Humanitarian
University, and Kyrgyz National University. Females dominated the sample: in 7 focus
groups of 3-8 participants, a total of 28 females participated and 15 males. In terms of
ethnic composition, the focus groups were diverse (with Russians, Koreans, Uzbeks, and
Tatars in the sample), although there were more Kyrgyz (20 of 42) than other ethnic
group representatives. The three focus groups with non-users of the Internet included
13 participants (five males and eight females) and were more diverse in terms of age
(ranging from early 20s to mid-50s), and ethnicity, with Russians, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and
Tatars represented.
As for the survey sample, it includes a total of 405 respondents. In terms of the
gender composition, it is roughly reflective of Kyrgyzstan’s general population, where
females comprise about 53 per cent. In the sample, of 385 respondents, whose gender
was identified or indicated (20 cases with missing gender data come from the online
survey), 164 (42.6 per cent) are males, and 221 (57.4 per cent) – females.
A total of 373 respondents in the sample identified their ethnicity. Of them, 243
(65.1 per cent) are Kyrgyz, 85 (22.8 per cent) – Russians, 6 (1.6 per cent) – Uzbeks, and 39
(10.5 per cent) identify with other ethnic groups, such as Kazakhs, Ukrainians, Tatars,
Uigurs, Dungans, Jews, and Germans. According to the recent National Statistics
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Committee estimates, Kyrgyzstan’s population currently consists of about 52 per cent
Kyrgyz, 30 per cent Uzbeks, 12 per cent Russian, and the rest – other ethnic minorities.
The sample for this study, then, slightly over-represents Kyrgyz and Russians and
substantially under-represents Uzbeks. However, given that the sample was drawn in
Bishkek, the capital city in the north, while most Uzbek population is concentrated in
the southern regions of the country, the sample actually reflects accurately the ethnic
composition of the capital city, where Russians are estimated to comprise about 25 per
cent and Kyrgyz – about 60 per cent, with the remaining 15 per cent represented by
other ethnic minorities.
Due to the subject availability, the sample over represents young people: a total of
233 respondents (60.1 per cent of 388 who reported the age) are within the first two
categories of 25 and younger. The other age groups are distributed more or less evenly,
from 2.1 to 9.8 per cent of respondents in each category. This variation still allows for
meaningful age comparisons, especially when it comes to comparisons between the
traditional and Internet-based media users, who are generally younger than those who
do not use the Internet.
The two largest income groups lay on both extremes of the sample: of 337 people
who indicated income, 65 (19.3 per cent) reported income of $700 or more, while 63
respondents (18.7 per cent) - $100-199. Twenty-nine of 65 high-income respondents
filled out the online survey from higher-income countries like the USA, Great Britain,
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Kazakhstan, thus skewing the sample considerably.
Overall, the income variable presents significant problems with 68 (16.8 per cent)
cases with missing data and cumulative percent of the three lowest categories of about
47. In a country like Kyrgyzstan, which is a cash economy with many economic
activities “in the shadow,” it is inevitable that income will be under-reported or not
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reported at all. This is also indirectly confirmed by the fact that in many personal
interviews respondents asked if the data on income would be reported to the
government. Even with these problems, however, the income variable reflects the
general tendency that there is no middle class majority in Kyrgyzstan, and most people
fall on either of the two ends – poor or well-off. This is why the concept of “average”
income does not make substantive sense and creates difficulties for statistical analysis.17
When the missing values are substituted with the mean in the regression models, many
variables that were significant lose statistical significance.
Related to income, 177 respondents, or 46.5 per cent of those who reported their
employment status are students, and another 46.4 percent – employed at least part-time,
with 4.7 and 2.4 per cent of unemployed and pensioners respectively. Finally, the
sample over represents educated people, with 47.8 per cent reporting incomplete higher
education (this category includes student respondents), 34.3 per cent – completed higher
education, and 6.8 per cent – an advanced academic degree.
Proceeding to political interest, the largest category of the respondents – 135, or
34.8 per cent of 388 who answered this question – indicated that they had a moderate
interest in politics. Those whose interest is at the two lower levels comprise 20.6 per
cent, and those with higher levels of political interest – combined 44.6 per cent. This, in
fact, is congruent with the actual levels of political knowledge: those who answered
correctly three questions of the 5-item scale comprise 22.5 per cent of the sample, while
those with high and highest levels of knowledge combined make up 54.6 per cent of the
sample. Only two respondents (.5 per cent) did not answer a single question correctly.

17

The National Statistics Committee of Kyrgyzstan reported that the average salary at the end of February 2007
was 2.869 som, or about $80, and as of February 2008 – 4.407 som, or $115 (24.kg, Economic news (April 22,
2008), http://eng.24.kg/business/2008/04/22/5197.html).
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The distribution of the media consumption falls mostly on the lower end: 46.7 per
cent of respondents identified that they use only one or two media outlets as a source of
political information, 25.4 per cent – three media sources, and 12.6 and 7.9 per cent –
four and five media respectively. However, this is at least partly compensated by the
Internet use: out of 271 (66.9 per cent of the total sample) Internet users, 260 reported
that they use Internet-based media to obtain information on politics and public affairs.
In subsequent analyses, both variables – Internet use in general and Internet-based
media use will be used, depending on the purpose of the model.

2.4 Results and Discussion
This section presents the results of various regression models based on the
relationships identified in Figure 2.2.2, as well as results of focus groups and
observations to provide depth and detail on the survey findings. The models will
correspond to the key elements in Figure 2.2.2, starting with evaluation of government
performance, evaluation of media performance, perception of the respondents’
economic situation and rights and liberties after March 2005, and ending with the
respondents’ political involvement and perceptions of their future in Kyrgyzstan.
However, it is necessary to start with the understanding of the factors driving the
political interest and political knowledge since they are key for understanding
differences between various media users.
2.4.1

Political Interest and Political Knowledge

These two variables are key to understanding of people’s perceptions of good
governance. Thus, the analysis will start with exploration of what demographic
variables drive them in the sample of this study. Many earlier research studies showed
that political interest is driven by such demographic factors as age, gender and
education, as well as income and media use patterns.
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For the purposes of this study, it is reasonable to assume that the political interest
may be a function of how satisfied the citizens are with their economic situation and
rights and liberties because higher levels of frustration with own current situation can
lead to either higher political interest and involvement out of protest or higher levels of
alienation from politics. Political interest, in its turn, should determine political
knowledge, which is key to understanding of good governance.
To test Hypothesis 1, I started with political interest, coded from 1=not interested
at all to 5=extremely interested. Table 2.4.1.1 presents the regression analyses results. It
should be noted that the demographic variables explain only about 13 and 17 per cent of
the variance in political interest in Models 1 and 2 respectively, which means that there
must be something else, most probably on the experiential side, that influences to what
extent people are interested in the political matters. In the focus groups, however, it
consistently came out that those who struggle economically are more alienated from
politics. One participant, pensioner Elena18, for example, stated the following:
When you have to… uh, always think about how to put bread on your table
and uh… not to become a burden for your children, you think about politics the
last. I am happy when I live through the day without thinking what I will eat
tomorrow or… how to pay the utility bills that eat up one third of my pension…
And you are talking about politics… our politicians don’t care about us, why
should I think about them?
Another participant, a part-time saleswoman at a struggling cosmetic store, also
noted that the government’s indifference deters her from paying attention to politics:
I work only because my pension is miserable. I would be much happier, at my
age, to sit at home and babysit my grandkids. But if I don’t work, I will die of
hunger – no one can survive on 765 som [about $18] a month… I wish our
politicians tried to live on such a pension. They are either clueless or don’t care.

18

Names of focus group participants are changed for confidentiality reasons.
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I am OK, though, because I still can work. Many people my age and older have to
live on their pension. I have a neighbor, baba Valya, whose children left for
Russia… she refused to go, and now she is alone. She literally survives on bread,
milk, and water, tea on a good day. When I think about people like her… and she
had worked all her life, her husband got killed in World War II and this is how the
government now is paying her back, when she is old and sick… it makes me really
angry. Why should I care about politics when the government couldn’t care less
about people? I simply stopped reading or listening to them… I read newspapers
for crossword puzzles only…
Income catches some of this relationship between the economic situation and
political interest, showing that indeed as income increases by one unit, the interest in
politics increases by .06 units (Model 2).
Table 2.4.1.1. Determinants of Political Interest
Independent
variables

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

B

SE

t

B

SE

t

B

SE

t

2.177***

.247

7.959

2.056***

.288

7.139

2.338

.400

5.846

1. Media Use

.199***

.044

7.959

.236***

.045

5.207

.240***

.046

5.221

2. Education

.151*

.082

2.118

.093

.085

1.092

.068

.087

.782

3. Age

.018

.029

.609

.029

.030

.328

.042

.031

1.390

4. Gender

-.255**

.116

-2.206

-.288**

.119

-2.418

-.305**

.120

-2.533

5. Internet use

.362**

.143

2.282

.317**

.159

1.999

.355**

.162

2.191

6. Kyrgyz

.424**

.164

2.585

.294*

.167

2.060

.320*

.168

2.187

7. Russians

-.044

.191

-.016

-.103

.195

-.525

-.123

.196

-.628

.055**

.024

2.272

.052**

.025

2.120

9. Government
works for people

.025

.054

.466

10. Public officials
are indifferent

-.002

.053

-.030

11. Perceptions of
rights and liberties

-.115*

.065

-2.045

12. Perceptions of
economic situation

-.042

.053

-.782

(Constant)

8. Income

Model summary

N=382, R2=.127,
F=7.752***

N=334, R2=.165,
F=8.029***

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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N=333, R2=.177,
F=5.741***

Since the income variable is problematic in the sample, three perceptual variables
were introduced in Model 3 to see if perceptions of the government’s indifference as
well as perceptions of own economic reality and political rights may play a role in
political interest. However, this did not increase the explained variance in political
interest significantly and of the four variables, only the perception of rights and liberties
turned out significant, indicating, as it was hypothesized, that the higher levels of
frustration with own economic situation results into lower levels of political interest
(alienation from political matters).
The findings from this analysis are significant for this project, as they show that
using the Internet media is strongly and positively associated with the political interest:
being an Internet media user increases the political interest by .362.
Thus, the data from this sample fully supports Hypothesis 1 (a) that use of the
Internet-based media increases political interest. Moreover, several participants in focus
groups pointed out that their political interest was stimulated by the use of Internet.
The following is what one of the students described:
Zulfiya: “I didn’t care about politics until I was given a task for my polisci class
– to make a presentation on the system of governance in Kyrgyzstan… basic stuff:
who is the president, what his authorities are, how the balance of powers works,
something like that… Before that assignment, I didn’t even know that my country
was a presidential republic. So, I started to do the Internet search and stumbled
upon a discussion about President Bakiev on Diesel forum. I got hooked and now
am totally addicted. There are so many people on that forum, and they all know
so much more, it is amazing. I always go there when I don’t understand
something about politics… or just want to learn something new.”
Another participant, a Turkish University student, had a similar experience with an
Internet-based newspaper:
Maria: “I wanted to find “Bely Parohod,” Chingiz Aitmatov’s novel, on the
Internet. The first link Google gave me was… the Bely Parohod newspaper. I never
heard about it before and, uh…, as a student of journalism I got interested and
decided to have a look. Oh, the comments the people leave there for each article!..
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It is like a micro cosmos of our entire society – those who love the president and
those who hate him, and they fight all the time. Sometimes they leave offensive
comments, but I think this is exactly what attracts other readers, as well as the
rumors they spread and discuss there. It’s like the gossip column on politics run
by the people themselves… I now start my day by reading this site, and when I
share it with my friends, they always ask now if I read this on Bely Parohod…”
Several more participants pointed out that their political interest was stimulated by
links to stories and political analyses that friends had sent to them by email. Thus, both
the survey and the focus groups show that Internet use is strongly and positively
associated with political interest.
In addition, the survey shows that, consistent with many other studies, being a
woman decreases political interest, persistently in all three models in Table 2.4.1.2.
Media Use Index is also highly significant in all models, showing that with every new
type of medium added to the user’s mix, political interest increases by .199, .236 and .238
in the three models respectively.
Another interesting finding is that being a Kyrgyz matters for political interest.
Being Russian, on the other hand, decreases political interest, although this relationship
is not statistically significant. This may be explained by the fact that as a titular nation
Kyrgyz have more vested interested in the political matters. Russians, on the other
hand, are becoming more and more excluded from the governance system, and
therefore feel alienated and lose interest to the political matters and public affairs.
Surprisingly, education has a statistically significant effect only in Model 1 and no
effect in Models 2 and 3, while age has no effect in any of the three models. This can be
explained by the homogeneity in the variables: perhaps they behave this way because
they do not vary much due to dominating students in the sample.
However, in the focus groups it often came up that age matters for political interest
and younger people are less interested in politics than older and more mature citizens.
93

As an example, consider this exchange between AUCA students in a focus group:
Aida: “I think young people are simply not interested in politics.”
Moderator: “Hmm…Why do you think this is the case?”
Aida: “I don’t know… being young we are not burdened by children, families
and other responsibilities, I guess… When you have those responsibilities, uh,
you start thinking about the government in a different way. I look at my sister
who has a baby, and she is now totally different. She is concerned about the
health care because the baby gets sick, and is thinking about quality of education.
I guess the next step for her will be thinking, like, ‘what does the government do
to improve these things?’ Yeah, I am far from this, personally.”
Olga: “A-ha, at this point we think more about how to study well…”
Bermet, interrupting: “and how to party well.” [laughs]
Olga: “Yes, exactly… we all have friends we want to hang out with, and
honestly, we rarely talk about politics…”
In another focus group with non-users of Internet, and older participant reiterated
the same idea:
Ainagul, accountant, 45: “My daughter is a student, and she studies so hard she
has no time to take a break… When I start talking with her about politics and
government, she… she knows a lot because she has access to Internet and they
discuss things in their classes, but she is not interested at all. She thinks politics is
boring… I guess I am not like that – I always go to vote and want to know what is
going on… She just wants to have fun, and sometimes it is frustrating how
indifferent she is…”
Sergei, high school sports coach, 26: “Do you remember yourself at that age?
Were you interested in politics then?”
Ainagul, pausing: “Hmm… Good question. I guess, not. I also wanted to spend
time with my friends and, uh, have fun more than anything else. But those were
different times [Soviet Union]. The government took good care of us… now
everything is so uncertain… I think about my job, my family, my country all the
time… I hope my daughter will come around and grow up as well… It is
impossible not to be concerned when life is so hard…”
Sergei: “Yeah, but right now she is not concerned because she has you… You as
parents take care of her, feed her, clothe her, so why should she be concerned?
Give her some time… or kick her out of the house [laughs]. Then she’ll definitely
start looking at everything from a different angle, when she is independent.”
Natalia, Sergei’s girlfriend: “Someone speaking from his own experience…”
Sergei, smiling: “Yeah, I moved in with you two years ago, remember?”
The theme that young people are not mature and responsible enough to be deeply
interested in politics came up in the focus groups again and again. However, during
debriefing at the end of the focus groups, when asked whether they learned something
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new and useful, many of the younger participants emphasized that their interest in
politics was renewed. One of the participants formulated her feelings this way:
Aigul, a KRSU student: “This was really refreshing. I didn’t know what focus
groups were, so I came only out of curiosity… and it wasn’t a time wasted.
Usually, the teachers ask us questions only to test our knowledge, and are
interested in what we say only as long as it is a correct answer in their minds, to
put it nicely. Here, it felt like, uh, you were genuinely interested in our opinions,
and wanted us to discuss things… I liked the discussion, and, uh, that we all had
such different opinions and views and didn’t fight about them, but simply
talked… I will think about politics in a different way now, and will be more
curious about the government and governance issues…”
Returning to the survey results, they should be considered with caution in terms of
the causal direction. Even though the results show that the political interest is driven by
Internet use, it may be also that the people who are more interested in political matters
move to the Internet because they cannot find sufficient information in the traditional
media and are attracted by the Internet resources and communities where the
discussions are much more open. Indeed, as Table 2.4.1.1a below shows, the regression
models with the same variables as in Table 2.4.1.1 with the exception that the dependent
variable (political interest) becomes an independent one, and the Internet Use variable is
the variable of interest, have higher levels of explained variance and much higher Fvalues than the models with political interest as a dependent variable.
As the table shows, political interest indeed determines Internet use. Internet use is
also driven by education, income, and age: higher educated respondents, respondents
with higher levels of income, and younger people use Internet more. Finally, Internet
use is also determined by the respondents’ perceptions of their economic situation and
rights and liberties: those people who disagree more that their situation improved after
March 2005 use Internet in contrast to non-users, who are associated with lower levels of
frustration with the personal economic situation and rights and liberties.
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Table 2.4.1.1a. Determinants of Internet Use
Independent
variables

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

B

SE

t

B

SE

t

B

SE

T

.490***

.103

4.748

.288**

.106

2.701

.033

.147

.226

1. Media Use

-.010

.016

-.587

.004

.016

.228

-.001

.016

-.090

2. Education

.155***

.029

5.410

.109***

.029

3.754

.117***

.029

4.004

3. Age

-.109***

.009

-12.394

-.099***

.009

-11.384

-.098***

.009

-10.920

4. Gender

.014

.042

.343

.003

.042

.082

.017

.042

.405

5. Political interest

.042*

.018

2.282

.038*

.019

1.999

.040*

.019

2.095

6. Kyrgyz

-.033

.059

-.547

-.003

.058

-.056

-.007

.058

-.116

7. Russians

.032

.069

.465

.063

.068

.929

.070

.067

1.033

.054***

.008

6.730

.051***

.008

6.348

9. Government
works for people

-.002

.018

-.105

10. Public officials
are indifferent

.020

.018

1.101

11. Perceptions of
rights and liberties

.037*

.022

1.985

12. Perceptions of
economic situation

.034*

.016

2.202

(Constant)

8. Income

Model summary

N=382, R2=.310,
F=24.030***

N=334, R2=.421,
F=29.582***

N=333, R2=.440,
F=20.921***

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

These results suggest that the causality between the political interest and Internet
use is two-directional, but this study does not provide sufficient data to test it further.
One of the recommendations for future research is to conduct the same survey at
different points of time so that the true causality could be established through the
dynamic statistical models.
Returning to the relationships central for this study, political interest should
influence political knowledge. Indeed, the two variables have a meaningful correlation
coefficient of .21, significant at .01 level. As the results of multiple regression analysis
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show, a one-unit change in political interest indeed increases political knowledge by
.113 units (see Table 2.4.1.2). To explore what other variable are associated with political
knowledge and to test Hypothesis 1 (b), the same demographic and perceptual variables
as in Table 2.4.1.1 were included into regression models as independent variables.
Table 2.4.1.2. Determinants of Political Knowledge
Independent
variables

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

B

SE

t

B

SE

t

B

SE

t

2.159***

.309

6.961

2.585***

.450

5.741

2.474***

.412

6.003

1. Media Use

.100**

.047

2.119

.084*

.051

1.634

.114**

.047

2.415

2. Education

.137

.087

1.587

.191*

.093

2.047

.152^

.087

1.749

3. Age

.071**

.031

2.340

.061^

.033

1.869

.073**

.031

2.378

4. Gender

-.202^

.122

-1.657

-.116

.130

-.894

-.167

.121

-1.375

5. Internet Media
Use

.416**

.150

2.769

.438**

.175

2.510

.426**

.151

2.833

6. Kyrgyz

.107

.173

.043

.112

.181

.619

.103

.172

.596

7. Russians

-.253

.200

-1.265

-.234

.210

-1.116

-.254

.198

-1.285

8. Income

-.016

.026

-.623

9. Government
works for people

.090

.058

1.558

.093^

.054

1.720

10. Public officials
are Indifferent

-.132*

.056

-2.351

-.128*

.052

-2.454

11. Perceptions of
rights & liberties

-.133*

.070

-1.897

-.146*

.065

-2.224

12. Perceptions of
econ. situation

.066

.057

1.150

.074

.054

1.373

.096^

.060

1.597

.109*

.054

2.038

(Constant)

13. Political Interest
Model Summary

.113**

.054

2.095

N=382, R2=.105,
F=5.457***

N=333, R2=.125,
F=3.508***

N=381, R2=.141,
F=5.032***

^p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

In this set of models, income behaves differently than in the models with political
interest as a dependent variable. When added in Model 2, due to missing cases, income
drives the proportion of explained variance down compared to Model 3 with the same
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variables where it was excluded. In addition, it is not statistically significant, therefore I
will focus on Models 1 and 3.
In these models, there are tendencies similar to the determinants of political
interest: again, media use index and Internet media use are positively and significantly
associated with political knowledge, providing support for Hypothesis 1 (b). Some
differences are present as well: in contrast to political interest, political knowledge is not
driven by either ethnic origin or gender. Another difference is that age becomes highly
significant: as age moves up one unit (five years), the political knowledge increases by
.073 units (Model 3). Also, education is positively associated with political knowledge,
although this relationship is only marginally statistically significant.
The most intriguing findings in this model are that political knowledge is
determined by the belief that public officials do not care about what people think of
their performance and by the perception of current political rights and liberties. As the
regression coefficients show, the more people agree that their rights and liberties are
better than before March 2005, and the more the respondents disagree that public
officials are indifferent, the less is their political knowledge. In other words, less
knowledgeable and rights-conscious citizens have a stronger belief that the government
actually cares about what they think of its performance (ignorance is bliss?). It is logical
to assume that if the government does not perform well, the relationship will also run in
the opposite direction: the higher political knowledge will enforce the belief that the
government does not care about what citizens think of its work. This model will be
considered later in the section on perceptions of government performance.
To sum up, by providing strong support to Hypotheses 1 (a) and (b), the findings
that both the media use index and Internet use are strong predictors of political interest
and political knowledge allow for further exploration of other variables central for this
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study, namely, respondents’ perceptions of experienced and imposed reality, evaluation
of government performance, and their future in Kyrgyzstan.
We will start by exploring how the respondents assess the imposed reality
constructed by the traditional media and how they evaluate their rights and economic
situation after March 2005 (experienced reality). Then we will move to how the
respondents evaluate the government performance from various angles. Finally, we will
conclude with how the respondents see their future in Kyrgyzstan (“exit” options) and
whether civic activity plays the role of “voice.”
2.4.2

Perceptions of Constructed Reality

The content analysis of referendum coverage presented in Chapter 1 earlier has
shown that different types of media create different realities of good governance for the
citizens. It is important to understand how the citizens on the receiving end evaluate
these constructed realities. To measure the evaluations of the “imposed” reality, or
reality constructed by the traditional media, I selected the variable “Do you believe that
the TV channels, radio and newspapers you use do a decent job in covering national
politics?” assuming that the high levels of disapproval will be serving as a proxy for
negative evaluation of constructed reality.
A logical assumption here, based on the theoretical model in Figure 2.2.2 is that if
through the use of the traditional media and Internet-based media people are exposed to
both constructed realities – those that promote the official point of view and those that
provide an alternative view – they will have more negative evaluations of the officially
imposed reality because they have an opportunity to compare and contrast information.
Political interest and political knowledge should also play the role in this process: more
politically interested and knowledgeable citizens should be more critical of the reality
constructed by the state-controlled media.
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The results of regression analysis for the media performance evaluation presented
in Table 2.4.2.1 show that the model is quite weak. It explains only eight per cent of
variance in the media approval variable and has an F value significant at p=.013. There
must be some other independent variables, not available for this sample, which would
explain the media performance better. One factor explaining the difficulties with this
variable may be relating to self-esteem: people would most probably have hard time
admitting that they consume the media performing their job poorly. For future studies,
better variables should be designed to measure the perceptions of reality constructed by
the traditional media.
Table 2.4.2.1. Approval of Media Performance
Independent Variables

B
(Constant)

SE

t

-.018

.184

-.097

-.057

.073

-.778

.013

.021

.619

-.025

.021

-1.186

.048

.038

1.249

5. Age

-.005

.014

-.364

6. Income

-.009

.011

-.856

7. Gender

.009

.054

.166

8. Political Knowledge

-.007

.022

-.303

9. Political Interest

-.002

.025

-.067

.272***

.075

3.637

.167*

.086

1.929

.039

.039

.999

.059**

.023

2.595

1. Internet media use
2. Media Use Index
3. Complexity of Politics and Political Incapacity
4. Education

10. Kyrgyz
11. Russians
12. Civic Activity Index
13. Governments’ tolerance to criticism from
opposition and media
Model summary

N= 326, R2=.081, F= 2.114*

^p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

However, even this weak model shows that the relationship between the Internet
media use and media job approval is negative, albeit statistically insignificant. That is, as
100

it was suggested in Hypothesis 2, Internet media users are more critical of traditional
media’s performance. A strongly significant factor in this model is ethnic origin: both
Russians and Kyrgyz evaluate the media they consume positively. Another significant
predictor is the government’s tolerance to criticism from opposition and media: those
who agree that the government is tolerant approve of media performance.
In short, this analysis provides no support for Hypothesis 2 that Internet media
users would have more critical and negative evaluations of media performance than the
traditional media users.
At least a partial explanation was provided by focus groups with non-users of
Internet. The exchanges there showed that when the difference between the official,
constructed reality and experienced reality is big, the people do not need a referent
alternative reality constructed by independent online media to make negative
evaluations. One of the focus groups illustrates this very well in this exchange:
Moderator: There is so much information on the Internet about the government
and politics that is not available in the traditional media… aren’t you interested?
Sergei: Not really. I don’t need the Internet to understand that the government
lies. A simple example: Bakiev may tell me all he wants that, uh, the school
education improved because… uh, if you can believe it, he now provides free milk
and cookies to the pupils, like in Soviet times (scoffs). My niece is in the second
grade… I know how much my sister pays every month for her “free” education:
for school repairs, textbooks, contribution to teachers’ salaries, mentors, and what
not…
Ainagul: And the hospitals? Bribes to the doctors and nurses, meals for the
patients, medicine and, uh, tools that you need to bring in for any simple
treatment… and they are talking about free health care…
Sergei: Exactly! Wherever you look – corruption, decay and lies everywhere…
Of course newspapers, they… will not write about this… or if they do, they
always blame some small-time bureaucrat, a scapegoat. I am not a fool, I can see
through the government’s lies. I just feel powerless to do anything about it…
Moderator: Why?
Sergei: How do you talk to the people who are sitting so high above you, you
can’t just knock on their door… and even if you could, how do you explain to the
people who tell you that this is white when it is indeed black? Sometimes I think
they convinced themselves that black is white…
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This conversation illustrates not only that people are capable of contrasting their
realities with the lies the government feeds them, but also that they are highly skeptical
about their own capacity to change anything. Another example from a focus group also
shows that people maintain a certain sense of humor about the situation:
Ivan, martial arts coach, early 20s: You know, I don’t believe the government
tales. I heard that people in Uzbekistan now call their country… “Karimov’s
fairytale land” because the tales he tells are so different from the reality people live
in… we are not far from this… I guess our country can be called a “field of
miracles,” like in that famous song from childhood, “field of miracles in the
country of fools…” except that we are in the country of no fools. Only our
government thinks we are fools and continues to feed us bullsh… I don’t think I
am a fool, and I don’t buy the government’s lies, I am just tired of them and don’t
believe them…
Moderator: Do you think you can do anything about it?
Ivan: Like what? Protest, participate in the demonstrations, you mean (scoffs)?
Moderator: Why not?
Ivan: We all know what the March 2005 protests led too…
Elmira, state employee, mid-50s: Yeah, Bishkek residents were really scared
then, especially when looting started… that alone would prevent reasonable
people from participation in any demonstrations, even for May 1 [Labor Day
celebrations with famous workers’ parades in the Soviet Union]…
Tatiana, music teacher, early 20s: I guess people are just tired of all these
political actions and protests, and are afraid that there will be violence again… all
these spring and fall ‘side effects’ of democracy [most of protest activity in
Kyrgyzstan between 2005 and 2007 fell for spring and fall] are just too much for
the people…
Moderator: All right, how about voting?
Ivan: Yeah, that’s like what… uh, once in four years? What can the voting
change? Those who want to stay in power will find a way without my vote…
Thus, as these exchanges show, people with an ability to think critically can
deconstruct the reality created by the government and the media it controls by
contrasting it with what they see and experience every day. It should be noted that in
focus groups it was usually the people with higher levels of education and more life
experiences (older respondents) who demonstrated this ability.
It is important now to understand what determines the perceptions of the reality
people experience in their daily lives, which will be considered in the next section.
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2.4.3

Perceptions of Experienced Reality

Perceptions of the respondents’ current reality were measured with two questions:
“My economic situation today is better than before March 2005” and “As an individual I
have more rights and freedoms today than before March 2005,” both with answer
options ranging from 1 = “strongly agree” to 5 = “strongly disagree.”
While it is more difficult to assess the changes in personal rights and liverties, the
economic situation is something that the people were more comfortable with evaluating.
Kyrgyzstan’s economic situation worsened after the March 2005 Tulip Revolution: there
is no improvement in economic growth, the country’s external debt is increasing, and
for the first time in 17 years of independence the country with abundant hydro energy
resources is facing a deep energy crisis. It is important to explore whether the citizens of
Kyrgyzstan understand how this overall situation affects their individual life by
measuring their perception of economic wellbeing and rights as citizens.
According to the model in Figure 2.2.2, the perceptions of experienced reality will
be shaped by the government’s performance, including the approval ratings for the
president and the parliament, spread of corruption and to what extent citizens are
involved in it, directly and indirectly, as well as normative understanding of democracy
and the key demographic variables.
The first set of regression analyses presented in Table 2.4.3.1 looks at how satisfied
the citizens of Kyrgyzstan are with their current economic situation. At the outset it
should be noted that the majority of the respondents – 260, or 64.2 per cent – disagreed
(39.5 per cent) or strongly disagreed (24.7 per cent) that their economic situation
improved after March 2005. By the same pattern, 317 (78.3 per cent) of respondents
strongly disagreed (31.1 per cent) or disagreed (47.2 percent) that their rights and
liberties improved after the March 2005 Revolution.
103

As Table 2.4.3.1 shows, the extent to which the respondents think their economic
situation today is better than before March 2005 is indeed determined by several
demographic variables and the factors related to government performance (Model 1).
The first one of such factors is the spread of corruption: as people’s evaluation of
corruption moves from “corruption is pervasive” toward “corruption is rare” by one
unit, the agreement that their current economic situation is better than before March
2005 increases by .230 units. This means that lower levels of corruption are associated
with better economic situation, which is logical.
The second variable relating to government performance that affects perceptions of
current economic situation is the evaluation of the government’s effort to solve current
problems the country is facing (coded from 1=they do everything possible, to 5=they
don’t care). As the values of this variable move from positive to negative by 1 unit, the
satisfaction with the current economic situation decreases by .157 units, which is also
logical and expected.
The third variable behaves similarly: as President Bakiev’s approval rating
(0=disapprove, 1=50/50, 2=approve) moves from negative to positive, the evaluation of
the respondents’ own current economic situation increases by .292. It is interesting that
even though marginally significant at p=.103, the parliament approval rating has the
negative effect on agreement about improved economic situation, perhaps because the
Parliament was considered to be in opposition to the president.
Surprisingly, income is not statistically significant in this model, although it is
considered to be one of the major factors, along with education, which drives the
satisfaction with the economic situation. Education behaves in the expected direction:
its association with the perception of current economic situation is positive, i.e. higher
educated people agree that their economic situation after March 2005 improved.
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Table 2.4.3.1. Satisfaction with Current Economic Situation
Model 1

Independent Variables
B
(Constant)

Model 2

SE

t

B

SE

t

2.439***

.583

4.186

1.980***

.585

3.386

1.

Appropriateness of democracy for
Kyrgyzstan

.003

.151

.019

-.021

.148

-.143

2.

State function is to serve people

.016

.106

.154

.023

.104

.217

3.

Spread of corruption

.230*

.112

2.057

.184^

.110

1.671

4.

Relatives and friends gave bribes
in the last 3 months

-.087

.148

-.588

-.043

.145

-.298

5.

You personally gave bribes in the
last 3 months?

.113

.175

.647

.080

.172

.464

6.

Government’s effort to solve
current problems

-.157*

.062

-2.533

-.141*

.061

-2.318

7.

President Bakiev’s approval rating

.292***

.086

3.385

.223**

.087

2.583

8.

Parliament’s approval rating

-.163^

.100

-1.635

-.170^

.098

-1.739

9.

Political interest

-.071

.061

-1.152

-.050

.060

-.836

10.

Political knowledge index

.074

.057

1.285

.086

.056

1.524

11.

Media use index

-.026

.051

-.509

-.046

.051

-.908

12.

Civic activity index

-.025

.098

-.250

-.033

.096

-.347

13.

Internet use

.500**

.185

2.698

.434*

.183

2.377

14.

Education

-.226*

.098

-2.305

-.197*

.097

-2.044

16.

Age

.036

.038

.950

.013

.038

.339

17.

Employment status

.049

.071

.693

.043

.069

.619

18.

Income

-.006

.028

-.215

-.001

.028

-.053

19.

Gender

-.238^

.134

-1.782

-.221^

.131

-1.687

20.

Kyrgyz

.381*

.187

2.040

.301^

.184

1.633

21.

Russians

.052

.219

.240

.093

.215

.436

22.

Perceptions of rights and liberties

.251***

.068

3.663

Model Summary

N = 325, R2 = .157,
F = 2.828***

N = 325, R2 = .193,
F = 3.442***

^p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Among other demographic characteristics, gender is associated with perceived
economic situation only marginally, at p=.076, indicating that women are more satisfied
with their economic situation than men are. Another variable that is of interest is ethnic
origin: being Kyrgyz significantly increases the satisfaction with the current economic
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situation, perhaps reflecting the loyalty to the idea that revolution was all about the
people and improvement of their lives.
Finally, the variable of most interest for this study, Internet media use, came out
not significant at all in the model not shown here, but Internet use in general is
significant. Internet use is positively and significantly associated with the respondent’s
perception of economic situation: the users agree that their economic situation has
improved since March 2005 more. This is most probably explained by the fact that
Internet users generally have higher-paying jobs and other opportunities that make their
economic situation better compared to non-users.
Even more interesting is that the satisfaction with the economic situation is
strongly connected with perceptions of individual rights and freedoms. When this
variable is introduced in Model 2, the explained variance in “my economic situation
today is better than before March 2005” increases by 3.6 per cent. The political rights
and freedoms variable shows a high level of statistical significance, although decreases
significance of some variables, such as the spread of corruption and being Kyrgyz. It
also takes away some of the significance from the president’s approval ratings and
Internet use, but these variables still stay highly significant and in the same direction. It
is important, however, that the perception of rights and liberties drives the perception of
economic situation: as the satisfaction with individual rights and freedoms increases by
one unit, so does the satisfaction with economic situation by .251 units.
In their turn, respondents’ perceptions of their rights and liberties after 2005 also
strongly depend on President Bakiev’s approval ratings: president’s approval is
associated with higher levels of respondent’s agreement that the situation with the
rights and liberties improved. However, neither the government performance in
general, nor the parliament approval ratings affect the perception of rights (see Table
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2.4.3.2). Spread of corruption has the same negative effect on perception of rights and
liberties as on the perception of economic situation described above, but in the second
model it loses significance with the introduction of perception of economic rights as an
independent variable.
Table 2.4.3.2. Satisfaction with Political Rights and Freedoms
Model 1

Independent Variables
(Constant)

Model 2

B

SE

t

B

SE

T

1.831

.478

3.828

1.418

.482

2.942

.096

.124

.777

.096

.121

.789

1.

Is democracy appropriate for
Kyrgyzstan?

2.

State function is to serve people

-.025

.087

-.286

-.028

.085

-.324

3.

Spread of corruption

.182*

.092

1.984

.143

.091

1.581

4.

Relatives and friends give bribes
in the last 3 months

-.174

.121

-1.432

-.159

.119

-1.336

5.

You personally gave bribes in the
last 3 months

.133

.144

.927

.114

.141

.810

6.

Government’s effort to solve
current problems

-.063

.051

-1.241

-.037

.050

-.726

7.

President Bakiev’s approval rating

.272***

.071

3.849

.223**

.071

3.157

8.

Parliament’s approval rating

.028

.082

.341

.055

.080

.688

9.

Political interest

-.081

.050

-1.601

-.069

.049

-1.388

10.

Political knowledge scale

-.048

.047

-1.026

-.061

.046

-1.313

11.

Media use index

.079^

.042

1.874

.083*

.041

2.018

12.

Civic activity index

.035

.081

.438

.040

.079

.500

13.

Internet use

.264^

.152

1.732

.179

.151

1.186

14.

Education

-.116

.081

-1.434

-.077

.080

-.970

16.

Age

.093**

.031

2.975

.087**

.031

2.831

17.

Employment status?

.024

.058

.420

.016

.057

.283

18.

Income

-.018

.023

-.792

-.017

.023

-.763

19.

Gender

-.068

.110

-.620

-.028

.108

-.257

20.

Kyrgyz

.318*

.153

2.080

.254^

.151

1.682

21.

Russians

-.164

.179

-.912

22.

Perceptions of economic situation

-.172
.169***

.176
.046

-.981
3.663

Model Summary

N = 325, R2 = .184,
F = 3.424***

^p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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N = 325, R2 = .218,
F = 4.033***

In contrast to Table 2.4.3.1, in these models media use and some demographic
variables are playing a significant role. First, as age increases, respondents agree more
that their rights and freedoms are better than before March 2005, but this is, perhaps,
due to overrepresentation of young people (students) in the sample. Second, the more
media people add to their media use mix, the more satisfied they are with the status of
their political rights and freedoms, and this variable is more significant in Model 2.
This finding is difficult to explain by anything but the propaganda effect aimed at
enforcing the loyalty: most of the local media in Kyrgyzstan are government-controlled
and if people are not capable of thinking critically and are not exposed to other sources
of information, they may support the government’s point of view, as it was shown in
the content analysis chapter. However, to test for the propaganda effect, a more refined
media use variable is needed to differentiate between the state and independent media
consumption, which was not available for this study.
As in the previous model, being Kyrgyz again increases the level of satisfaction
with the rights and freedoms, but loses statistical significance with the introduction of
perceptions of economic situation as an independent variable in Model 2.
In contrast to the perceptions of economic situation, Internet use has only a
marginal positive effect on the perceptions of the political rights and freedoms in Model
1 and becomes insignificant in Model 2.
Finally, Model 2 in Table 2.4.3.2 shows again the connection between the
satisfaction with the status of individual rights and freedoms and the respondents’
economic situation: as the agreement with the statement that the economic situation
improved after March 2005 grows, the satisfaction with the status of individual political
rights and freedoms increases by .169 units. The interconnectedness of the perception of
rights and liberties and economic situation may be an indicator that these variables are
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endogenous, but as it was pointed out earlier, this particular sample lacks the data to
address the potential questions of endogeneity properly.
Overall, the models testing the relationship between the respondents’ perceptions
of their current situation on the one hand and the variables assessing government
performance on the other hand, when controlling for demographic factors, show that
individual perceptions of experienced reality depend strongly on evaluation of the
government’s performance, thus providing support for Hypothesis 3.
Therefore, the subject of the next section is what factors determine the evaluation of
government performance.
2.4.4

Perceptions of Government Performance

Perceptions of government performance have been demonstrated to influence the
individual perceptions of reality, or status of rights and economic situation after March
2005. It is important now to test what drives the perceptions of government
performance, and whether use of Internet media plays a role here (Hypothesis 4).
Three different variables were designed to measure the perceptions of government
performance. The first one is the belief that the “government officials do not care much
about what people think of their performance” (ranging from 1=“strongly agree” to
5=“strongly disagree”), the second is the direct question, “Does the government make
enough effort to solve current problems?” (varying from 1=“yes, they are doing
everything possible” to 5=“no, they don’t care about how people live”), and the third –
the Overall Frustration with Government index derived from the factor analysis, with
values ranging from 7 – the highest level to 29 – the lowest level of frustration.
The theoretical assumption behind all these models is that the evaluation of
government performance will be determined by the appropriateness of democracy,
approval ratings of the executive and legislature, spread of corruption as a measure of
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the government’s capacity, and perceptions of citizens experienced reality, in addition to
the demographic variables.
Table 2.4.4.1. Belief that Public Officials Are Indifferent to What People Think of
Their Performance
Independent Variables

Model 1
B

SE

Model 2
t

B

SE

t

3.396***

.356

9.551

3.677***

.502

7.321

.023

.060

.383

.018

.058

.309

2. Political Knowledge

-.140**

.055

-2.560

-.160**

.054

-2.987

3. Civic Activity Index

.017

.095

.183

.106

.092

1.151

.106**

.051

2.099

.109**

.049

2.231

5. Internet Media Use

.214

.173

1.236

.202

.174

1.164

6. Education

.131

.093

1.414

.084

.090

.927

-.033

.033

-.993

-.032

.033

-.949

8. Gender

.154

.129

1.201

.126

.125

1.010

9. Income

.016

.026

.617

.010

.025

.378

10. Kyrgyz

.101

.181

.559

.001

.177

.003

11. Russians

.168

.209

.802

.098

.204

.481

.017

.140

.121

13. Perception of rights and liberties

-.031

.068

-.465

14. Perception of economic situation

-.010

.056

-.184

-.215**

.105

-2.044

.159**

.059

2.707

-.165**

.083

-1.995

-.336***

.095

-3.519

(Constant)
1. Political interest

4. Media Use Index

7. Age

12. Appropriateness of Democracy for
Kyrgyzstan

15. Spread of corruption
16. Government’s effort to solve
current problems
17. President Bakiev’s approval rating
18. Parliament’s approval rating
Model summary

N= 333, R2=.067, F= 2.086*

N=328, R2=.186, F=
3.913***

^p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Results presented in Table 2.4.4.1 demonstrate that among sample demographic
characteristics, only the political knowledge and media use affect the belief that the
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public officials do not care about what people think of their performance. As the
respondents add more media to their mix, they disagree more that the public officials
are indifferent to people’s evaluation of their performance. This may seem to contradict
logic, however it should be kept in mind that the media use index measures the use of
traditional media, so with adding more media, the users add to the quantity rather than
to the quality or diversity of information they receive. This is also supported by the
finding from the same model that people who demonstrate higher levels of political
knowledge agree with the statement more, suggesting that it is the quality of knowledge
rather than the quantity of it that determines how critical the respondents are of
government’s attitudes toward the people’s opinions.
Adding variables relating to government evaluation increases the explained
variance in the dependent variable (citizens’ perceptions of how much the government
cares about their evaluations) by almost 12 percent. Model 2 shows that the
respondents’ perceptions of government officials’ indifference are driven by other
measures evaluating the government’s performance. These relationships are all in the
expected direction: as the respondents’ evaluations of President Bakiev’s and
Parliament’s performance moves from approval to disapproval, the belief that the
government officials do not care about what people think of their performance only
enforces. By the same token, as the spread of corruption moves from “corruption is
pervasive” to “corruption is rare” by one unit, the belief that the government officials do
not care about the people’s evaluation of their performance increases by .215 units.
Finally, as the evaluation of the government’s effort to solve current problems
moves from “yes, they are doing everything possible” to “no, because they don’t care
how the people live,” by one unit, the belief that the government officials are indifferent
to the people’s opinions about their performance reinforces again by .159 units.
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The regression analysis of the second variable “Does the government make enough
effort to solve current problems?” is presented in Table 2.4.4.2.
Table 2.4.4.2. Evaluation of Government’s Effort to Solve Current Problems
Independent Variables

B

SE

t

3.994***

.740

5.394

1. Political interest

.117*

.057

2.068

2. Political Knowledge

-.031

.052

-.594

3. Civic Activity Index

-.088

.090

-.979

4. Media Use Index

-.028

.047

-.592

5. Internet Media Use

-.226

.169

-1.336

6. Education

-.139

.086

-1.612

7. Age

.030

.032

.916

8. Gender

.173

.123

1.414

9. Income

-.037

.025

-1.460

10. Kyrgyz

.006

.169

.038

11. Russians

.079

.199

.398

12. Appropriateness of democracy for Kyrgyzstan

-.158

.140

-1.130

13. Perception of rights and liberties

-.010

.079

-.129

14. Perception of economic situation

-.174**

.062

-2.805

15. Spread of corruption

-.171

.104

-1.644

16. President Bakiev’s approval rating

-.113

.083

-1.366

17. Parliament’s approval rating

-.172^

.094

-1.834

18. Individual political capacity

.064

.052

1.244

19. Norms of Democracy Index

.056

.037

1.530

20. Tolerance of Dissent Index

-.042

.028

-1.503

21. Independent Media and Free Expression Index

.007

.038

.179

22. Political Incapacity Index

.022

.021

1.091

-.032^

.017

-1.896

.047

.097

.479

(Constant)

23. Overall Frustration with Government
24. State function is to serve people
Model summary
^p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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N= 323, R2=.166, F= 2.471***

The results of this regression analysis show that the strongest predictors of how the
government performance is evaluated are the people’s political interest and perception
of economic situation. A one-unit change in the political interest results into a .117change in negative evaluation of the government performance, while stronger
agreement that the respondent’s economic situation improved after March 2005 results
into a better evaluation of government performance.
It should be noted that introduction of the indexes relating to normative
understanding of democracy, as well as the variable measuring individual political
capacity and normative expectation of the state function did add about 4 percentage
points to the explained variance in the model, but remained not statistically significant.
The parliament approval rating and overall frustration with the government have a
marginally significant negative affect on the evaluation of government performance,
indicating that the lower levels of frustration and higher levels of approval of
parliament’s performance are associated with higher levels of government performance
evaluation. Internet media use is in the expected direction: those who use Internetbased media are more critical of the government performance, but the relationship is not
statistically significant, thus providing no support for Hypothesis 4 (a).
Finally, the third variable relating to government performance is frustration with
the government, a composite index constructed from the seven items that loaded
heavily on the first component in the factor analysis. The index runs from 7 – highest
level of frustration to 29 – the lowest level of frustration. Conceptually, the frustration
with government is a proxy for the gap that exists between the constructed and
experienced reality (see Figure 2.2.2), the depth of which will define the options
available for citizens, namely exit and voice.
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From the outset it should be noted that the respondents in this sample were highly
frustrated with government performance and the system. Of the 400 scores in the index
(five respondents did not answer at least one question, resulting into missing data in the
entire index), 351 (87.8 per cent) fell below the mid-point of 21, and only 32 (eight per
cent) scores were above the mid-point, i.e. lower levels of frustration with government.
Table 2.4.4.3 presents the results of the regression analysis where Overall
Frustration with Government is a dependent variable. This model is most robust in the
entire analysis: the independent variables explain almost 44 per cent of variance in the
Overall Frustration with Government and nine variables in the model are highly
significant statistically, with two more marginally significant, while all of the variables
show the expected direction of relationship.
The strongest predictors of frustration with government are spread of corruption,
Norms of Democracy Index, and Independent Media and Free Expression Index. The
relationship between the spread of corruption and frustration is positive, i.e. with every
one-unit change in perception of corruption spread from “pervasive” to “rare” the
frustration with government decreases by 1.347 units. With Norms of Democracy,
however, the relationship is negative: as the respondents answer more that they agree
with the normative statements regarding democracy, their frustration with the
government increases by .455, which is reflective or the government’s poor performance
discussed above. The Independent Media and Free Expression Index runs in the
opposite direction: as the respondents agree stronger that the media and expression
should be free, their frustration with the government decreases by .566.
This relationship is in the same direction as Tolerance of Dissent Index, which is
significant at a slightly lower but still high level of p=.011: the agreement that the
government tolerates criticism and dissent is associated with lower levels of frustration.
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Table 2.4.4.3. Overall Frustration with Government
Independent Variables

B

SE

t

11.880***

2.664

4.460

-.327

.479

-.682

-.619*

.333

-2.170

3. Perception of Rights and Liberties

.547*

.231

2.371

4. Perception of Economic Situation

.089

.184

.484

-.455***

.124

-3.668

.246*

.096

2.551

.566***

.128

4.436

.012

.071

.167

1.347***

.360

3.742

10. Relatives gave bribe in last three months

-.451

.466

-.967

11. Yourself gave bribe in last three months

.015

.548

.027

12. Government’s effort to solve current problems

-.309

.200

-1.547

13. President Bakiev’s Approval Rating

.703*

.286

2.457

14. Parliament’s Approval Rating

.760*

.321

2.367

15. Individual Political Capacity

.485**

.177

2.743

16. Political Interest

.168

.196

.855

17. Political Knowledge Index

.116

.181

.638

-.167

.164

-1.021

.079

.311

.255

-1.856**

.592

-3.137

21. Education

.079

.313

.251

22. Age

.005

.123

.041

23. Employment Status

-.106

.224

-.472

24. Income

-.138

.090

-1.533

25. Gender

-.064

.432

-.149

26. Kyrgyz

-.102

.591

-.173

.688

-2.126

(Constant)
1. Is Democracy Appropriate for Kyrgyzstan?
2. State Function is to Serve the People

5. Norms of Democracy Index
6. Tolerance of Dissent Index
7. Independent Media and Free Expression Index
8. Political Incapacity Index
9. Spread of Corruption

18. Media Use Index
19. Civic Activity Index
20. Internet Media Use

27. Russians

-1.256*
Model summary

N= 319,

R2=.437,

F= 8.368***

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

This is indeed reflective of the current situation in Kyrgyzstan as it is still
considered to be one of the most permissive and tolerant states in Central Asia in terms
of democratic norms of free expression and dissent. In laws, freedom of expression and
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dissent is guaranteed and the government always uses it as a trump card when it is
accused of becoming more authoritarian. In practice, however, the government found a
better way to suppress the media freedom through ownership and other forms of
control but is still unable to control dissent effectively, which is confirmed by the 2.5
years of demonstrations and protests after March 2005 Revolution.19
Other highly significant variables in the model include individual capacity and
perception of own rights and liberties: people who agree more that they can improve the
situation in the country for the better and those who believe more that their rights and
liberties improved after March 2005 have lower levels of frustration. The same is true
for the government approval ratings, as the respondents who approve President
Bakiev’s and Parliaments’ performance are less frustrated with the government.
Two more significant variables are indicative of interesting relationships. The first
one is the understanding of the state’s function: as the variable moves from “to rule” to
“to serve,” the level of frustration with the government increases. This is similar to the
Norms of Democracy Index discussed above, indicating that there is a gap between the
normative understanding of the state’s function and the actual government’s
performance. The second variable indicates that Russians have higher levels of
frustration with the government, which may have negative implications for Kyrgyzstan
if the level of frustration translates into Russians’ leaving the country, given, of course,
that the government of Kyrgyzstan wants to preserve its ethnic heterogeneity.20

19

The frequency of protests and demonstrations decreased in 2007-2008, after the police forces used tear gas to
disperse the mass protests demanding to speed up the Constitutional reform in April 2007.
20

Russian-speaking population has been leaving the country steadily since Kyrgyzstan acquired independence.
Before the Soviet Union fell, Russian speakers comprised about 25 per cent of the population. The peak of
immigration was in 1993-94, when in one year about 100,000 Russians left the country. After the 2005
Revolution, the immigration varies at the level of 30,000-45,000 people a year, having shrunk the estimated level
of Russian-speaking population in Kyrgyzstan to about 12-15 per cent.
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Finally, the variable of most interest for this study, Internet Media Use, is
significantly and negatively associated with the overall frustration with government,
indicating that those who use Internet-based media have higher levels of frustration.
Thus Hypothesis 4 (b) is fully supported by this model.
To sum up, the level of frustration with the government is greatly affected by the
factors relating to government performance (the poorer the performance, the higher the
frustration) and normative understanding of how the democracy should work, where
the Kyrgyz government performance does not meet the respondents’ expectations.
According to the main theoretical model of this project presented in Figure 2.2.2,
frustration should result in either higher orientation toward leaving the country, or exit
option for the citizens, or higher civic activity, whereby they voice their dissatisfaction
with the current situation (Hypothesis 5). The next portion of the analysis is to explore
whether the levels of frustration with government and Internet media use are
determinant factors in these two options available for the citizens of Kyrgyzstan.
2.4.5

Respondents’ Civic Activity and Perceptions of Future in Kyrgyzstan

According to the project’s theoretical model presented in Figure 2.2.2, the civic
activity (voice) should be the function of not only the demographic characteristics such
as age, gender, political interest and knowledge, but also such factors as satisfaction
with experienced reality, government performance, own capacity to change things for
the better, and in particular frustration with the government, that may move people to
express their protest energy.
However, as the results of multiple regression analysis for civic activity index
presented in Table 2.4.5.1 show, most of these relationships are statistically insignificant
for this sample. First, Hypothesis 5 (a) is not supported: Internet media use has no
significant effect on the respondents’ civic activity. Moreover, it runs in the opposite
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direction, similarly to Overall Frustration with Government Index, indicating that civic
activity decreases with higher levels of frustration and use of the Internet media,
perhaps testifying for the “exit” option.
Table 2.4.5.1. Determinants of Civic Activity
Model 1
Independent Variables

Model 2

B

SE

t

B

SE

t

-.299

.208

-1.439

-.470

.381

-1.232

1. Media Use Index

.020

.030

.668

.012

.030

.407

2. Education

.079

.056

1.395

.083

.058

1.430

.088***

.021

4.259

.087***

.022

3.948

4. Gender

.018

.076

.239

.040

.078

.519

5. Internet Media Use

-.006

.103

-.060

-.033

.109

-.301

6. Kyrgyz

.185^

.107

1.734

.200^

.108

1.846

7. Russians

.093

.124

.747

.104

.128

.809

8. Income

-.017

.016

-1.064

-.015

.017

-.896

9. Employment Status

.053

.040

1.331

.053

.041

1.300

10. Political Interest

.054

.035

1.524

.047

.036

1.312

11. Perceptions of Rights and Liberties

.033

.043

.776

12. Perceptions of Economic Situation

-.012

.034

-.350

13. Political Knowledge Index

.028

.033

.848

14. State Function is to Serve People

.028

.062

.452

15. President Bakiev’s Approval Rating

.102*

.053

1.936

16. Parliament’s Approval Rating

.030

.060

.508

17. Government’s Effort to Solve
Current Problems

-.042

.037

-1.151

18. Appropriateness of Democracy for
Kyrgyzstan

-.083

.089

-.933

19. Individual Political Capacity

.063^

.032

1.929

20. Overall Frustration with
Government Index

-.005

.010

-.484

(Constant)

3. Age

Model summary

N=330, R2=.174,
F=6.715***

^p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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N=371, R2=.195,
F=4.479***

Another problematic variable is the marginally significant (at p=.054) President
Bakiev’s approval rating indicating that as the approval increases, so does the civic
activity. There may be two explanations for this. One is that those who support Bakiev’s
policies are more politically active than his opponents, especially in 2005 presidential
elections when Bakiev ran as a revolutionary leader. Second, a simpler explanation, is
that the civic activity index itself is problematic due to the respondents who were not
eligible to vote in 2005 presidential election, which is the first item in the scale.
In both models, age is the strongest statistically significant demographic predictor
of civic activity. This can be at least partly explained by the fact that many student
respondents in the sample were not of age during the 2005 presidential election, which
would bring their entire civic activity index score down. However, this finding again is
consistent with other studies reporting that young people are usually detached from
politics and public affairs and are not as actively involved as older people.
The variables approaching significance in Table 2.4.2.3 are ethnic origin (being
Kyrgyz increases activity by .200) and belief in own political capacity: as people agree
more that they can do something to improve the situation in the country better, their
civic activity index increases.
Focus groups also showed that older citizens are generally more conscientious
about being involved in public affairs and performing their civic duty, especially when
it comes to voting. Consistently with patterns of voting in other countries, in
Kyrgyzstan the most active voters are those who are older than 40. They also try to
encourage younger people to vote and even influence for whom they will vote.
Consider this exchange from a focus group with those who do not use the Internet:
Moderator: “Where do you usually get the information on important political
events? To be more specific, for example, the parliamentary elections are coming
soon, as you know. How will you decide for whom you will vote?”
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Elmira, mid-50s, state agency employee: “I mostly look at the party members,
who the leaders are. If I like the leaders, if I know them and trust them, I will vote
for the party… We have heated debates about this in our family, my daughter has
a totally different opinion about this, and it is very bad when your own child goes
against you. For example, I am going to vote for the communists, because they
are… what’s the word I am looking for? uh, predictable?, and I know what they
are about. My daughter will never vote for them because she is from the new
generation and she does not trust communists at all.”
Ivan, early 20s, martial arts coach: “I trust communists. They are very well
known, and predictable, as you said. So I support them. But I don’t know if I will
vote for them. I don’t know if I will vote at all.”
Elmira: “Oh, but you should… It is important to vote, otherwise your vote will
be used by someone else.”
Tatiana, music teacher, early 20s: “Exactly, it is important to vote.”
Ivan: “I am perhaps prejudiced, but I believe that my vote will not change
anything.”
Elmira: “It won’t if you don’t use it. Because by not voting, you give your vote
to someone else.”
Tatiana: “Yes, we have this… uh, perhaps the only, opportunity to change
things once in four years, so we really must use it. This is why you should vote…”
Ivan: “Well, I don’t know… I’ll think about it…there is still time to decide…”
This exchange illustrates not only the generational differences, but also that young
people vary greatly in their understanding of civic duty and actual civic activity. Below
is another illustrative example from a focus group with Internet users (KTMU students):
Ainura: “I just don’t see any point in voting. No matter how you vote the
government always comes up with the numbers they need.”
Bakhtiyar: “But this is exactly why they get the numbers they need – because a
lot of people think like you and don’t vote.”
Ainura: “What do you mean?”
Bakhtiyar: “Have you ever heard of the administrative resource?”
Ainura: “Of course I have. That’s …uh, when the state manipulates the vote
with the resources they have… like making students from state schools vote the
way the government needs. This isn’t a state university, I will vote any way I want
to, so I just don’t understand how the administrative resource can use my vote…”
Bakhtiyar: “It’s very simple, really. You are on the voter list, right? [Ainura
nods]. So you don’t come to vote and closer to the end of the voting day they, uh,
just put a signature across your name and stuff the ballot on your behalf.”
Ainura: “But what about the observers who are supposed to… uh, prevent this
stuff from happening?”
Almaz: “I worked as an observer once. This is exactly how they do it. But they
do it so quickly and skillfully that it is really difficult to catch them in the act.
Besides, uh, as an observer you cannot really ‘prevent’ anything… you can report
the violations, but who would pay attention? Many observers, especially local
ones, were also threatened to write the ‘needed’ reports.”
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Ainura: “But what if, as a citizen, I want to check how my vote was used? Can I
see the lists with the voters’ signatures to verify that one of them is really mine?”
Almaz: “As an individual, I doubt it. You can get together with other citizens
who feel their votes were abused and put in a court claim, but, uh, as far as I
know, you have to have the evidence… and no one will show you the voters’ lists
once they are done, without a court decision… so it is like a vicious circle…”
Baktiyar: “So, as a citizen you’d better vote so that your vote is not used against
your will. The best abused vote is an uncast one…”
This exchange also indicates that civic activity may increase with negative personal
experiences: when asked later how he came to work as an observer, Almaz said that as a
first-time voter in 2005 parliamentary elections he saw some things he “was not
supposed to see,” as he put it, and joined a political party “to work with like-minded
people for the betterment of our society.”
Overall, the range of opinions on voting expressed in focus groups varied from “I
don’t vote because my vote does not matter” to “I vote because it’s my duty as a
citizen,” but mostly revolving around “the last two years showed that the government
does not listen any way, so why bother?” Disillusionment with the governance and
frustration with the voting process were the factors most often cited in response to the
question “Why do you think young people are reluctant to vote?” When the results of
the focus groups and survey are considered together, it may be concluded that voicing
dissatisfaction through increased civic activity is not an appealing option for this
particular sample, even though for the reasons of young age.
As for the second, “exit” option (see Table 2.4.5.2), in the model it pulls together
influences from most other elements: perceptions of experienced reality and constructed
reality, government performance and normative understanding of democracy, as well as
the overall frustration with government and demographics. From the model it can be
seen that the exit option seems to be more appealing for those with lower employment
status, those who have lower income, and the Internet media users, thus supporting
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Hypothesis 5 (b). All these variables have a negative association with the respondents’
future in Kyrgyzstan, which is expected and logical.
Table 2.4.5.2. Respondents’ Perceptions of Their Own Future in Kyrgyzstan
Independent Variables

B

SE

t

1.925

1.452

1.325

.105

.255

.411

2. State Function is to Serve the People

-.158

.179

-.882

3. Perception of Rights and Liberties

-.135

.123

-1.097

4. Perception of Economic Situation

.221*

.099

2.229

5. Norms of Democracy Index

-.042

.067

-.628

6. Tolerance of Dissent Index

-.119

.052

-2.295

7. Independent Media and Free Expression Index

.046

.070

.657

8. Political Incapacity Index

.041

.038

1.071

9. Overall Frustration with Government

.052*

.031

2.231

10. Media Performance Approval

.527*

.254

2.077

.035

.195

.180

12. Government’s Effort to Solve Current Problems

-.146

.106

-1.378

13. President Bakiev’s Approval Rating

-.047

.155

-.303

.240

.171

1.400

.357***

.096

3.729

16. Political Interest

.228*

.105

2.181

17. Political Knowledge Index

.231*

.095

2.423

18. Media Use Index

.214*

.086

2.482

19. Civic Activity Index

-.092

.164

-.561

20. Internet Media Use

-.603*

.320

-2.283

21. Education

.042

.168

.252

22. Age

.079

.065

1.204

-.208*

.119

-2.041

24. Gender

.215

.227

.945

25. Income

-.085*

.048

-2.077

26. Kyrgyz

.443

.327

1.355

-.482

.372

-1.295

(Constant)
1. Appropriateness of Democracy for Kyrgyzstan

11. Spread of Corruption

14. Parliament’s Approval Rating
15. Individual Political Capacity

23. Employment Status

27. Russians
Model summary
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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N= 314, R2=.248, F= 4.833***

Overall Frustration with Government index is also significant in a one-tail test at
p=.046 and indicates a negative relationship (the higher the frustration, the stronger the
intent to leave). This may mean that such respondents’ intent to leave is associated with
the hopelessness of their situation in Kyrgyzstan and the hope for better opportunities
elsewhere.
In addition to these variables, higher levels of agreement that the government of
Kyrgyzstan is tolerant of dissent are also associated with intent to leave the country,
which is more difficult to explain by anything else but the association of dissent with
anarchy and disorder and respondent’s fatigue of protests and demonstrations over the
2.5 years after the 2005 Revolution.
On the positive end of the scale, the option to stay in the country and make
contribution to its development is more appealing for those with higher political
interest, higher political knowledge, more diversified media use, and the respondents
believing that they can do something to improve the situation in the country for the
better. Those who agree that their economic situation has improved since March 2005
also tend to associate with higher levels of intent to stay in Kyrgyzstan.
Not surprisingly, those respondents who agree that the traditional media are
performing a decent job in covering the politics and public affairs (i.e. positively assess
the constructed reality), also have higher intent to stay in the country. Finally, being
Kyrgyz enforced the intent to stay in the country, while being Russian on the contrary
adds to the desire to leave, but these variables are not statistically significant.
Such a neat distribution of expected relationships in the “your future in
Kyrgyzstan” variable alerts one to the possibility of social desirability bias affecting the
responses, especially given the fact that an estimated 500,000-800,000 Kyrgyz currently
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reside in Russia and Kazakhstan as migrant workers. However, the distribution of the
“your future in Kyrgyzstan” variable shows that about a half (54 per cent) of 390
respondents who answered the question opted for the socially desirable and patriotic
higher end of the scale, while 180 (46.2 per cent) checked the exit option. Thus, this
distribution, although perhaps still not reflecting the true picture of the exit intentions, is
not as skewed toward the socially desirable answers as it could have been.
In summary, this part of the analysis provides partial support for Hypothesis 5:
Internet media use does not affect the civic activity index, or political involvement, for
this sample, but it does increase the exit moods when it comes to the respondents’
potential to stay in Kyrgyzstan.
2.4.6

Internet Use and Information Sharing Patterns

One of the major goals of this project was to see whether the view of alternative
reality constructed by independent online media has the potential to be transferred by
the Internet media users into the off-line world through their sharing the information
with those who have no Internet access. To answer this question, we first need to
understand what activities the Internet users actually are involved in and whether they
indeed share the information with non-users. The final part of analysis will explore
whether and how the citizens seek the information online and share it with those who
have no access to the Internet through three methods: observation of Internet users,
survey results and focus group discussions.
Observations of Internet users at the public Internet cafés showed that political
news consumption is not high on their list of priorities. They mostly came to the cafés to
check their email, chat in various social utility networks such as Odnoklassniki.ru (a
rough equivalent of FaceBook in Russian), and conduct Internet research on various
topics. Younger users download music and movies and play computer games.
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Computer video games are particularly popular among adolescents and teenagers, and
when they come to the Internet cafés to play in teams they tend to oust other users who
cannot tolerate their noisy presence. In such cases, Internet café owners and managers
do not mind other more serious users leaving – teens spend hours playing the
videogames, and sometimes a group of nine playing in three teams can bring a profit
equivalent to a day’s income in just a couple of hours.
It should be mentioned that Internet use is quite affordable in Kyrgyzstan: the
average fee in 2007 was 25 som ($.65) per hour during the day and 40 som ($1.05) for the
whole night starting from 11 pm to 7 am. The number of Internet cafés in proper
downtown Bishkek (nearly 30 cafés serving the area of about eight blocks long and six
blocks wide) is growing and they compete so much that some of them started to merge
into chains. However, as the Internet café managers admit, a lions’ share of their income
comes from IP phone services and computer games rather than Internet services per se.
Coming back to the use patterns, college and university students often work on
their class assignments and term papers in Internet cafés. Occasionally, they also
conduct research for their professors – a female graduate student was observed to do the
online search while talking with her advisor on the cell phone and asking if that was the
information he needed. From time to time, users came in for services such as printing,
copying and scanning of documents, without spending any time on the Internet at all.
Occasionally, people were observed to have come to the Internet cafés to fill out
paperwork for visa applications to German and US Embassies.
On several occasions, a couple of people were sharing one computer, obviously for
the reason of one being more skilled in Internet use than the other. In two of such cases,
the person using the computer was also serving as a translator on match-making
websites, putting up a personal ad for her counterpart. On another occasion, two young
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males were having fun on a “meet other singles” website, coming up with fake
identities, much older and more attractive than they were in real life. One of them was
the “creative director” while the other served as a typist and commentator.
One of the most popular activities of Internet users in Kyrgyzstan is downloading
fiction and other literature. Russian websites are extremely generous in providing and
sharing the electronic versions of newly released novels and classics for free, and over
the period of six months of observation, 74 users were observed downloading books,
and sometimes reading novels by popular Russian writers such as Davlatov, Pelevin,
and Akunin off the screen. Very rarely users were observed to add to the shared
knowledge online – only once a young male was working on a Kyrgyzstan-related entry
in Wikipedia.
For a cash-based economy like Kyrgyzstan online shopping is not only a novelty
but also an opportunity accessible only for those people who have studied or lived
abroad and maintained a western credit card or for Kyrgyz residents who can afford to
use the expensive services of local banks issuing mostly debit cards. This is why it was
surprising on several occasions to see people browsing online book stores and
merchandise websites, but in any case they would not complete the transaction in the
Internet café, most probably for security reasons. One young man was observed
spending more than two hours on the websites selling used cars, which is also an
unusual online activity in Kyrgyzstan.
In general, it was observed that only a handful of the users in public Internet cafés
browsed through the news. Only on two occasions the users were observed to leave
comments in political forums – one male on Diesel.elcat.kg and a female on 24.kg when it
still had its forum open for comments. On one occasion, two young males were
observed reading the news from 24.kg news agency from one computer, but they left
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five minutes later. On one occasion, a male user in his early 30s was observed to read
Bely Parohod newspaper website. He stroke a conversation when he saw me bringing up
the same site and said that not many people know about this website, unfortunately,
and he is always curious about who reads it. He admitted he was an avid consumer
who couldn’t go a day without reading the website and to my question “why?”
responded that this was the only website that “wrote the truth about the current affairs”
and because “the forum there is very interesting to read.” When I told I was doing
research on coverage of politics and invited him to participate in a focus group, he
politely declined, citing lack of time.
The survey results also show that using political news is not the first item on the
list of online activities. Consistent with numerous uses and gratifications studies of
Internet users, number one activity is still email (selected as such by 260 of 271 Internet
users who answered this question), followed by general 180 people who marked “news”
(often specified “non-political”) as their first priority, information search in the third
place with 119 preferences, and entertainment, with 92 respondents ranking it as
number one – in the fourth. Political news is in the sixth place, selected by 39
respondents as their number one activity. The same patterns were confirmed by the
focus groups with the Internet users, except for one focus group with trainees of the
Bishkek Press Club, who are much more knowledgeable and politically aware than
other student users. They listed political news as the second on their list, still after email.
The results of the survey show that on average, respondents spend about 2.5 hours
on the Internet per day, with the majority of 80.2 percent (207 of 258 respondents who
answered this question) in the first three categories: less then an hour – 57, or 14.1 per
cent; 1-2 hours – 101 people, or 39.1 percent, which is the largest category; and 49
respondents, or 19 per cent – up to three hours a day. Heavy users of the Internet are
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quite rare in Kyrgyzstan: only 6 respondents, or 1.5 per cent, indicated that they spend
on the Internet more than 6 hours a day, and two of them were a web designer and a
computer programmer, and the other four – students in western universities.
As it was described earlier, 260 of 271 Internet users in the sample indicated that
they used Internet-based media to obtain information about politics and public affairs.
The survey results also showed that both the users and non-users of the Internet agreed
for the most part that Internet users know more about politics and public affairs: of the
total 364 respondents who answered this question, 262 (68.2 per cent) agreed that the
Internet users know more.
Table 2.4.6.1. Agreement that Internet Users Know More About Politics
Independent variables

B

St. Error

Wald

Media Performance Approval

.216

.294

.541

Political Interest

.108

.126

.731

Political Knowledge Index

.005

.115

.002

Media Use Index

-.288**

.106

7.361

Civic Activity Index

.872***

.243

12.855

.663*

.372

4.207

Education

.011

.206

.003

Age

.056

.078

.527

Employment Status

.045

.148

.092

Gender

-.558*

.276

4.091

Income

.052

.058

.804

Kyrgyz

.469

.374

1.573

Russians

.333

.428

.605

Internet Media Use

(Constant)
Model summary

-.360

.777

.215
2

N =320, Cox & Snell Pseudo R =.124,
Χ2 =42.293***

^p<.10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

This agreement, of course, can be the result of Internet users thinking that being the
Internet users they know more. The results of a one-tail bivariate logistical regression
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presented in Table 2.4.6.1 show that it is indeed the case: Internet users are more likely
to think that those who use the Internet do know more about politics.
The interesting finding here is that the more media people add to their media use
index, the less likely they are to agree that Internet users are more knowledgeable than
non-users about politics. This is quite logical because the respondents feel that having
diverse sources of information may broaden the knowledge. The agreement that
Internet users are more knowledgeable is also driven by the civic activity index: more
politically involved citizens are more inclined to agree that the Internet users are more
knowledgeable, as well as by gender: females are less likely to agree that Internet users
know more about politics than non-users.
Earlier it was established that political knowledge is preceded by political interest.
Surprisingly, in focus groups, the participants often pointed out that they are not really
interested in politics and that they sought political news on the Internet only when
something extraordinary or “interesting” was happening. Here is one example:
Olga, senior journalism student: I am not really interested in politics, so I
mostly use the Internet to get general news, like what’s going on, in like…
economics, sports – I am a big sports fan, and celebrity gossip (giggles).
Moderator: But you just mentioned that you use the Internet media to get the
political news. How do these go together?
Olga: Oh, I mean, I use the political news only when something interesting or
extraordinary happens. For example, the Constitutional referendum is not
something of interest for me…
Irina, senior journalism student, interrupting: But this one is important… it
should define what constitution we will live with…
Olga: Not really, it has already been decided for us. You’ll see, we will get the
Bakiev constitution one way or another…
Asia, senior political science student: But you can vote against it…
Olga: Ye-aah, but it won’t change anything, they will still get the numbers they
need for the approval. We all know how it works, we’ve had these referenda a
dime a dozen.
Moderator: OK then, what would be an important political event for you then?
Olga: Well, I don’t know… I remember I was following the Shanghai 5
[Shanghai Organization for Cooperation, that includes Russia, China, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan] summits for quite some time because I was curious:
will they be able to force Bakiev to kick out the Manas [US military] base…
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Asia: For me, referendum is still important, especially because it will, uh, most
surely precede the parliamentary elections. I am particularly interested in the
development of political parties because… uh my thesis is about political parties
in Kyrgyzstan. So I will definitely watch what happens…
Irina: I also follow the referendum, especially this standoff between the
parliament and the Constitutional Court. But for me it is more like, uh, watching a
… circus performance, if you will, – it’s so funny how all these clowns cling to
power and pretend to be civilized…
Moderator: Would you agree that the Internet has more information about
these events than the traditional media?
All in agreement: Oh, yeah.
Irina: I forgot when I opened the real newspaper last time. Everything is online
these days, and even more than anyone needs or can catch up with…
This exchange shows that even though the students admit they have no or
moderate interest in politics, they still have enough background information and critical
skills to be skeptical and sober about the government practices and performance. This
may also suggest that the participants have a higher interest in politics and public affairs
than they give themselves credit for. When asked how they make judgments about the
government performance if they don’t actively consume political news, the focus group
participants would again cite common sense and their experienced reality. One of the
economics students, Andrey, said the following:
Bakiev and his team try to convince everyone, and especially, uh, the ordinary
people, that after the Revolution we started to live better: the economy improved,
the GDP grows 7-10 per cent a year, the industry is developing, the investments
are coming in, uh, and all this blah-blah-blah… As an economist, I can tell this is
bogus… first, because the numbers do not mean anything when you adjust them
for the inflation, second, because I see how the people, uh, including my family,
lose in the value of the som because their income is eaten up by inflation and
rising prices for everything.
Another student of public relations echoed the same idea in simpler, every-day
terms and observations:
Marina: I walk to school every day, and I see how many beggars and disabled
people we have now in the city streets… and those heartbreaking old babushkas
[ladies], always neat and clean, who are even ashamed to rise their eyes at you
when you give them money because they have to beg – can’t survive on their
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pensions… and another thing – Bishkek used to be so green and clean, and now…
you’ll never find a trashcan and the entire city is simply trashed, like a big
dumpster… the other day on my way from school I saw a fat big rat kind of, uh,
leisurely strolling across the road– a RAT! Even three years ago this would be rare,
but now they feel, uh, so safe and comfortable in this dirty and, uh, contaminated
environment that they come out to the surface. RATS in my capital city! And
municipality does nothing about this, a zilch!
Moderator: Can you do something about it as a citizen?
Marina: Well, I don’t know… the municipality always complains that they
have no money in the budget… as a student, I am not making any money, but my
parents have a small-scale business and they pay their taxes… I just don’t know…
where all these taxes go and why the municipal services are not doing their job…
we know they are all corrupt, but they should do at least something, otherwise
why do they exist?
Moderator: How about expressing your displeasure about the situation?
Marina, puzzled: Well…
Aida, advertising student: You mean, like, uh, protests and demonstrations?
(scoffs)
Moderator: Not necessarily. Filing a complaint with the municipality about the
rats and trash might be an option…
Aida, sarcastically: Oh, yeah, and the municipality would rush to follow up and
send an exterminator and a dumpster truck…
Moderator: Perhaps, if they got enough complaints they WOULD follow up…
Aida, laughing: With all due respect, are you from this planet? ... I bet they
already have more complaints than they care to read…
This interaction shows that the participants are not only acutely aware of the
worsening situation and poor government performance, they are also quite
disillusioned about the citizen power, which in most cases is immediately associated
with protests and demonstrations. This is, perhaps, a result of the 2.5-year standoff
between the government and the protestors that ultimately resolved nothing. In most
cases, protests and demonstrations now are the least desirable or respected forms of
political involvement.
At the same time, the power of such mild forms of citizens’ collective power as
filing a complaint is greatly underappreciated, and the citizens thus truly believe that
they cannot do anything in terms of citizenry beyond paying taxes and simply expecting
that the government would perform at the minimum expected level.
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These findings of high awareness of the situation, low awareness of rights and
options as well as the diminished belief in individual political incapacity are distressing,
given that the sample of this study consisted mostly of people who are on the higher
end of the educational scale and therefore should be more aware of their rights and
options as citizens, especially in the light of the hope that they would play the role of
opinion leaders for the other citizens, less fortunate to have advanced education and
Internet access, for that matter.
Nonetheless, there are also Internet users with high political interest, knowledge
and awareness of their citizen rights and duties. Here is one participant of a focus
group, an active member of a youth wing of a political party and a participant of such
political forums as Diesel, talking about the importance of Internet in the political life of
the oppositional parties:
Almaz: Internet is very important these days, especially for political parties in
opposition. For us, this is a way to communicate, to send messages to members
and even to plan actions. For example, we organize political flash mobs through
our website’s blog accessible only to the party members… and of course we place
our party documents for the public to see on our website… this would have been
impossible to do in the traditional media controlled by the state…
Moderator: What if tomorrow the government decides to close or block
oppositional websites, hypothetically?
Almaz: I don’t see why they would do it. They think that the impact of political
parties’ websites is so small they don’t really care…
Moderator: What about the oppositional media and networking websites that
have large audiences, like Diesel?
Almaz: Diesel appeared from nowhere, it is controlled by no one and belongs to
no one. If for some stupid reason the government decides to crack down on it, it
will just move to another domain, probably outside Kyrgyzstan, but I am sure it
will maintain all its users – it is a very strong network now with a high sense of
community and self-worth. As for the online media, they are also free to move to
any other domain. This is the beauty of the Internet – no government in the world
can completely close it.
Nazgul: The Chinese government is quite successful in blocking dissident sites…
Almaz: Our government has neither the capacity nor the determination of
China to do this… And even if they do, they will not be able to stop the political
parties’ activities anyway. They squeeze us out of the Internet – we will use text
messages and cell phones. In the age of high communication technologies it is
impossible to shut everyone up…
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Young people like Almaz are rare in Kyrgyzstan, but they are extremely active in
building the networks of influences through the web. In addition to them, there may be
still hope if the educated citizens with the Internet access share their knowledge with
their friends, relatives, and acquaintances without Internet access. The results of the
survey show that there is sharing of information, recognized by the users and non-users
of Internet on both end. On the one hand, 53 (20 per cent) of the 271 Internet users in the
sample admitted that they participated in political discussions and forums and of those,
46 (86.8 per cent) said they share the information they obtain there with their friends,
relatives and acquaintances with no access.
On the other hand, of 134 non-users, 93 (75 per cent) said they had friends and
relatives who use the Internet, and of them 63 (64 per cent) acknowledged that these
users shared the information with them, which for 46 non-users (73 per cent) was
different from the information they receive from the traditional media. These results
lack the data quantity to test for statistical significance, but the flow of information is
obvious here: both the users and non-users state that the more knowledgeable Internet
users share the information with non-users.
The theoretical model of government-citizen interaction in Figure 2.2.2 can hint at
what motivates the users to do so. First, the users should have a relatively high interest
in politics to seek information from the alternative reality available to them in online
media and to contrast it with their experienced reality. Second, they should realize that
the alternative reality is different from the reality constructed by state-controlled media
and it is not fair in relation to non-users that they do not have the access to it.
Third, there should be a certain level of frustration with the government that
would be an additional motivator to share the information with others, as people do not
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like to be miserable alone. Fourth, people should also know that they could do
something to change the situation, i.e. believe in their political capacity, otherwise why
bother? Finally, certain demographic characteristics such as media use, education, age
and employment may also be contributing factors to the desire to share the information.
The results of a bivariate logistical analysis reflecting these relationships are
presented in Table 2.4.6.2. The model has only 46 cases in the dependent variable and
statistically not significant Chi-sq value; therefore it has only limited capacity.
However, it has a relatively high Cox & Snell Pseudo R-sq, which testifies to its potential
for explained variance. Even in this model, political interest is again a strong predictor
of whether the Internet users are likely to share the information with non-users.
Table 2.4.6.2. Sharing of Information between Internet Users and Non-Users
Independent variables

B

Political Interest

St. Error

Wald

2.187*

1.138

3.791

Political Knowledge Index

-.534

.993

.289

Media Use Index

1.740

1.318

1.745

Civic Activity Index

-.779

1.238

.396

Education

-.214

1.190

.032

Age

-.822

.596

1.903

Employment Status

-.055

.788

.005

Gender

4.303^

2.319

3.444

Income

.218

.384

.324

Kyrgyz

-4.134

5.021

.678

Russians

16.914

11442.823

.000

Media Performance Approval

-.943

2.219

.181

Individual Political Capacity

.261

.701

.139

Overall Frustration with Government
Index

.371

.296

1.571

Perceptions of Rights and Economic
Situation Index

.482

.470

1.052

(Constant)
Model summary
^p<.10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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-10.911

8.554

1.627

N =46, Cox & Snell Pseudo R2 =.351,
Χ2 =20.354

Gender is another variable approaching significance at p=.063, indicating that
women are more likely to share information obtained on the Internet than men. The
overall frustration with government is significant at p=.114, and media use index – at
p=.134, so in a model with more cases they could become more significant.
In the focus groups, participants admitted that some of them shared information
with non-users and some did not. There was no obvious pattern to why people shared
or did not share information, it seemed to mostly depend on the participants’ individual
characteristics such as the networks of friends and relatives, communicability, and
availability of time. On a couple of occasions, generational difference came up again.
Below is one example of an exchange with journalism students illustrating this:
Moderator: Do you ever share the information you find on the Internet with
your friends and relatives who have no access?
All participants: Oh, yeah…
Bermet: I usually send a link with something I find interesting to my friends by
email…
Moderator: Actually, I meant those who have no Internet access…
Bermet: Ah, well, no, because I don’t really have friends who have no access.
Elena: Neither do I. May be some high school friends, who do not go to
university, but I don’t really interact with them that much now…
Asel: Yeah, these days everyone seems to be online… it’s great, especially when
the friends leave the city and email is the only way to keep in touch…
Natalia: I have some friends with no access, but we usually don’t talk politics…
Moderator: Why is that?
Natalia: Don’t know… they are not that really interested in politics and have
totally different problems.
Moderator: How about your parents or older relatives like aunts and uncles
who have no access? Do you share the information with them?
Bermet: No. My parents have a totally different world of problems. We just
don’t take about stuff like politics. I can’t, for example, even imagine that I will be
talking with my father about politics.
Moderator: Why?
Bermet: Because he thinks he knows everything he needs to know… and he
does know a lot, but he mostly talks about it in the context of how much better
everything was 20 years ago and how everything is bad now…
Elena: Right, people of the older generation have this nostalgia about the Soviet
times I cannot understand. Talking about politics with them makes me really mad
and impatient – they cannot be convinced…
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This exchange illustrates that young people are also aware of the generational
differences that break the communication down. However, in another focus group with
Turkish University students, the participants said that they talked about politics with
their parents, in an attempt to “enlighten them little by little and try to change their
political views” (Azamat, communications student). Thus, from the focus groups there
is no conclusive evidence of how and why people share the information they obtain
from online sources, and it seems that in most cases it depends more on individual traits
and social networks than on particular trends across groups of people.

2.5 Conclusions
What this chapter has shown is that in a fragile and new democracy, the
government of which fails more often than performs according to the citizens’
expectations, the citizens develop high levels of frustration with the government system
and performance despite what the government communicates to the citizens through
the state-controlled media. At the same time, disillusionment about the March 2005
Revolution and its undelivered promise, as well as fatigue from the overly long protests
against the government that did not bring any visible results translate into low political
involvement and alienation of the citizens from the entire governance system.
This chapter also provided support for an important, non-deterministic view of
mass communication: a media technology is what the people make of it. The theorists of
democracy may argue all they want about whether the Internet facilitates or impedes
the democratic processes and the development of a public sphere, but it is ultimately the
users who shape and mold what the medium will become and what promises it can
deliver. In a country like Kyrgyzstan, where the government controls most traditional
media, Internet indeed has a great potential and promise as a free and open medium.
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However, if the citizens in the first place have a low political interest and motivation to
participate in public life, the most wonderful and inviting medium will stay an
uninhabited land with unfulfilled promise, albeit full of various sorts of information.
As the observations, surveys, and focus groups under this research show, in
today’s Kyrgyzstan, the Internet users vary greatly in terms of their use goals and
political involvement. On the one hand, there are users who are completely alienated
from the public life and use the Internet to explore other country’s immigration
programs and educational opportunities. On the other hand, there are users who live in
the virtual world of political forums and organize flash mobs for the young members of
political parties. Somewhere in the middle there are the users who “peek” the political
forums without active participation, but spend a lot of time downloading music,
movies, and novels. This survey seem to have produced the estimates that the first and
the middle group dominate in Kyrgyzstan, but in such a highly sensitive political
environment many politically savvy Internet users may opt to stay anonymous and in
the shadow, so their true number is difficult to estimate.
It is clear that such politically savvy and involved citizens are crucial for a viable
democracy. However, for this group to grow in numbers, there must be support coming
from not only the civil society but also from the government, if not in the form of
encouragement then at least through non-interference. Unfortunately, at this time such
good will on the part of the government is lacking. So the hope is still with the civil
society, both domestic and international, that would develop and maintain a necessary
level of citizen awareness and involvement.
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CONCLUSIONS
This research project was designed to explore the potential and role of the Internetbased media in the Kyrgyz Republic after the 2005 March Revolution. It used a model of
interaction between the government and citizens through various types of realities: the
reality constructed and imposed by the state-controlled media, the reality created by
alternative, independent sources of information online, and the realities experienced by
citizens individually (see Figure 2.2.2). The model pulled together various theories from
political science, sociology, psychology, and mass communication and focused on the
exit-voice-loyalty options available for the citizens in response to governance practices.
Chapter 1 was devoted to exploration of the media space with its imposed and
alternative realities through content analysis of an event, which provides a perfect
example of how good governance is understood by state-controlled print media and
independent online media. The event in question was supposed to be a form of people’s
democracy in action – the Referendum on Constitutional reform. However, with the
careful manipulation of public consciousness and the voting process, the Referendum
became a legitimization tool for what many experts believe to be an authoritarian
constitution establishing a super-presidential, pseudo-democratic regime in a country
that in early 1990s was in the forefront of democratic reforms in the post-Soviet space.
The content analysis showed that the realities constructed by the state-controlled
media and independent media were vastly different but in a constant dialogue and
reference to each other. The frames and messages the media sources used in relation to
what the Referendum initiative meant for the key players – the president, the
parliament, and the people and democracy – were mirrored with precision and depth on
three most important dimensions.
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First, whereas the independent media expressed concern over the looming
authoritarian regime and usurpation of power by the president, the state-controlled
media were talking about the necessity of enlightened authoritarianism, the strict and
disciplined executive, and responsibility for government actions and initiatives
concentrated in one hands.
Second, while the independent media were concerned about elimination of
opposition and shrinking public space, the state-controlled media promoted
homogeneity of the political space in support of benevolent presidential policies and
political stability. This was a message particularly appealing for the citizens in the
protest-torn country with sharp divisions between the poor and the reach, and between
the southern and northern regions.
Finally, while the independent media tried to convey that one month was not
enough for the citizens to make an informed decision about such a crucial initiative as
the constitutional reform, the state-controlled media stressed that the constitutional
reform was long overdue, has been discussed for months earlier and people were ready
to make the decision.
The statistical analyses in Chapter 2 show that while there are no significant
differences between the print and online media in evaluating the Constitutional Court
and Referendum decisions, the mode of production mattered for the overall evaluation
of government actions in terms of good governance. Online media were more critical
and negative of the current government in their overall evaluation than the print media.
These findings are sufficient to support the central hypothesis of Chapter 2 that online
media are capable of constructing alternative realities that are more critical of the
government and its performance than the traditional media with larger outreach, most
of which are controlled by the state.
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This presents a serious problem in for an emerging and struggling democracy like
Kyrgyzstan because such an alternative reality is accessible only to those 10-15 per cent
of the population who have access to Internet as well as residents of the capital city
Bishkek, where circulate a few independent papers with the print run of 3,000-5,000
copies. The overwhelming majority of the country’s population was exposed only to the
state TV and radio channels and state-controlled newspapers. Therefore, the alternative
reality created by independent online media is non-existent for most citizens.
What citizens are left with as a measure for imposed reality is their own, currently
experienced realities. Chapter 2 of this dissertation was focused on how the different
types of realities are perceived by the citizens in the light of good governance. Through
observation, surveys and focus groups with both traditional and Internet-based media,
the research produced the results showing that the study respondents are acutely aware
of the sharp differences between the experienced and imposed reality.
In many cases, this realization comes without the reference to the alternative reality
constructed by online media, through common sense and everyday experiences. The
realization translates into high levels of frustration with the government and decreased
forms of loyalty to the governance system and practices, pulling the pressure toward the
exit and voice options. As this research shows, the intentions to leave the country (exit)
and to express concerns about the malfunctioning in the governance and to participate
in the public life (voice) are equally available for the citizens.
However, the research also showed that the level of citizens’ political involvement
is quite low, perhaps in part due to the reason that the sample is skewed by overrepresented youth (students). Nonetheless, coupled with the high “exit” moods, such
low involvement of citizens in the country’s public life will almost inevitably negatively
affect the prospect for a viable democracy. To correct for this serious malfunctioning,
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not only an effort to wake the public consciousness is needed, but also a certain amount
of commitment from the government to perform better, to fight corruption, and to
include citizens more in the decision-making process. Unfortunately, this reserve is
simply lacking in the current government institutions and leadership concerned mostly
with preserving the status quo.
With the low levels of political interests and motivation to be involved in public
affairs, the option of exit seems to be more appealing for the citizens of Kyrgyzstan,
which is also supported by the high permanent and temporary immigration rates. It is
natural that the exit option is exercised mostly by the young, skilled and educated,
whose political interest and involvement in the public life is traditionally low, similar to
other democracies. The Internet opens up new opportunities for them in the form of
information about education and jobs outside of the country. As one of the focus group
participants noted, with the current rate of immigration and brain drain “Bakiev will
soon become the president of babushkas and dedushkas [the elderly].” To stop this
trend, the government needs to open up to the young and qualified people and include
them into the system of decision-making, which it is reluctant to do.
This research project has produced valuable insights for some policy implications.
It has shown that as far as online media are concerned, the strongest skeptics’ fears that
Internet is divisive and elitist have not come true and the Internet media in Kyrgyzstan
still have the potential to facilitate the public debate at least for the politically interested
citizens. Since the government of Kyrgyzstan does not seem to be interested in
development of the public sphere, it is the task for the domestic and international civil
society to provide more support for Internet-based media targeted at youth with the
goal of changing the youth’s perception of political incapacity and turning them away
from “easy exit” option toward higher political involvement in the country’s public life.
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Further, the model developed for this project can be applied to other countries.
Even in well-functioning democracies the gaps between the government performance
and citizens’ experienced realities are inevitable, and the depth of frustrations and
availability of information through the media can be an interesting research topic for
mass communication and political science scholars.
The next logical step for this project would be to see how this model applies to
other countries that recently experienced the second wave of post-Soviet revolutions –
the Ukraine and the Republic of Georgia. The potential comparative country analysis
resulting from such research projects may produce an important contribution to the
studies of Internet media effects and the second wave of post-Soviet democratization in
the form of specific recommendations for facilitation of the public sphere development
and support for Internet-based media that have the potential for “spilling over” their
influence into the off-line world. Even in its current form, focused on one country only,
the research implemented under this dissertation has the potential to make an important
contribution to the study of democracy and media in several forms and ways:


The project is a cross-disciplinary study of media processes and effects in a
democratic transition (pulling together the current theories from mass
communication, sociology, psychology and political science)



The project’s focus on new media and good governance in a “colored” revolution
country is a unique set of research questions that has not been explored before
with such a variety of methods and approaches



The results can be used by policy makers to support new media in remaining
managed democracies and to facilitate educational efforts to increase awareness
of and demands for good governance among the citizens in new democracies.
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APPENDIX A: TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS – THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC
1990

1991
1993

1994
1995

1996
1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

The president’s position is introduced in all Soviet Union republics. In October, the
Parliament elects physicist Askar Akaev the first president of the Kyrgyz Republic for his
first 5-year term
On August 31, days after the coup against USSR President Gorbachev, Kyrgyzstan declares
its independence from the Soviet Union; large-scale market and democratic reforms start
The first Kyrgyz Republic’s Constitution defines the country as a “secular democracy” and
establishes a parliamentary-presidential republic; national currency – som – is introduced
making the country independent of the Russian rouble and markets; Kyrgyzstan joins WTO
President Akaev dissolves the largely Communist parliament after a long political stand-off
over the country’s reformist policies and natural resources
February – new Parliament is elected; the first of five referenda is conducted on
Constitutional Amendments; President Akaev is re-elected for the second (and last) 5-year
term uncontested
First constitutional amendments introduced following the 1995 referendum tip the balance
of power in favor of the president
Second constitutional referendum effectively transforms the republic into the presidentialparliamentary republic by stripping the Parliament of some of its functions (including
appointing the prime-minister) and expanding the president’s authority
August – Kyrgyzstan faces a serious external threat to national security when Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan guerillas penetrated the country and took civilian foreign
hostages
July-August – IMU insurgencies repeat, Kyrgyzstan joins the international anti-terrorist
agreement; Constitutional Court resolves that Akaev’s first presidential term did not count
toward the two-term constitutional limit as he was elected by the parliament rather than the
popular vote and term was served under the original, not the current Constitution; Akaev is
elected for the third term through a highly manipulated election
Under the anti-terrorist agreement, the Unites States establish a military air base for the
operations in Afghanistan. Third referendum on constitutional amendments gives the
president even more powers
In a southern village of Aksy, police opens fire at several-thousand-strong protest
demanding to release an imprisoned parliament member and kills six protestors; under the
pressure from the civil society, President Akaev establishes a broad Constitutional Council
to develop amendments that would consolidate the society, move the reforms, and improve
his eroded trust and reputation with the people
Fourth Constitutional referendum approves amendments allegedly developed by the
Constitutional Council but effectively giving the president unlimited power; the 2003
version is often referred to as the “Akaev super-presidential” Constitution
President Akaev’s proponents form a party “Alga, Kyrgyzstan!” (“Kyrgyzstan, Forward!”),
the leaders of which include president’s daughter and son, to run in 2005 parliamentary
elections
February 19 – highly manipulated parliamentary elections produce a parliament with 80%
of members loyal to President Akaev, including his son and daughter; opposition labels it
“Akaev’s pocket parliament” and mobilizes broad protests all over the country;
March 24 – Akaev is ousted by a popular uprising – Tulip Revolution, third in the postSoviet space after the Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution and Ukraine’s 2004 Orange
Revolution; Akaev flees to Moscow where he currently resides;
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2006

2007

March-April – the country’s revolutionary leaders, now in power, are in turmoil over
Akaev’s resignation and the legitimacy of two parliaments – old and newly elected; as a
result of political compromises, the newly elected “Akaev” parliament is legitimized; Akaev
officially resigns from the presidency on April 4 in exchange for immunity from any future
prosecution;
July 14 – one of the revolution leaders, Kurmanbek Bakiev, is elected the second Kyrgyz
Republic’s president; his election program includes the promise to return the country to the
parliamentary-presidential republic through a constitutional reform
President Bakiev fires several governments; the promised constitutional reform is stalled; in
spring and fall the opposition mobilizes masses demanding to complete the reform
October - the opposition presses President Bakiev to adopt the constitutional amendments
restoring the parliamentary system, Bakiev signs in the new constitution in November
late November – Bakiev threatens the parliament dissolution, and the pro-presidential
parliamentarians force another version by putting pressure on the opposition; the new
constitution with more presidential powers is signed in on Dec.16; neither versions go
through the Constitutional Court evaluation required by law
April – United Front opposition movement organizes a series of large-scale “no-term” (i.e.
finishing only when their goals will be achieved) protests to demand the completion of the
constitutional reform. After three weeks of the stand-off, police disperses the protests using
the tear gas
September 14 – the Constitutional Court looks into a claim by two parliament members –
Eshimkanov and Karabekov – and resolves that both 2006 Constitution versions are
illegitimate since they were not adopted by a proper procedure and did not receive the
Constitutional Court scrutiny; the country is effectively returned to 2003 “Akaev”
Constitution
September 15-19 – the parliament contests the Constitutional Court decision and fires three
of the five judges who made it; the Constitutional Court petitions President Bakiev to
interfere and he schedules the fifth Referendum on Constitutional amendments for October
21, leaving it for the people to decide whether they want to support him by approving his
version of the Constitution along with the Election Code providing for parliamentary
elections by party lists rather than individual tickets
October 21 – the Referendum approves Bakiev’s constitutional draft and the Election Code
by a reported 75% vote in favor; opposition and NGOs contest the results claiming that the
referendum was rigged and the voter turnout was only about 20-30%
October 22-24 – President Bakiev dissolves the parliament and schedules new
parliamentary elections by party lists for December 16, 2007; simultaneously he fires the
government leaving it acting until the new government is appointed by the new
parliament’s majority party
October 24-December 16 – political parties mobilize and re-group; a number of propresidential parties forms the Movement “For Constitution, Reform and Development” that
became a foundation for the new pro-presidential party “Ak-Jol” (“Bright, Clear Path”);
opposition parties fail to unite
December 16 – pro-presidential party “Ak-Jol” wins 80% of the seats in the new and
enlarged parliament through what the opposition claims to be “doctored” elections;
opposition organizes a series of protest actions under the slogan “I Don’t Believe It” which
are dispersed by force and detainments; President Bakiev officially announces that the
country has completed the constitutional reform and effectively become a parliamentary
republic.
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APPENDIX B: CODING SHEETS
CS 1 – Coverage of Constitutional Court and Referendum Decisions
Coder name_________________________________ Coding date__________________________
Story source___________________________ Date__________________ Length ________words
Story headline______________________________________________________________________
Story genre (circle one):

news

analysis

opinion

interview

editorial

other________

1. Is the Constitutional Court decision assessed (check one):
 Neutrally – no judgments, just facts and straightforward reporting
 Negatively – as something that resurrects the old 2003 “Akayev” constitution, takes the
country back to where it was before the Revolution, etc.
 Positively – as something that will allow to move the Constitutional reform forward and
overcome the political tensions, eliminate chaos, etc.

2. Are there any reactions to the decision by the officials or experts?___________________
If yes, please provide short descriptions:
Quote 1 by __________________(name), ___________________(position): ________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________
Quote 2 by __________________(name), ___________________(position): ________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________
Quote 3 by __________________(name), ___________________(position): ________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________

3. References to what this decision means for President Bakiev? Examples: opportunity to
dissolve the Parliament and set new elections, push for a new Constitution, acquire even
more power, etc. Please provide exact quotes from the story when available: ____________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
4. References to what this decision means/does for the Parliament? Examples: early
dismissal, new elections by party lists; all laws adopted by the Parliament from March
2005 till now will be void, etc. Please provide exact quotes from the story when available:
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
5. References to what this decision means for the people and democracy? If so, please give
a quote: ________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
6. Any references to possible developments (future referendum, etc.)? If so, please provide
a quote: ________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
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Referendum:
7. Date decision made and whose initiative is this? ____________________________________
8. What will be included on the ballot (check all that applies):
 Election Code
 New constitution
 Both ________________________
 No mentioning
9. Are the draft laws available for the discussion?
 Yes
 No
 No, but will be available soon (date?)________________________________________
 No mentioning
10. Reaction of any NGOs or political parties to the decision on referendum?
 Positive
 Positive, but with reservations/recommendations to improve
 Negative, but with recommendations to improve
 Negative
11. Is there enough time for the people to think about the drafts and make an educated
decision?
 Yes
 No
 No mentioning
12. Any references to how much the referendum will cost?
 Yes_____________________ (cost estimate)
 No
13. According to the story, will the administrative resource be used during the referendum?
 Yes
 No
 No mentioning
14. Will the referendum be observed by international organizations?
 Yes
 No
 No mentioning
15. Overall in terms of good governance, does the story present the government actions as
 Strongly negative
 Negative, but indirect, implied
 Negative, but with recommendations to improve
 Neutral
 Positive, but indirect, implied
 Positive, but with reservations/recommendations to improve
 Strongly positive, supportive of President Bakiev

150

CS 2 – Coverage of Referendum Results
Coder name_________________________________ Coding date__________________________
Story source___________________________ Date___________________ Length ________words
Story headline________________________________________________________________________
Story category (circle one): news analysis opinion interview

editorial

other___________

16. According to the story, what is the Referendum’s turnout rate? __(official – 0, lower – 1) _
17. Is there any mentioning if the turnout numbers are different for Bishkek and the
regions? If yes, describe the differences____________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
18. Reaction of any NGOs or political parties to the referendum results?
 Positive (specify) ____________________________________________________________
 Negative (specify) ___________________________________________________________
 Neutral (specify) ____________________________________________________________
 None mentioned
19. Any descriptions of how the process was taking place?
 Yes (specify briefly) _______________________________________________________
 No
20. Any mentioning of violations of the voting process?
 Yes
 No
21. If violations are mentioned, please check all those that are:
 Stuffing of ballots by local officials
 Violations of counting procedure
 Multiple voting by the same person
 Voter buy-out and bribery
 Threats and obstructions to
 Abuse of the migrant and “budget”
observers
votes
 Other (please specify)_____________________________________________________
22. Was the administrative resource used during the referendum?
 Yes
 No mentioning
 No
23. Was the referendum observed by international organizations?
 If Yes, was their assessment positive or negative_________________________?
 No
 No mentioning
24. Overall, is the referendum outcome presented as a positive or negative one? What will
the referendum do for the democratic developments and good governance in the
country? Please provide exact quotes from the story, if available:
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
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APPENDIX C: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
1. In your opinion, what is the function of government in Kyrgyzstan? Is it to
 (1) Rule the people
 (2) Other (please specify)__________(“Both rule and serve” appeared most)__________
 (3) Serve the people
2. In your opinion, is democracy an appropriate governance system for today's Kyrgyzstan?
 (1) Yes (please skip Question 3)
 (0) No
3. If no, what do you think IS the appropriate form of governance for today’s Kyrgyzstan? _____________
4. Who is the president of Kyrgyzstan? _____(correct: Kurmanbek Bakiev)____________________________
5. Who is the prime-minister of the Kyrgyz Republic? ___(Almazbek Atambaev) _____________________
6. Please name the speaker of Kyrgyzstan's parliament. ___(Marat Sultanov) _________________________
7. Is Kyrgyzstan a presidential or parliamentary republic? ___(presidential) _________________________
8. When was the last version of KR Constitution adopted? ____(December 2006) ______________________
9. What did the Russian intelligence services do in relation to Asia Universal Bank in 2006?
__(put on black list of money-laundering banks and advised Russian businessmen not to deal with it) __
Questions 10-38 use the scale with various degrees of agreement with a given statement (3) – (don’t know, not sure):
(1) – high degree of disagreement: «strongly disagree»
(4) – moderate degree of agreement: «agree»
(2) – moderate degree of disagreement: «disagree»
(5) – high degree of agreement: «strongly agree»

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements (please mark the appropriate answer box):
Strongly
disagree

10. There is no way other than voting that people like me can
influence actions of the government
11. No matter what a person’s political beliefs are, he/she is entitled
to the same legal rights and protections as anyone else
12. As an individual I have more rights and freedoms today than
before March 2005.
13. As an individual I have more rights and freedoms today than
when the Soviet Union existed.
14. My (my family’s) economic situation today is better than before
March 2005.
15. My (my family’s) economic situation today is better than before
the collapse of the Soviet Union.
16. We are more likely to have a healthy economy if the government
allows more freedom for individuals and does not interfere with
honest businesses’ affairs
17. Generally, the government can be trusted to implement policies
that will improve people’s situation
18. The current government of Kyrgyzstan is committed to fighting
corruption.
19. Generally, the government is tolerant to the criticism from the
opposition and media.
20. The press should be protected by the law from persecution by the
government

152

Disagree

Agree

Strongly
agree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Agree

Strongly
agree

21. Today, it is less dangerous for an individual to criticize the
government than it was two years ago.
22. Kyrgyzstan’s government should become much more open to the
public.
23. If an unjust law were passed, I could do nothing about it.
24. The government provides me with enough information about its
initiatives, programs and actions.
25. Anyone with the appropriate skills and qualifications can enter a
government agency and work in it.
26. People should be able to participate in any organization even if
this activity opposes some current laws
27. As an individual I can do something to change the current
situation in Kyrgyzstan for the better.
28. The public officials do not care much about what people like me
think of their performance.
29. Demonstrations and protests are an effective way to influence the
government in Kyrgyzstan.
30. Private radios, television, and newspapers should exist alongside
state-owned media.
31. Those who are in power today understand that they were elected
to serve rather than to rule the people.
32. I feel that if I had to seek a court’s protection I would receive a
speedy and fair trial.
33. The courts in Kyrgyzstan make decisions independently, without
the government officials’ interference.
34. It is necessary that everyone, regardless of their views, can express
themselves freely
35. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that I
can’t really understand what’s going on
36. People like me don’t have much say about what the government
does
37. I have the right and an opportunity to voice my concerns to my
parliament representative.
38. I believe that my parliament representative would follow up on
my concern if I express it.

39. Did you ever express a concern to your parliament representative?
 (1) Yes
What was it about?_________________________________
 (0) No
40. Many of the problems Kyrgyzstan is facing today are the result of
 (1) President Akaev's rule
 (2) Both presidents are responsible
 (3) President Bakiev's rule
 (4) Other (please specify)______________
41. Recently, Transparency International ranked Kyrgyzstan as one of the most corrupt countries in the
world. Which of the following statements reflects your feelings about the spread of corruption in
Kyrgyzstan?
 (1) Corruption in the government is pervasive
 (2) Most government structures are corrupt
 (3) Only some government structures are corrupt
 (4) Corruption in government agencies is rare
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42. Did anyone among your relatives or close friends bribe a government employee in the last three
months? If yes, in exchange for which service?
 (2) Yes
Service___________________________________
 (0) No
(1) Would rather not tell
43. Did you personally have to bribe a government employee recently? If yes, for what service?
 (2) Yes
Service___________________________________
 (0) No
(1) Would rather not tell
44. Do you believe the current government is capable of eliminating corruption?
 (1) Yes
 (0) No
45. Where do you get information about the government’s performance (please rank all applicable options in
the order of importance, where 1 is the most important source)?
___ Media (TV, newspapers, radio)
___ Internet
___ Friends and acquaintances
___ My relative(s) working for the government
___ Government information (brochures, leaflets, meetings with officials, etc.)
___ Other (please specify)______________________________
46. On the scale from 1 to 10, please rank in the order of importance the following problems that Kyrgyzstan is
facing today (where 1 is most serious, 10 is least serious problem):
___ Dishonest and irresponsible government
___ Tribalism and nepotism
___ Economic decline
___ Poverty
___ Migration of capable workers to Russia and Kazakhstan and exodus of ethnic minorities
___ Increasing crime rate and “criminalization” of government structures
___ Corruption
___ Worsening social services (pensions, healthcare, education, etc.)
___ Rising prices and decreasing living standards
___ Other (please specify) __________________________
47. Do you think the government is doing a decent job in trying to solve these problems?
 (1) Yes, they are doing everything possible
 (2) They are trying but there are too many obstacles to overcome
 (3) They are doing only what will help them stay in power
 (4) No, because their main goal is to survive to the next elections
 (5) No, because they don’t care much about how people live
 (6) Other (please specify)________________________
48. Please select only one statement that best describes your feelings about your own future in Kyrgyzstan
 (0) already left (option for online survey only)
 (1) I will leave the country at the first opportunity
 (2) I love my country but will have to leave because of the worsening situation
 (3) I will leave temporarily (to study, earn money) but will come back
 (4) I would like to leave, but realistically it is not possible right now
 (5) I am not pleased with the way things are now, but I feel they will improve so I’ll stay
 (6)This is my country and I will stay and do everything I can to make the life better here
 (7) I love my country and will never leave it even if the things go worse
 (8) Other (please specify)_______________________________
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Approve
(2)

Disapprove (0)

Other
(1)

49. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Kurmanbek Bakiev is handling his
job as president?
50. Do you approve or disapprove of the way the Parliament is handling its job?
51. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Almazbek Atambaev is handling his
job as prime-minister?
52. On the scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “most interested” and 5 is “not interested at all,” please indicate
your interest in politics and public affairs (circle the applicable number):
Not interested at all
1
2
3
4
5
Most interested
53. Where do you get the information about political events in Kyrgyzstan (please check all that applies)?
 Local newspapers
 Russian and foreign TV channels
 National newspapers
 Local and national radio
 Kyrgyz TV channels
 Nowhere – I am not interested in politics
54. What TV channels do you watch regularly? Please name: _________________________________________
55. Please name a newspaper you read at least once a week __________________________________________
56. What radio stations do you listen to? Names: ___________________________________________________
57. In your opinion, which Kyrgyzstan's media openly criticize the government? ______________________
Yes

58. Do you know anyone who uses Internet?

Skip to
Q.61

59. If yes, do they share with you the political information they receive on the
Internet?
60. If yes, is this information different from the political information you receive
through TV, newspapers and radio?
61. Do you feel that in general those citizens of Kyrgyzstan who have Internet access
are better informed about the political events in the country?
62. Do you believe that the TV channels, radio and newspapers you use do a decent
job in covering national politics?
63. Did you vote in 2005 presidential election?
64. Did you participate in any demonstrations or protests starting from February
2005?
65. Are you a member of any political party or civil society organization?
66. Will (did) you vote in the constitutional referendum on October 21, 2007?
67. What is the highest level of education you completed?
 (1) Secondary/vocational school
 (2) Technical/incomplete higher
68. What is your age?
 18-20
 21-25
 26-30

 31-35
 36-40
 41-45

No (0)

 46-50
 51-55
 56-60
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 (3) Completed higher education
 (4) Degree (MA, PhD)
 over 60

Skip to
Q.61

69. What is your ethnic background? ________________________________________________________
70. What is your employment status?
 (1) unemployed
 (2) student
 (3) employed part-time

 (4) employed full-time
 (5) self-employed
 (6) other

71. What is your profession? _______________________________________________________________
72. What is your monthly income (your family’s income if you do not make money)
 Less $50
 $200-299
 $500-599
 $50-99
 $300-399
 $600-699
 $100-199
 $400-499
 over $700
73. Your gender:
 (0) Male

 (1) Female

Would you like to participate in focus groups on how various media cover public affairs in
Kyrgyzstan? If yes, please provide your name and telephone number on the enclosed card.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION!

Questions for Internet Users (replace Questions 52-60):
1) How much time do you spend on the Internet per day on average? (from less then an
hour, 1-hour intervals to more than 7 hours a day)
2) What are your primary goals in using the Internet (check all that applies):
• Email
• Communication (including social utility networks)
• News, information (non-political)
• Political news
• Entertainment (download music, videos)
• Information search (for studies or work)
• Leisure (to kill time)
• Other (please specify)
3) Do you use Internet-based media to obtain information on politics and public affairs in
Kyrgyzstan (yes-no)?
4) Do you participate in the online political forums (yes-no)?
5) If you answered “yes” to Question 4, do you share the information you receive from the
Internet with your relatives and friends who have no access (yes-no)?
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APPENDIX D: VARIABLES AND INDEXES – CODING SCHEME
Content Analysis (Chapter 1)
Variable Name

Variable Description

Variable Coding Scheme

1. Source
Independence

Media source independence from
government control, ranging from
highest to lowest degrees of control

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

state
conformist
independent
foreign

2. Offline Impact
Potential

Potential of the media source to
make an impact in the offline (real)
world, ranging from highest to
lowest potential

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

print newspaper
online version of print paper
online news agency
online paper
analytical website

3. Print/Online
Source

Distinction between online and print
sources, dichotomous variable

(1) print source
(2) online source

4. Originality of
Material

Originality of material published in
media sources’ stories, ranging from
least to most original

(1) borrowed, reprinted material
(2) borrowed material with own
comment or analysis
(3) mostly original material

5. CC/Referendum
Evaluation

Media source’s evaluation of the
Constitutional Court decision on
Referendum

(1) negative
(2) neutral
(3) positive

6. Overall Evaluation
of Government
Actions

Media source’s overall evaluation of
the government actions in terms of
good governance

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

7. Reporting of
Turnout Rate

Media source’s reporting of the
Referendum turnout rate,
dichotomous variable

(0) lower than the official
(1) officially reported rate

8. Reporting of
Violations

Media source’s reporting of the
violations and irregularities during
the Referendum, dichotomous
variable

(0) no violations reported
(1) violations reported

9. Reporting of
Administrative
Resource Use

Media source’s reporting of the use
of the administrative resources
during the Referendum,
dichotomous variable

(0) no use reported
(1) administrative resource use
reported

10. Evaluation of
Possible
Developments

Media source’s evaluation of
possible developments after the
Referendum as pessimistic or
optimistic

(1) pessimistic
(2) neutral
(3) optimistic
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strongly negative
somewhat negative
neutral
somewhat positive
strongly positive

Survey (Chapter 2) variables and indexes in order of appearance
Variable Name

Variable Description

Variable Coding Scheme

1. Political
Interest

Respondents’ self-reported interest in politics
and public affairs (Q.52 in the Questionnaire),
ranging from lowest to highest interest

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

2. Internet Use

Respondents’ use of the Internet,
dichotomous variable

(0) do not use Internet
(1) use Internet

3. Internet Media
Use

Internet users’ self-reported use of Internetbased media to acquire information on
politics and public affairs, dichotomous
variable

(0) do not use Internetbased media
(1) use Internet-based
media

4. Government
Works for
People

Respondent’s agreement with the statement
“Generally, the government can be trusted to
implement policies that will improve people’s
situation” (Q.17)

(1) strongly disagree
(2) disagree
(3) uncertain/don’t know
(4) agree
(5) strongly agree

5. Public
Officials are
Indifferent

Respondent’s agreement with the statement
“The public officials do not care much about
what people like me think of their
performance” (Q.28)

(1) strongly disagree
(2) disagree
(3) uncertain/don’t know
(4) agree
(5) strongly agree

6. Perceptions of
Rights and
Liberties

Respondents’ agreement with the statement
“As an individual I have more rights and
freedoms today than before March 2005”
(Q.12)

(1) strongly disagree
(2) disagree
(3) uncertain/don’t know
(4) agree
(5) strongly agree

7. Perceptions of
Economic
Situation

Respondents’ agreement with the statement
“My (my family’s) economic situation today is
better than before March 2005” (Q.14)

(1) strongly disagree
(2) disagree
(3) uncertain/don’t know
(4) agree
(5) strongly agree

8. Perceptions of
Rights and
Economic
Situation Index

Composite index of Items 6 and 7 (Q.12 and
14 in the Questionnaire)

Ranges from 2 – “strongest
disagreement” to 10 –
“strongest agreement”

9. Political
Knowledge
Index

Composite Index of Questions 4-8:
“Who is the president of Kyrgyzstan?”
“Who is the prime-minister?”
“Name the Parliament speaker”
“Is KR a presidential or parliament. republic?”
“When was the last version of KR
Constitution adopted?”

Ranges from 0 – “no
question answered
correctly” to 5 – “all
questions answered
correctly”

10. Media Use

Composite index of Q.53 items - respondents’

Ranges from 0 – “no
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not interested at all
low degree of interest
moderate interest
interested
extremely interested

Index

self-reported use of the following traditional
media: (1) local papers; (2) national papers; (3)
Kyrgyz TV channels; (4) Russian and foreign
TV channels; and (5) local and national radio

medium used” to 5 – “all five
types of media used”

11. Media
Performance
Approval

Respondent’s answer to Question 62: “Do you
believe that the TV channels, radio and
newspapers you use do a decent job in
covering national politics?”

(0) no
(1) yes

12. Complexity
of Politics and
Political
Incapacity

Respondents’ agreement with the statement
“Sometimes politics and government seems so
complicated that I can’t really understand
what’s going on” (Q.35 in the Questionnaire)

(1) strongly disagree
(2) disagree
(3) uncertain/don’t know
(4) agree
(5) strongly agree

13. Civic
Activity Index

Composite index of Q.63-65 - respondents’
self-reported political involvement: (1) voting
in 2005 presidential election; (2) participation
in demonstrations and protests starting from
Feb.2005; and (3) being a member of a political
party or civil society organization

Ranges from 0 – “no type of
activity reported” to 3 – “all
three types of activity
reported”

14.Government’s
Tolerance to
Criticism from
Opposition and
Media

Respondents’ agreement with the statement
“Generally, the government is tolerant to the
criticism from the opposition and media”
(Q.19)

(1) strongly disagree
(2) disagree
(3) uncertain/don’t know
(4) agree
(5) strongly agree

15. Appropriateness of
Democracy for
Kyrgyzstan

Respondents’ answer to the question “In your
opinion, is democracy an appropriate
governance system for today’s Kyrgyzstan?”
(Q.2)

(0) no
(1) yes

16. State
Function Is to
Serve People

Respondents’ answer to the question “In your
opinion, what is the function of government
in Kyrgyzstan? Is it to…” (Q.1 in the
Questionnaire)

(1) rule the people
(2) both rule and serve
(3) serve the people

17. Spread of
Corruption

Respondents’ answer to Question 41: “Which
of the following statements reflects your
feelings about the spread of corruption in
Kyrgyzstan?” ranging from the highest to the
lowest levels of corruption

(1) Corruption is pervasive
(2) Most government
structures are corrupt
(3) Only some government
structures are corrupt
(4) Corruption is rare

18. Personal
Experiences with
Corruption

Respondents’ answer to Questions 42-43: “Did
you personally(43)/anyone among your
relatives or close friends(42) have to bribe a
government employee in the last three
months?”

(0) no
(1) would rather not tell
(2) yes

19.Government’s
Effort to Solve
Current
Problems

Respondents’ answer to Question 47: “Do you
think the government is doing a decent job in
trying to solve the current problems?”
ranging from the most to the least effort

(1) Yes, they are doing everything
possible
(2) They are trying but face too
many obstacles
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(3) They do only what will help
them to stay in power
(4) No, their main goal is to survive
to the next elections
(5) No, they don’t care about how
people live

20. Government
Approval
Ratings

Respondents’ answers to Questions 49-50:
“Do you approve or disapprove of the way
Kurmanbek Bakiev (49)/ Parliament (50) is
handling his/its job?”

21. Individual
Political
Capacity

Respondents’ agreement with the statement
“As an individual, I can do something to
change the current situation in Kyrgyzstan for
the better” (Q.27)

(1) strongly disagree
(2) disagree
(3) uncertain/don’t know
(4) agree
(5) strongly agree

22. Norms of
Democracy
Index

Composite index of the following 3 items:
Q.11. “No matter what a person’s political
beliefs are, he/she is entitled to the same legal
rights and protections as anyone else”
Q.16. “We are more likely to have a healthy
economy if the government allows more
freedom for individuals to do as they wish”
Q.22. “Kyrgyzstan’s government should
become much more open to the public”

Ranges from 3 – “highest
level of disagreement” to 15
– “highest level of
agreement”

23. Tolerance of
Dissent Index

Composite index of the following 3 items:
Q.19. “Generally, the government is tolerant to
criticism from opposition and media”
Q.21. “Today it is less dangerous for citizens to
criticize the government than before March ‘05”
Q.29. “In Kyrgyzstan, demonstrations and
protests are effective in influencing a
government decision”

Ranges from 3 – “highest
level of disagreement” to 15
– “highest level of
agreement”

24. Independent
Media and Free
Expression
Index

Composite index of the following 3 items:
Q.20. “The press should be protected by the law
from persecution by the government”
Q.30. “Private media should exist alongside
state-owned ones”
Q.34. “It is necessary that everyone, regardless
of their views, can express themselves freely”

Ranges from 3 – “highest
level of disagreement” to 15
– “highest level of
agreement”

25. Political
Incapacity Index

Composite index of the following 4 items:
Q.10. “There is no way other than voting that
people like me can influence the actions of the
government”
Q.23. “If an unjust law is passed, I could do
nothing about it”
Q.35. “Sometimes politics and government
seem so complicated that I can’t really
understand what’s going on”
Q.36. “People like me don’t have much say
about what the government does”

Ranges from 4 – “highest
level of disagreement” to 20
– “highest level of
agreement”

26. Overall
Frustration with

Composite index of the following:
Q.17. “Generally, the government can be

Ranges from 7 – “highest
level of disagreement”
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(0) disapprove
(1) 50/50
(2) approve

Government

trusted to implement policies that will improve
people’s situation”
Q.18. “The current government of Kyrgyzstan is
committed to fight corruption”
Q.25. “Anyone with appropriate skills and
qualifications can enter a government agency
and work for it”
Q.31. “Those who are in power today
understand that they were elected to serve
rather than to rule the people”
Q.32. “I feel if I had to seek a court’s protection I
would receive a speedy and fair trial”
Q.33. “The courts in Kyrgyzstan make decisions
independently, without government officials’
interference”
Q.38. “I believe my parliament representative
would follow up on my concern if I express it”

27. Future in
Kyrgyzstan

Respondents’ answer to Question 48: “Please
select only one statement that best describes
your feelings about your own future in
Kyrgyzstan?”

28. Internet
Users Know
More about
Politics

Respondents’ answer to Question 61: “Do you
feel that in general those citizens of
Kyrgyzstan who have Internet access are
better informed about the political events in
the country?”

(0) no
(1) yes

29. Internet
Users Share
Information

Respondents’ answer to Question 59: “Do
you(they) share with them(you) the political
information you (they) receive on the
Internet?”

(0) no
(1) yes
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(denoting highest level of
frustration) to 35 – “highest
level of agreement” (lowest
level of frustration)

(0) already left (online survey)
(1) I will leave the country at the
first opportunity
(2) I love my country but will
have to leave because of the
worsening situation
(3) I will leave temporarily (to
study, earn money) but will
come back
(4) I would like to leave, but
realistically it is not possible
right now
(5) I am not pleased with the
way things are now, but I feel
they will improve so I’ll stay
(6) This is my country and I will
stay and do everything I can to
make the life better here
(7) I love my country and will
never leave it even if the things
go worse
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